

RHODESIA ACCUSES

"In these pages I ask you — you people of the United Kingdom, you people of the older Dominions, you people of the United States of America, you people of Europe — and the respective governments of each one of you ... are you not, perhaps, even as I write, now guilty of and contemplating yet, the perpetration of that final treason: the unconscious furthering of the ends of evil in the name of all that is most holy?"

That is the question asked in this book. — Is it a question that the West can afford to ignore?

by
A.J.A. Peck



A THREE SISTERS SPECIAL

www.rhodesia.nl

CONTENTS

Preface

Chapter 1.	Introduction	7
2.	A Letter to <i>The Times</i>	.11
3.	Reactions to "The Times" Letter	15
4.	Ethical Insanity menaces Central Africa ..	19
5.	The Good Faith of Mr. Macmillan's Government	25
6.	The Seeds of Bitterness: Rhodesia's 1961 Constitution.	.31
7.	The "Sins" of the Rhodesians.	.52
8.	The "Freedom" of African Nationalism ..	76
9.	Todd and Whitehead.	.103
10.	Ethical Insanity in Action.	.125
11.	Thoughts concerning a Solution	144
12.	Postscript.	159
Appendix:	The Middle Road—an Election Manifesto ..	165

PREFACE

The letter reprinted here as Chapter 2 was originally published by *The Times* of London on the 19th November, 1965.

It was reprinted in its entirety six days later by the *East Africa and Rhodesia*, a weekly periodical published in London; it was quoted in *The Rhodesia Herald*, a Salisbury daily newspaper; and, after a further three weeks, it was re-published in full by a Salisbury weekly newspaper, *The Citizen*.

Added to this, it has evoked a flood of correspondence (of which extracts are printed in Chapter 3), together with numerous requests for permission to reproduce and distribute it.

I have, in this book, sought to amplify and to prove the contents of that letter to *The Times*; and, since the Rhodesians have had to endure such constant, prolonged—and often grossly unfair—attacks, I make no apology for presenting only the one side of the case, and for presenting it vigorously. Should my reader suspect my title to have been derived from the title of Zola's *J'accuse*, he will not be incorrect.

A.J.A. Peck.

Salisbury,
Rhodesia.



Twentieth Century Rhodesia —Jameson Avenue, Salisbury.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Rhodesia was born of a vision—the vision of one man, Cecil John Rhodes, who believed that the British way of life was the best and made it his own life's work to spread that British way of life over as much of Africa as possible.

Rhodes died on the 26th March, 1902, a millionaire three times over, gasping for a little air. It had been said of him that when he stood in Cape Town his shadow fell upon the Zambezi.

Born at Bishops Stortford in 1853, he had come seeking a cure for tuberculosis in the sunshine of South Africa, and had stayed to amass his fortune at the Kimberley diamond fields.

The thought then came to him, Rhodes later declared, "to render myself useful". Africa lay to the North—the "Dark Continent"—ruled by despotism, ignorance, witchcraft, slavery, savage tribal warfare and by disease unbounded. To bring light, to bring a nobler way of living, to that Dark Continent seemed to Rhodes to be work worthy of a man. Accordingly, in 1890, he fitted out an expedition to occupy what is today Rhodesia.

The Pioneer Column came to a land in which there were no roads and there were no bridges, no telegraph lines and no electricity. Its inhabitants were totally illiterate, dressed in skins, living in huts of sticks, mud and thatch, and subsisting by the herding of a few scrub cattle and by the scratching of the soil for meagre crops; and the vast majority of the inhabitants were Mashona, living with their huts perched high up in the stone hills in deadly terror of the raiding parties of the Matabele.

The handful of white men brought peace to that ravaged land. Medicine. Education. The fullness of the Western way of life. The indigenous peoples prospered, multiplied.

In 1923, His Majesty King George V thought fit to confer self-government upon Southern Rhodesia; and, under that 1923 Constitution, of which more will be said in Chapter 6, save for the fact that during Federation certain powers were delegated to the Federal Government, the Rhodesians were completely self-governing for the forty-two years prior to the Declaration of Independence.

Surmounting the hard times of the Great Depression, Southern Rhodesia marched steadily forward. The British South Africa Police—a force equalled perhaps only by the Canadian Mounties—and a fine body of District Commissioners, Magistrates and Judges, administered a system of justice second to none, and unbroken peace replaced the previous ceaseless slaughter.

Magnificent roads and bridges spanned the country. Free rural clinics fought pestilence to a standstill. Industry, mining, agriculture and commerce yielded rich fruit. Apart from South Africa—an older country with a vast output of gold—the educational facilities afforded to the indigenous peoples were unsurpassed in the whole continent.

By 1953, Southern Rhodesia could have had Dominion status for the asking.

But no!—the greatness of Rhodes was in the blood of the Rhodesians: in a national Referendum they voted, following the wishes of the United Kingdom, to join Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland—a vast Federation with almost exactly four times the land area of the entire British Isles.

Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern) who had been Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia since 1933, became Prime Minister of the new Federation, to be succeeded in that capacity by Sir Roy Welensky in 1956, when Malvern retired on the grounds of advancing years.

Mr. Garfield Todd replaced Sir Godfrey Huggins as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, only to be compelled to resign in 1958, in circumstances to be outlined in Chapter 9.

Sir Edgar Whitehead, also to be mentioned in

Chapter 9, replaced Mr. Todd as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia until defeated in the General Election of December, 1962, by the Rhodesian Front, first led by Mr. Winston Field, a Marandellas farmer, and then by Mr. Ian Smith.

During the years in office of Mr. Todd, Sir Edgar Whitehead and the Rhodesian Front, five main African nationalist organisations were formed, each being banned in turn:—

- (1) The African National Congress (the A.N.C.)
- (2) The National Democratic Party (the N.D.P.)
- (3) The Zimbabwe African People's Union
(Z.A.P.U.)
- (4) The People's Caretaker Council (the P.C.C.)
- (5) The Zimbabwe African National Union
(Z.A.N.U.)

These various organisations were, essentially, all one and the same organisation resuscitated after repeated bannings, save that the latter two factions, the P.C.C. and Z.A.N.U. represented a split in the African nationalist movement, and were two separate organisations, bitterly hostile to one another, formed and banned at about the same times.

The reasons officially given for the banning of these organisations are set out in Chapters 8 and 9.

Despite all that the enemies, external and internal, of the Federation and of Southern Rhodesia might say and do, Southern Rhodesia strode forward like a young giant within that Federal framework. Criticisms there were—of course ... The white man in Africa is adjudged unclean amongst the peoples of mankind simply because he is white; and I have considered those criticisms in Chapters 6 and 9. Has the white man's "crime" been any more, essentially, than to protect himself and his country from possible degeneration?

Be that as it may, in Salisbury, the capital city of Southern Rhodesia and of the Federation, multi-storey buildings soared upwards. On the Zambezi was built the greatest man-made lake in history—Lake Kariba. The three Territories flourished, and wealth poured into Rhodesia's poor relation, Nyasaland.

All Southern Rhodesia asked was her Independence

so far as was possible within that Federal structure. In Chapter 6 we see how, in 1961, the Rhodesians were squalidly tricked by those whom they believed they had most reason to trust.

And, in 1963, as is recounted in Chapter 5, the very Federation itself was destroyed by resort to a subterfuge desperately unworthy of rulers of—

*This royal throne of kings, this sceptered isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise . . .
This precious stone set in the silver sea . . .*

Nyasaland was given independence, and re-named "Malawi". Northern Rhodesia was given independence, and re-named "Zambia". Neither Territory had ever before been self-governing.

And Southern Rhodesia, now named simply "Rhodesia", the richest and most sturdily self-sufficient of the three, who had been self-governing for 42 years, who had sacrificed her independence in order to join the Federation—a Federation later to be destroyed by Britain—whose Electorate had been promised independence in 1961?—was she given *her* independence?

No!

On the 11th of November, 1965, after two years of barren negotiation to be considered in Chapter 11, the Rhodesian Government, under the leadership of Mr. Ian Smith, felt compelled to declare Rhodesia independent. Wilson's Government immediately imposed the most vindictive sanctions possible. And the prospect of war upon Rhodesia has "not been ruled out" . . .

In these pages I ask you—you people of the United Kingdom, you people of the older Dominions, you people of the United States of America, you people of Europe—and the respective governments of each of you . . . are you not, perhaps, even as I write, now guilty of, and contemplating yet, the perpetration of that final treason: the unconscious furthering of the ends of evil in the name of all that is most holy?

CHAPTER 2

LETTER PUBLISHED IN THE TIMES ON THE 19TH NOVEMBER, 1965.

Sir,

In the December, 1962, General Election in Southern Rhodesia I stood as a United Federal Party candidate against the Rhodesian Front; and in the May, 1965, General Election I was one of the three European candidates who stood as Independents, again opposing the Rhodesian Front.

I am Rhodesian-born but my name derives from the Peak District of Derbyshire, I have a large number of relatives in Britain, my grandfather's business is still in existence in Wigan and in Manchester, my mother was born within the sound of Bow Bells, I joined the Royal Air Force on leaving school during the last war—soon to be boarded out, however, on medical grounds—and I obtained a degree at Oxford University.

I say these things to indicate my own close ties with Britain and to establish that I am myself no slavish follower of Mr. Smith's Government.

But of one thing I am positive: the ordinary white Rhodesian's belief in the dishonesty, the lack of integrity, of successive British governments, together with his total distrust of these governments, have been as much a contributing factor to the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence as any policies of Mr. Smith himself.

The people of Rhodesia have been compelled to watch successive "permanent" constitutions imposed at short intervals upon Zambia. The Monckton Commission, agreed to by the Federal Government as an instrument for the framing of a new Constitution for the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, was used, instead, as an implement for its destruction.

I myself closed my own offices for a few days in order to act as Sir Edgar Whitehead's chauffeur and

personal assistant when he toured Rhodesia in 1961 seeking to persuade the Rhodesian Electorate to accept that 1961 Constitution. I was then assured, and believed with good reason, that—apart from the Federal ties—this new Constitution would confer upon Rhodesia the equivalent of Dominion Status.

What was the outcome?

This Constitution that I personally strove as hard as I could to help introduce was said to be contained in two White Papers (Nos. 1399 and 1400) entitled "Southern Rhodesia Constitution: Summary of Proposed Changes" and "Southern Rhodesia Constitution: Detailed Provisions", respectively. However, I was to find to my dismay, when the new Constitution was finally promulgated, that an additional provision—Section 111—had been introduced into that Constitution, which purportedly gave to her Majesty the Queen almost unlimited powers to intervene, by means of Orders in Council, in the affairs of Rhodesia.

This particular section had appeared in the previous Constitution, the 1923 Constitution, as Section 61. *It did not appear in the two White Papers, by means of which the new Constitution was supposedly presented to the Electorate of Rhodesia, in any shape or form whatsoever; when it voted for the new Constitution, the Rhodesian Electorate had no means at all of knowing that this section would be inserted in the new Constitution; and the Rhodesian Electorate would, in fact, have almost certainly rejected the 1961 Constitution had these provisions appeared in the two White Papers.*

It is today my firm and bitter conviction—and I speak as a practising lawyer—that the British Government was hence, in regard to this 1961 Constitution, a party to a confidence trick which, if practised by one member of the public upon another member of the public in everyday life, might well have resulted in criminal proceedings.

Today this 1961 Constitution is, after only four short years, regarded as obsolete! Great Heavens!—Why?—are British-designed constitutions, even though constitutions commonly purport to be reasonably permanent structures, in fact designed, like American

automobiles, to have a planned obsolescence? Do four short years make such a vast difference in the circumstances of a peaceful nation?

And, if our Constitution has not worked entirely satisfactorily, the factor preponderantly to blame is, surely, African nationalism?—African nationalism that at first accepted the constitutional proposals, but thereafter rejected them and waged a terrorist campaign to compel all Africans to refrain from voting; and, by now condemning that 1961 Constitution, is not the British Government setting the stamp of its approval upon such terrorism?

Mr. Wilson's grandiloquent phrase "majority rule" is a terminological inexactitude masquerading in the purple robes of a Pontius Pilate. Mr. Wilson well knows that in Ghana there is no "majority rule": one man rules—Dr. Nkrumah; he well knows the position to be the same in numerous other African states; and he well knows that "majority rule" in Rhodesia would today, inevitably, bring dictatorship by one particular man.

For, doing Mr. Wilson the honour of believing that he is not prepared to sacrifice the people of Rhodesia merely in order to curry favour with the Afro-Asian bloc and preserve his markets, can his and the American governments be anything other than ethically dishonest with themselves or ethically unbalanced?

Is it ethical to apply so-called "good" principles in circumstances in which they have no application?—such as giving the vote to ignorant illiterates who have not the slightest idea of how to use it?

Is it ethical to love your neighbour *more* than yourself rather than *as* yourself?—so indulging in the lunacy of handing to the Communists on a plate (if I may mix my metaphors) sundry perfect springboards for expansion in Africa, while spending millions in money and thousands of lives in opposing Communist expansion in Vietnam by force?

Is it ethical to have a double standard—one for whites and one for blacks—so that Mr. Bottomley can in a radio broadcast this very evening wax righteously eloquent over the mote of the misdeeds of Mr. Smith, yet overlook with unctuous rectitude the beam of the

47 deaths in the Nigerian elections, reported in the very same broadcast?

Many of we Rhodesians have striven hard and conscientiously towards the goal of a united Rhodesia; but I can assure you, Sir, that we are not helped by the antics that your successive governments have on occasion indulged in, in the name of morality, and certainly not by Mr. Wilson's present policy of seeking to reduce our beloved country, in which our parents lie buried, to a Congo—even on the pretext that Britain should strangle her child lest others resort to the club.

Yours truly,

AJ.A. Peck.

Salisbury.

12th November, 1965.

CHAPTER 3

REACTIONS TO "THE TIMES" LETTER

Lord Coleraine writing to the Times:—

"You have done a great service to your country in publishing today Mr. Peck's moving (and for many of us shaming) letter from Salisbury, Rhodesia.

"You have broken the conspiracy of silence which has so clouded consideration of the tragic events of the past 10 days. We, the unconsidered British people, are much in your debt.

"Why have we been encouraged to believe that Rhodesia's rebellion is the work of a minority of Facist extremists in Rhodesia, and that moderate opinion there is utterly opposed to it?

"Why do we accept, without question, the proposition that majority rule is right for Rhodesia at this stage of that country's development and that, because most white Rhodesians disagree with us, they need their heads examining?

"Why do we believe that unless we support a policy which, in the opinion of many persons well qualified to judge, can end only in humiliation for us or in the ultimate of ruin for Rhodesia, we are traitors to our country?

"The reason is clear. Extreme pressure is being exerted by Government and opposition alike to ensure that only one side of the question is put before the British people."

From a Baronet residing in the United Kingdom:—

"I would like you to know how profoundly I and many others agree with your letter published in the Times on November 19th."

From a Colonel in London:—

"To many of us the recent happenings at Government level have remained a mystery.

"The object of this letter is to assure you that there are many thousands of people in this country who cannot see the justice or sense in a political ideology of 'one man one vote.' Recent history of experiments in democracy in other parts of Africa should surely show the hypocrisy of such ideas.

"Good luck to you all in your stand. I know that allegiance is still to the Queen and not to the British Government."

From a Rhodesian in Salisbury (ex-R.A.F. W/Commander, D.S.O., D.F.C. and Bar):—

"Just a note to let you know that I am proud of you and your letter to the Times.

"It reflects a fair minded person's view and a true Rhodesian.

"When I see and hear what Wilson and Bottomley say and do, I at times feel almost ashamed of the 8 years of my life that I served in the R.A.F. in the U.K.—Well done."

From a former Colonial Servant in Southern England:—

"Having served for 12 1/2 years in the administration of . . . , the last two and a half years under Independence, I can justify fully the view I give to all with whom I discuss Rhodesia:—

"It is as simple as this:— If Mr. Smith continued as before U.D.I., sooner or later 'one man, one vote' would be forced upon Rhodesia, either directly by or through pressure from the U.N. and U.S.A.

"The effect of this would be the destruction of Christian civilisation, integrity, moral values and prosperity, built up by succeeding generations of our fellow-Britons, for the African (and Asian) cannot co-operate on our standards—my own last 2 1/2 years in a responsible position in...have satisfied me beyond all doubt that 'one man, one vote' means corruption and degeneration from those in power. How often did Africans lower down the 'scale'—and Asians, too—say to me before I left: 'Whom are we going to turn to when you are gone?' 'The belief in 'one man, one vote' is a fallacy.

It never is one man to one vote. I conducted a few elections in the capital city, the last under Independence. Whatever safeguards I tried to impose, it was impossible to keep lorry loads of voters from casting votes, by 'personation' for the Party which paid them each a shilling or more. The Polling Clerks themselves, when increasingly Africans, were either unreliable or open to coercion. "And when, in February, 1964—the last election in the capital!!—four of the six vacancies on the City Council went to the opposition party in the country's politics, the Minister (of the Ruling Party) within 10 days appointed to the Council three (one wonders why he did not make it four!) members of the Ruling Party's Youth Wing—two of these had recently been released from prison by the P.M., where they had been sent by an as yet incorrupt Court for kidnapping, etc."

From a former Colonial Civil Servant in Surrey:—

"Your letter printed in the Times today is magnificent!—and unanswerable!"

From a Londoner:—

"The worry that has been gnawing at my vitals is the suspicion that the U.K. Government in 1961, when the constitution of that year was passed in Westminster, played a dirty trick on the white Rhodesians as between the wording of the White Papers Nos. 1399 and 1400 and the definitive legal jargon of the then new constitution. Ian Smith has said repeatedly that the so-called entrenched clauses were re-drawn at the last moment and give the U.K. government powers in excess of what the white Rhodesians read into the White Papers."

From an ordinary Englishman in Worcestershire:—

"So as one traitor to another may I wish you the best of luck."

Adv. W. A. Hope, a barrister in Johannesburg, wrote to the Times:—

"I lived in Rhodesia for six years, until with the dissolution of the Federation, it seemed that my reason for going there had ceased to exist. During that time I knew Mr. Peck as a professional colleague and as a deep and sincere political thinker. I would like to confirm, in an uncensored letter, that his letter accurately reflects the state of mind into which most Rhodesians of moderate and liberal views, in other words, the majority of Rhodesians, feel themselves to have been driven."

CHAPTER 4

ETHICAL INSANITY MENACES CENTRAL AFRICA

The following, which is a reprint of an article by the writer that appeared in the Rhodesia Herald on the 24th October, 1960, may have a slight historical interest.

It excited some discussion in Rhodesia; it was, amongst other things, translated into Greek; it was, so I am told, copied and circulated unknown to me amongst Members of the British House of Commons; and the fears expressed have already found partial fulfilment in the dismemberment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

(Mrs. Burton, the white woman mentioned, was in 1960 burnt to death by African political hooligans in what is now Zambia. Miss Phombeya, the young black woman, was vigorously demonstrating in Blantyre in the same year when a white policeman accidentally trod on her toe—a Royal Commission was appointed to go into the matter! Harare is an African township outside Salisbury.)

Ethical insanity surely presents Western civilisation with one of the deadliest menaces of the Twentieth Century: for the end product of ethical insanity is ethical suicide — honourable hara-kiri. A. N. Whitehead attributed the fall of the Roman Empire to this cause; it may be because of it that we are seeing the decline of the British Empire in our own era; and, like a deadly hamadryad poised to strike, the ethical insanity of sections of the British people daily menaces us all, white and black, here in Central Africa.

It can take one or more of three forms.

1. A man may come to believe that the Second Great Commandment reads, not "Love thy neighbour as thyself", but "Love thy neighbour *more* than thyself". He accordingly proceeds quite needlessly to sacrifice himself, or his society, for another person or for another society.

2. Or, secondly, ethical insanity may simply distort a man's vision. The death of Mrs. Burton becomes a bagatelle: the graze on Miss Phombeya's foot of cosmic importance. A riot in a London housing estate is nothing: a riot in Harare symptomatic of dastardly oppression. Michael Scott in South Africa is a Joan of Arc: Michael Scott in London, demonstrating against atomic weapons, is simply an offence against good taste.

3. Thirdly, a man may be ethically insane because he has come to have a blind belief in the efficacy of so-called "good" principles quite regardless of the circumstances in which they are applied.

This third form of ethical madness gives the vote to Ghanaians and Sudanese who can neither read nor write and who do not understand the need for the most elementary constitutional precautions. The inevitable consequence?—dictatorship, with civil liberty lost for ever.

Or, again, this third form of ethical insanity gives "National self-determination" to African "nations", oblivious to the fact that such "nations" often do not exist as nations—only as tribes; to the fact that the most advanced trend in Europe is towards amalgamation into larger entities rather than towards a splitting into nations; and to the fact that this policy in Africa may be merely creating a political vacuum that may well be filled by the Communist countries.

For the deadliest fallacy of the Twentieth Century may well be the widely-held belief that goodness consists in depriving oneself of the power to do good.

The British working man who would not dream of depriving the Metropolitan Police of the sheer physical power to apprehend a rapist or a teddy boy, will go to a Scarborough Conference and seek, by voting against the equipping of his country's forces with nuclear weapons, to deprive his country of the power to defend itself against the gangsters of the Communist countries.

And he is prepared to surrender the vast resources of all Africa—its iron, its copper, its gold, its manpower—to the East, so permitting Communism steadily and inexorably to envelop the earth.

Western Man today seems to forget that, in the absence of the power to carry them out, good intentions are worthless; and to deprive oneself of that power is wicked surrender to the forces of evil; and, unless he revises his outlook, Western Man may indeed find himself doomed to extinction, like the dinosaurs, as biologically unfitted for survival, due in this case, not to physical gigantism, but to a weird "ethical" gigantism that will have overwhelmed and obliterated his reasoning powers and his good judgment, leaving him a helpless prey to those races not so disabled.

For goodness is, above all, empirical; and true goodness must always be based upon a close and anxious study of existing situations. As soon as "goodness" ceases to be empirical, as soon as it becomes a blind belief in principles of conduct regardless of situations, it ceases to be goodness and becomes deadly evil, like the excesses of the Holy Inquisition, like the dogma of those who from religious motives deny their children the advantages of medical science, like the cheap, easy and contemptible fervour of the political extremist, who will plunge a nation into chaos because he lacks either the courage, the ability, or the integrity to think hard enough.

For this reason it is criminal negligence to accord the franchise to those unfitted to exercise it, since the correlative of political rights is the duty to fit oneself to exercise those rights, and recent ghastly happenings in the Congo and elsewhere, have shown all too clearly that those who have been screaming most loudly for political rights have failed lamentably to fulfil the corresponding duty.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that political constitutions are social instruments evolved to modify and control relations that are fundamentally relations of physical force; and, should they once crumble, through the ignorance of the electorate or for any other reason, less desirable relations of force come into being and may become semi-permanent, if not entirely permanent.

Has the British people, particularly, lost its sense of mission? Has it lost the ethical drive behind its

former efforts at overseas expansion? If so, why?—because the British people have become bewildered and confused in their notion of what is "right" and what is "wrong"? World fashions of thought come and go; and the Englishman is surely as much blinded today by fashionable presuppositions as the Englishman of the age of Queen Victoria or Queen Elizabeth I?

It has become, for example, the custom to snigger at the phrase "the White Man's Burden". Yet Rhodesia itself came into being only because Mr. Rhodes believed in that White Man's burden—because he desired to be of utmost service to mankind, and he sincerely believed that he could be of utmost service by spreading the British way of life as widely as possible, this being the happiest and best mode of life for all; and Britain's failure has lain, surely, not in taking up "the White Man's Burden", but in not taking it up fully enough?

This White Man's Burden, which we must today call "the Civilised Man's Burden", lies firstly in the inculcating of civilised values: Loyalty to the Second Great Commandment (and "partnership" is no more than the practical implementation of that Commandment), belief in fair play and in the importance and dignity of the individual, belief in the importance of personal integrity, of the personal freedoms and of the Rule of Law, understanding of the importance of tradition and constitutional procedures and safeguards, and so forth.


Has it not been a world disaster that, magnificent as Britain has been in introducing integrity, sound administration and the Rule of Law, she has in the administrative sphere, with her somewhat Kiplingesque contempt for "lesser breeds without the law", with her rigid caste system, with her failure to accord equality of opportunity, and with her paternalistic administration by petty officialdom, perhaps failed to assume the Civilised Man's Burden fully enough, and so has tended to outrage the personal dignity of subject peoples and made them only anxious to see the last of her? If only Britain had succeeded in welding the British Empire into one great people!

Similarly, Britain has surely failed to assume the

Civilised Man's Burden fully in the economic sphere? She has surely failed dismally to develop commercially and industrially countries such as India and Nyasaland; and has left them seething and discontented swamps of poverty—and, not only do we have to pay for Britain's failure: she seems to be attempting to place the blame for that failure upon us\

It is both our duty and our mission that we, the civilised peoples of Central Africa, both white and black, take up that Civilised Man's Burden. We, both black and white Rhodesians, must never cease to struggle to retain power in the hands of civilised men—in the hands of men loyal to a Christian-type ethic and with apprehensions quickened to observe the importance of maintaining constitutional safeguards.

It is our duty to bring freedom from want, freedom from encroachments upon human dignity, and opportunity to know daily the joy and fullness of living to every person in Central Africa; and, since we are not ethically insane, we must and shall, by force if needs be, preserve our country from the ethical vagaries of the insane overseas, from the dangers of its relapsing into despotic barbarism, and from the dangers of its being dragged helplessly into the Communist prison camp.



SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT IN AFRICA SINCE JUNE, 1965*

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. 1965. June 19: Algeria. | 5. 1966. Jan. 3: Upper Volta. |
| 2. Nov. 25: The Congo. | 6. Jan. 15: Nigeria. |
| 3. Dec. 22: Dahomey. | 7. Feb. 23: Ghana. |
| 4. 1966. Jan. 1: C.A. Republic. | |

*i.e. in the past twelve months.

CHAPTER 5

THE GOOD FAITH OF MR. MACMILLAN'S GOVERNMENT*

In the Common Law of Rhodesia, the test of what is "reasonable" is decided by asking the question: "Would a good head of a family (*bonus paterfamilias*) behave in this way in matters affecting his family?"

In this Chapter we are not concerned with the rights and wrongs of the Federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland; nor are we concerned with alleged "betrayals" in other parts of Africa, such as Kenya: we are only concerned to study the conduct of the British Government so far as it concerned the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and to ask ourselves: "Would any Rhodesian be behaving reasonably if he trusted any British Government thereafter?"

The Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland formally came into being on the 3rd September, 1953, with Sir Godfrey Huggins as its first Prime Minister. Sir Godfrey retired as Lord Malvern, due to advancing years, on the 1st November, 1956, and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Sir Roy Welensky.

The three territories of the Federation—Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland—formed a natural economic group; and, economically, the three Territories benefited enormously in consequence of Federation, for much the same reasons as the countries of the European Common Market have prospered.

In March, 1956, Lord Malvern proposed in a letter to the British Government that the less qualified persons in the Federation (i.e. mainly Africans) be given greater voting rights, and that the Federation be given a new Constitution that would confer full self-government and independence upon the Federation, but with any safeguards and restrictions thought to be necessary safeguarded by a treaty with the United Kingdom.

* See Sir Roy Welensky's "4000 Days" (Collins).

In February, 1957, Sir Roy Welensky formally proposed in a letter to the British Government that a conference should be convened in 1960 to consider the date on which the Federation should be accorded complete independence, and the conditions under which it should be granted. Sir Roy made it quite clear that, in his view, there should be no question of the Federation being broken up.

In consequence, in that same year, the United Kingdom Government publicly announced that the conference to review the Federal Constitution would be held, and said:—

"Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland have already made it clear and take this opportunity of reaffirming that they are opposed to any proposal either for the amalgamation into a unitary state of the Territories now composing the Federation or for the secession of any of those Territories from the Federation . . . The purpose of the conference is to review the Constitution in the light of the experience gained since the inception of Federation and in addition to agree on the constitutional advances that may be made for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth."

In the meanwhile, two series of events were taking place over which the Federal Government had no control, since these events were—in terms of the Federal Constitution—matters that came under the control of the governments of the constituent Territories: the respective African nationalist parties were succeeding in creating widespread disturbances in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland, and the governments of those Territories (which were in effect the United Kingdom itself, since these were non-self-governing Colonial territories) were yielding to those pressures.

Let no-one delude himself into believing that, where an African nationalist movement gains the upper hand, any African has any freedom *not* to join the ranks of

that movement; and it is, for this reason, extremely difficult to gauge the degree of genuine support that African nationalism has at any given time.*

In 1957, African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia already had its Saviour Figure in the person of Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the United National Independence Party; and, on the 6th July, 1958, Mr. Henry Chipembere brought back from London a volatile medical doctor deliberately intended to be the Saviour Figure of African nationalism in Nyasaland—Dr. Hastings Banda, whose slogan was to be henceforward "To Hell with Federation!"

How the British Government chose to abdicate in Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia, because it did not have the simple courage to retain law and order, is a different story; but, in Nyasaland particularly, the position was soon reached that the "police" of the African nationalists were controlling the country, not—in this supposedly Colonial Territory—the official police appointed and paid by the British Government. Perhaps the course of events can be best epitomised by recounting the incident that happened on the 15th February, 1962, when Mr. Duncan Sandys the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, lunched with Sir Roy Welensky, Mr. Julian Greenfield a member of the Federal Cabinet, and Lord Alport the United Kingdom High Commissioner.

Sir Roy remarked that with resolution and the firm exercise of authority it would not be difficult to keep Nyasaland peacefully in the Federation.

"No, Roy," replied Sandys. "You see, we British have lost the will to govern."

Sir Roy suffered a severe migraine that evening. Lord Alport went home and vomited.

In 1960, Belgium had abdicated its responsibilities in the Congo (and yet now has the impertinence to assist in imposing sanctions against Rhodesia!), and that Congo, which is right on the borders of the Federation, collapsed into chaos, with destruction, rape and murder taking place on an enormous scale; and it was with some incredulity that Rhodesians watched Britain and America

* See Chapter 8.

supporting the efforts of a United Nations task force under the ego-centric Irishman, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, to reduce that one portion of the Congo in which law and order was being maintained—Katanga—to the same shambles as the rest of the Congo.—"Are the American and British governments *mad*?" the average Rhodesian asked himself.

However that may be, under the pressure of that same rape and murder and arson that was taking place in the Congo, the British Government's will to govern in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland crumbled; and, with a series of White Papers, Constitutional Proposals and Constitutions—some of them almost as absurd as to have found their genesis at the Mad Hatter's Tea Party—these two Territories were given steady constitutional advancement towards full independence.

But what of the Federation itself?

Life in Britain was palmy; and, in Mr. Harold Macmillan's jaunty words, Britons had "never had it so good". But this was election year, and the one cloud on Mr. Macmillan's sunny political horizon was Sir Roy Welensky's importunate demand for Independence for the Federation. Accordingly, Mr. Macmillan resorted to that favourite device of Prime Ministers in distress and, with the reluctant agreement of Sir Roy, appointed a Royal Commission—the Monckton Commission.

Let there be no doubt about this: Welensky only agreed on the 6th July, 1959, to the appointment of this Commission in consequence of immense pressure brought to bear on him by Macmillan: and he *only* agreed on condition that the sole terms of reference of the Commission were to be "to advise the five Governments in preparation for the 1960 Review on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to achieving the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953 including the preamble".

Let there be no misunderstanding. *It was solemnly agreed thereby that the sole terms of reference of the Monckton Commission were to be that of ascertaining how to improve the 1953 Constitution of the Federation, and IT WAS THEREFORE AGREED BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION THAT ANY QUESTION*

OF WHETHER THE FEDERATION SHOULD BE
BROKEN UP WAS EXCLUDED FROM ITS TERMS
OF REFERENCE.

Yet, after only four short months, on the 24th November, 1959, Mr. Harold Macmillan stated in the British House of Commons: "... I regard the Commission as free in practice to hear all points of view from whatever quarter and on whatever subject."

The following day, Macmillan sent a secret message to Welensky in which he declared that he had not yielded and would not yield an inch on the Commission's terms of reference, and that he was sure that the Federation would gain by letting people talk, provided that the recommendations of the Commission were strictly within the terms of reference; and, in answer to Welensky's protests about Macmillan's statement in Parliament, Macmillan stated emphatically that the British Government had no intention of making an extension of the Commission's terms of reference to include secession: they had agreed to them and they would stand by them. Every member of the Commission had, after all, accepted on this basis.

But, before the Commission sat, Macmillan toured Africa; and, in several places, he said: "I recognise that the wind of change is blowing through Africa ..."

When he arrived in Salisbury Macmillan assured Welensky: "It is certainly not the function of the Commission to destroy the Federation: on the contrary, it is the means by which the Federation can go forward. This is quite clear from its terms of reference."

The Monckton Commission duly sat; and ...

One of the chief recommendations contained in its Report published on the 11th October, 1960, was that the question of secession should be discussed at the 1960 Federal Review Conference, and that the British Government should make clear its intention of permitting secession, subject to certain conditions.

An inconclusive conference was indeed held ...

Then, on the 5th November, 1962, Lord Alport advised Welensky that the British Government had agreed that Nyasaland should be permitted to withdraw from the Federation.

And, on the morning of Friday the 29th March, 1963, Mr. Harold Macmillan entrusted Mr. R. A. Butler with the task of advising Sir Roy Welensky that Northern Rhodesia would also be permitted to secede from the Federation.

On that day, Macmillan had invited Sir Roy to lunch, and Sir Roy felt himself compelled to reply to Mr. Butler: "First Secretary, will you ask one of your officials to tell Mr. Macmillan that neither I nor any member of my delegation will be able to go to his luncheon today. I don't want to be discourteous, but I cannot accept the hospitality of a man who has betrayed me and my country."

Is it any wonder that, from then on, Rhodesians felt themselves to be even less able to rely upon the integrity of any British government?—and that Mr. Smith found himself unable to accept Mr. Wilson's bland proposals for the appointment of yet another Royal Commission (the terms of reference of which were in dispute within twenty-four hours)?

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland formally came to an end on the 31st December, 1963.

CHAPTER 6

THE SEEDS OF BITTERNESS: RHODESIA'S 1961 CONSTITUTION

Perhaps one may say that Mr. Macmillan's Government had no alternative other than to end the Federation?

—Then let us, in this Chapter, briefly outline the circumstances leading to the introduction of Rhodesia's 1961 Constitution, and contrast, largely by means of quotations from official documents, the Constitution that the Rhodesian Electorate was promised with the Constitution that the Rhodesian Electorate was eventually given.

The conclusion is inescapable that the British Government of the day was guilty of deliberate collusion in leading the Rhodesian Electorate to believe, and to go on believing, that Rhodesia would be given her Independence in all but a few trifling details—in return for acceptance by that Electorate of constitutional changes that would immediately enfranchise many more Africans, and that would at the same time make it inevitable that Africans would eventually have the controlling interest in Rhodesia's political affairs.

The predominantly white Electorate kept to its share of the bargain; and, in the interests of national unity, and in order to extend the hand of friendship to the African people, accepted by an overwhelming majority the Constitution offered to it.

The British Government, however, did not keep to *its* share of the bargain. It will be seen in these pages how significantly the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution, when promulgated, differed from the Constitution that Britain offered to Rhodesia in the two White Papers.

The fair and impartial reader is compelled, in the light of these documents, to ask: Is not the present conflict between Great Britain and Rhodesia directly attributable to that lack of honesty on the part of the British Government in 1961? And: *vis-a-vis* Great Britain, is not Rhodesia now morally—and if the most solemn undertakings made in writing by the Government

of one country to the electorate of another mean anything at all—even *legally ENTITLED* to her Independence?

Shortly after he came to power, Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, declared that it was essential that the "reserved clauses" in the Rhodesian Constitution should be deleted because there were increasing signs of an inclination on the part of the British Government to interfere in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. He stated publicly:—

"During these last few years there have been rather ominous signs of an intention to try to interfere in our affairs ... and, seeing this, I became more than ever determined that the reservations on the Constitution must go."

These "reserved clauses" were contained in Sections 28 and 31, of the 1923 Constitution, and they were:—

- "28. Unless he shall have previously obtained Our instructions upon such Law through a Secretary of State, or unless such Law shall contain a clause suspending the operation thereupon, the Governor shall reserve (for the assent of His Majesty)—
- (a) any Law, save in respect of the supply of arms, ammunition or liquor to natives whereby natives may be subject or made liable to any conditions, disabilities or restrictions to which persons of European descent are not also subjected or made liable;
 - (b) any Law which may repeal, alter or amend, or is in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with such provisions of these Our Letters Patent, as may under these Our Letters Patent be repealed or altered by the Legislature;
 - (c) any Law constituting the Legislative Council passed in pursuance of section 2 of these Our Letters Patent;
 - (d) any Law which may repeal, alter or amend, or is in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the Land Apportionment Act,

1930, of the Legislature of the Colony.*

31. It shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, to disallow any Law within one year from the date of the Governor's assent thereto, and such disallowance, on being made known by the Governor by speech or message to the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly, or by Proclamation in the *Gazette* shall annul the Law from the day when the disallowance is so made known."

These may be summarised (I quote Sir Edgar) as the power "to advise the Sovereign to withhold assent to Bills of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia or to annul Acts already passed by it" and the power "to exercise control over matters relating to the Native Departments".

A Constitutional Conference was accordingly held towards the end of 1960, attended by representatives of the Rhodesian Government, the Rhodesian Opposition, Rhodesian African nationalism and the British Government, all of whom (with only the Opposition abstaining) agreed on a new Constitution for Rhodesia.

Mr. Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the delegation of African nationalists, stated:—

"We are to have a new Constitution which is an achievement resulting from the pressure of the National Democratic Party—a thing never before thought of in this country. We feel that the new provisions have given us a certain amount of assurance that the country will not pursue policies which mean that Africans would be perpetually unable to control their country."

In a statement broadcast by radio on the 8th February, 1961, Sir Edgar Whitehead declared:—

"I am well aware that some people have expressed fears of being sold down the river without even knowing what was going on. But I can repeat the assurance which I have given to you so often, that no new Constitution can come into force in Southern Rhodesia until the Electorate have en-

* Note that the clear implication of this sub-section is that the retention of the Land Apportionment Act was thought to be in the interests of Africans.

dorsed the proposals. As a number of matters remain to be finalised, it is unlikely that a White Paper setting out the terms of the proposed new Constitution can be ready for your consideration before the end of April or early May. After the White Paper has been prepared, at least eighty thousand copies will have to be printed to ensure that all of you can obtain a copy. It is therefore not anticipated that it will be possible to hold a Referendum earlier than the middle of June, as I am most anxious to ensure that everyone has ample time to study and debate the proposals."

It will be noted that Sir Edgar thus, in effect, gave the most solemn assurance to the people of Rhodesia that the "new Constitution" would be the Constitution set out in "the White Paper". This is the crux of the matter: the Rhodesians were promised the Constitution set out in *"the White Paper"*.

On the 22nd February, 1961, in a public speech at a Special Congress of the Southern Rhodesia Division of the United Federal Party, Sir Edgar declared:—

"When we started with these negotiations I had one primary aim in view—and that was to get the restrictions removed from our Constitution.

Now if these proposals are adopted and if, subsequently, the Electorate endorse them at the Referendum, *it means that the Conference we have finished a few weeks ago will be the last Constitutional Conference that will be held in Southern Rhodesia ...*

I am rather well up on our present reservations at the moment. In fact I have found some I never knew existed until I started these negotiations, but in every case the present reservations are entirely for the protection of Africans with no mention of any other race at all. *Under the new proposals protection is given to people of any race of this country for all time.* That, I believe, is a major and most important amendment.

I am satisfied that these provisions will be more effective than a Secretary of State who has to ask advice from people who know nothing about this

country at all and who arrives at a sort of chance decision. I believe that we have now got the whole of this on a local basis and once it is adopted and becomes law *we shall never suffer this interference again from outside . . .*

I want to make another thing clear. I told you at the beginning that we had held our last Conference. *The provisions of the new proposals are that future amendments to the Constitution will rest with us here in Southern Rhodesia . . .*

We are determined that our rights shall only be changed when the people of every one of the principal racial groups in this country want it, and I believe that that is a novel proposition. I wasn't going to leave that power in London for all the tea in China, because you might have a Labour Government one day which would be quite agreeable to making changes we could never accept. So I believe that we have given you a real guarantee for the future."*

Having read these undertakings given by Sir Edgar Whitehead to the Rhodesian Electorate in 1961, with the full knowledge and concurrence of the British Government, my readers may—at the very least—be puzzled to account for the subsequent insertion of Section 111 into the new Constitution.

The Rhodesian Electorate was told, not once, but many times, that the new Constitution would be *as set out in the two White Papers (Cmnd. 1399 and Cmnd. 1400)*. These White Papers, it must be emphasized, were *British White Papers* issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office in London, *i.e.* The White Papers were *prepared and printed by the British Government*. Further, these constitutional proposals were actually *the subject of a formal debate in the British House of Commons*.

The Rhodesian Electorate was asked to vote in a Referendum held on the 26th July, 1961, either for or against the proposed Constitution *as set out in the two White Papers*. All Ballot Officers were, in fact, given the following written instructions:—

* The italics in these passages are as in the official, printed version of this speech, issued by the United Federal Party.

"Each registered voter shall be given a ballot form and shall take it to a cubicle and shall vote for or against the proposals contained in Parliamentary White Papers, Command 1399, Part 1, and Command 1400, Part 2, published in the Government Gazette of the 30th June, 1961."

Printed on the actual Ballot Papers were the words:—

"If you are in favour of the proposals make a cross in the square opposite the word 'yes'.

If you are against the proposals make a cross in the square opposite the word 'no'."

The Rhodesian Electorate then well knew that if it voted "yes" it was voting for eventual African rule. Sir Edgar Whitehead, in his radio broadcast to the nation of the 8th February, 1961, had said:—

"Politics in a multi-racial community must involve the formation of genuinely non-racial parties. There is no future for Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a struggle for power between all-European parties, advocating white supremacy for all time, on the one hand, and African nationalist parties, advocating black supremacy for all time on the other."

And Mr. Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had on the 22nd June, 1961, already stated in the British House of Commons:—

"I think it is accepted that as time goes on the African people will get a bigger and bigger say in the country's affairs until, through process of Parliamentary democracy, their greater numbers will give them a controlling interest."

Sir Edgar Whitehead described the Constitutional Proposals in a speech to the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly on the 20th June, 1961, in the following words:—

"I believe firmly that if in ten years' time—after these proposals have been rejected perhaps—those who sit in this Chamber in ten years' time read through this offer and feel they had a

part in getting it rejected that they will never cease to condemn themselves for their stupidity. I honestly believe that many of those who took up the cudgels against the proposals after the Report of the Conference was published as the first White Paper never believed that the final document would take the precise form it has, would never have believed that for instance this great talking point of the Convention would be written into the White Paper by the United Kingdom Government under the cover of the Lion and the Unicorn. I do not think that they believed that the Secretary of State would give a press conference in this country and would inform that press conference that provided the Referendum accepted all the terms, all the reservations would go. I will just read what he actually said. It was taken from a tape at a public press conference that the Secretary of State and myself gave jointly. He was asked 'Will any powers be retained by the British Government to interfere in Southern Rhodesia?' and his reply was 'I am not sure but that on this *you should wait for the White Paper** But as this is such an important point I think *I ought to make it quite clear that apart from a very few entirely formal matters we have found it possible to provide safeguards which will enable us to do away with all the powers at present reserved to the British Government.*"* He was then asked a further question by another reporter: 'Could you explain what the formal matters are, Sir?' and the Secretary of State replied 'Well I think you had better wait and see. They are trifling, of an entirely formal constitutional type.'

And, in the broadcast to the Rhodesian Nation on the 8th February, 1961, that has already been quoted, Sir Edgar Whitehead said:—

"Southern Rhodesia will, of course, not have achieved complete independence in the international sense, but the United Kingdom participation in our internal affairs will have ceased and we shall have reached a position so near to complete independence

• My italics.

that, in practice, it would be impossible for any future United Kingdom Government to put the clock back."

Although the British Government must have been well aware of the contents of this speech—Sir Edgar's speeches were actually being quoted in the British House of Commons—the United Kingdom Government made no attempt to question the accuracy and the truth of such statements.

The "Introduction" to Command 1399, issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and entitled: *"Southern Rhodesia Constitution: Summary of Proposed Changes"*, reads:—

"The Constitution of 1923 conferred responsible government on Southern Rhodesia. Since then it has become an established convention for Parliament at Westminster not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesia Government.

The proposed new Constitution, which is based on the conclusions of the Conference, will reproduce many of the provisions of the existing Constitution. It will eliminate *all** the reserved powers at present vested in the Government of the United Kingdom, save for certain matters set out in paragraph 50."

Paragraphs 49 and 50 of Command 1399 read:—

"49. At present, no amendment can be made to the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, except with the approval of the Government of the United Kingdom.
50. Under the new proposals, Southern Rhodesia will be free to make amendments to any sections of the Constitution without reference to the United Kingdom, with the exception of amendments which would affect:

- (a) the position of the Sovereign and the Governor;
- (b) the right of the United Kingdom Government to safeguard the position regarding:
 - (i) international obligations;

• My Italics.

- (ii) undertakings given by the Government of Southern Rhodesia in respect of loans under the Colonial Stock Acts."

The final paragraph of the "Introduction" to Command 1400, issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and entitled: "*Southern Rhodesia Constitution: Detailed Provisions*" reads:—

"The following paragraphs of this Paper set out, *in detail** the substance of the proposed new Constitution. This will reproduce many of the existing provisions in improved phraseology and will include certain new features, the principal of which are the elimination of *all the reserved powers at present vested in the Government of the United Kingdom** save for certain matters set out in paragraphs 36 and 78."

And paragraphs 36 and 78 read:—

"36. (1) There will be no power of disallowance except where the Act passed:

- (a) is inconsistent with any international obligations imposed on the Queen in relation to Southern Rhodesia; or
- (b) alters to the injury of the stockholders or departs from the original contract in respect of any stock issued under the Colonial Stock Acts by the Southern Rhodesia Government on the London Market.

(2) Such laws may be disallowed by Her Majesty within six months of their being passed. Every law so disallowed will cease to have effect as soon as notice of disallowance is published in the *Gazette*.
78. The provisions which refer to the formal functions within the Constitution of the Sovereign and of the Governor in his capacity as the Sovereign's representative, will not be amendable by the Legislature."

The Rhodesian Electorate are ordinary, straightforward people, mainly of British stock, and they may be pardoned for believing that words mean what they appear to mean, and that these words meant that they

* My italics.

were, in 1961, being promised their Independence—but for a few trifles. Would not the British Electorate, in similar circumstances, have thought the same?

Indeed, when His Excellency the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, opened the Fourth Session of the Ninth Rhodesian Parliament on the 8th August, 1961, he said in his Speech from the Throne:—

"The Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference, which opened in London on the 16th December last, under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and which was resumed in Salisbury in January of this year, was brought to a successful conclusion. The United Kingdom Government subsequently issued a White Paper setting out the provisions for a new Constitution and the *proposals set out in this White Paper** were accepted by the Electorate in a Referendum held on the 26th July. The new Constitution will now be brought into force by stages set out in the introduction to the White Paper.

A Bill will be placed before you, after the passage of the necessary legislation by the United Kingdom Government, *to bring the new Constitution into force and to amend the Electoral Act, 1951, in accordance with the provisions set out in the White Paper** It is anticipated that this will be done in early November and thereafter about six months will be required to register the new voters who will be qualifying for the franchise under the new law; the Delimitation Commission will then be set up to delimit constituencies and electoral districts provided for in the new constitution. It is anticipated that a General Election will become possible in the second half of 1962."

This passage has a double significance . . .

Firstly, His Excellency the Governor was, in terms of the 1923 Rhodesian Constitution, *the personal representative in Southern Rhodesia of Her Majesty the Queen*. Section 27 of that Constitution read:—

* My Italics.

"When any Law has been passed by the Legislature it shall be presented for Our Assent to the Governor, who shall declare according to his discretion, but subject to this Constitution and any instructions in that behalf given him, under Our Sign Manual and Signet, or through a Secretary of State, that he assents in Our name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves the Law for the signification of Our pleasure."

Secondly, here was the personal representative of Her Majesty the Queen once again solemnly assuring the Rhodesians that *"the White Paper"* {i.e. *Cmd. 1399 and Cmd. 1400*) contained the provisions of the new Constitution.

On the 19th June, 1962, His Excellency the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, in opening the Fifth Session of the Ninth Parliament, said the following in his Speech from the Throne:—

"This will be the last Session of the Ninth Parliament, and the last Session to be held under the Constitution which has governed us since 1923.

Last year I informed you that the first step necessary to bring the new Constitution into force was to amend the Electoral Act, 1951, in accordance with provisions set out in the White Paper. The Electoral Amendment Act was, in fact, promulgated on the 3rd January, 1962, and it is intended to bring Chapter III of the new Constitution into force six months later, that is, on the 3rd July, 1962, with the appointment of the Delimitation Commission...

My Ministers have received the clearest assurances from Her Majesty's Government that they cannot revoke or amend the new Constitution."

Further, on the 27th June, 1962, the Member for Shabani, Mr. Dillon, asked Sir Edgar in the Legislative Assembly whether the assurances from Her Majesty's Government that Her Majesty's Government could not revoke or amend the new Constitution, referred to in the Speech from the Throne, were given in writing; and, if so, whether he would lay the documents concerned

upon the Table; and Sir Edgar Whitehead, speaking in his capacity as Prime Minister, replied:—

"I would remind the House that it is not the practice to divulge the nature of confidential communications between Commonwealth Governments. But the honourable members will be aware of the assurances contained in Mr. Butler's statement in the House of Commons on the 8th May, 1962. On that occasion he said:—

'Here I would like to say something about the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Committee of Seventeen which visited London recently to enquire into the Constitutional position of Southern Rhodesia. The Sub-Committee saw my Noble Friend the Foreign Secretary and my right honourable Friends the Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies, and myself. We told the Sub-Committee, as I tell the House now, that the British Government cannot by themselves introduce a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia nor can they set aside the 1961 Constitution. This would be contrary to the convention, which has operated for nearly forty years, of non-interference in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia.' I am in a position to assure the House that the policy of the United Kingdom Government remains unchanged."*

As we shall observe, in order to intervene in Rhodesian affairs there was to be no need for the United Kingdom Government to "introduce a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia" or to "set aside the 1961 Constitution": the new Constitution was in fact to be such that it was purportedly to confer upon the United Kingdom Government all the powers that she was ever likely to need for such intervention.

Indeed, it seems clear—now—that the British Government in reality had at no time any intention

* It is to be noted that Mr. Dillon obviously took it for granted that the new Constitution would, when promulgated, itself preclude British intervention in Rhodesian affairs; and Mr. Butler's statement was, so it would appear, calculated to convey the same impression.

whatsoever of granting Rhodesia that Independence.* Indeed, when Dr. Mabon (Labour) dared mention "Independence" in the Debate on the Constitutional Proposals in the British House of Commons on the 22nd June, 1961, he was abruptly cut short by Mr. Braine, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, in the following revealing exchange:—

"Dr. Mabon: We are by this Constitution giving Southern Rhodesia independence—irrevocably. We can never claim back any of the powers. I believe that is right.

Mr. Braine: I think this is an interesting and important point, but would the hon. Member turn his mind . . . (changes the subject)."

And, when the Bill introducing Rhodesia's 1961 Constitution was finally debated in the House of Commons, on the 8th November, 1961, Mr. Braine said:—

"My right hon. Friend (Mr. Duncan Sandys) proposes to advise Her Majesty to grant, by Order in Council under the Bill, once enacted, a Constitution which will follow the White Paper in every detail. It will include a few minor points for which provision has to be made, which were not mentioned in the White Papers since these, of necessity, were expressed in layman's language."

One of the "few minor points not mentioned in the White Papers" was the inclusion of Section 111 in the new Constitution:—

"Section 111. Full power and authority is hereby reserved to Her Majesty by Order in Council to amend, add to or revoke the provisions of Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 29, 32, 42, 49 and this Section, and any Order in Council made by virtue of this Section may vary or revoke any previous Order so made:

Provided that the power and authority herein reserved to Her Majesty shall not be exercised for the purpose of amending this Section or adding to it a reference to any section of this Constitution not included in this Section on the appointed day."

* See also Chapter 9.

An almost identical provision, Section 61, was to be found in Rhodesia's previous Constitution, the 1923 Constitution, but, *as has been pointed out in Chapter 2, the Rhodesian Electorate would most certainly not have accepted the 1961 Constitution had Section 111 been included in the two White Papers.*

The Sections referred to in Section 111 are as follows:—

"Section 1. (1) There shall be a Governor in and over the Colony of Southern Rhodesia who shall be appointed by Her Majesty by Commission under Her Sign Manual and Signet and shall hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure:

Provided that before any appointment is made under this sub-section, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia shall be consulted concerning the person to be appointed, but the question as to whether or not the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia has been so consulted shall not be enquired into in any court.

(2) Before entering on any of the duties of his office, the Governor shall cause his Commission to be read in the presence of the Chief Justice or some other Judge of the High Court and of such Ministers as can conveniently attend; and shall thereupon take before them the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath for the due execution of the office of Governor in the forms set out in the First Schedule, which oaths the said Chief Justice or other Judge is hereby required to administer.

Section 2. The Governor shall have such powers and duties as are conferred or imposed on him by or under this Constitution or any other law, *and such other powers {not being powers to be exercised in his personal discretion} as Her Majesty may from time to time be pleased to assign to him.** Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any law by which any such powers or duties are conferred or imposed, the Governor shall do and execute all things that belong to his office according to such Instructions, if any, as Her Majesty may from time to time see fit to give him:

Provided that the question of whether or not the

* The clause in italics was not contained in the two White Papers.

Governor has in any matter conformed to or observed any such Instructions shall not be enquired into in any court.

Section 3. (1) During any period when the office of Governor is vacant or the Governor is absent from Southern Rhodesia or is for any other reason unable to perform the functions of his office, those functions shall, during Her Majesty's pleasure, be assumed and performed by such person as Her Majesty may appoint in that behalf by Commission under Her Sign Manual and Signet:

Provided that before any appointment is made under this subsection, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia shall be consulted concerning the person to be appointed, but the question as to whether or not the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia has been so consulted shall not be enquired into in any court.

(2) Before assuming the functions of the office of Governor, any such person as aforesaid shall take the oaths directed by section 1 to be taken by the Governor.

(3) Any such person as aforesaid shall not continue to perform the functions of the office of Governor after the Governor or some other person having a prior right to perform them has notified him that he is about to resume or assume them.

(4) The Governor or any other person as aforesaid shall not, for the purposes of this section, be regarded as absent from Southern Rhodesia or as unable to perform the functions of the office of Governor at any time when there is a subsisting appointment of a deputy under section 4.

Section 5. (1) The Governor shall receive such salary and allowances (if any) as may from time to time be prescribed by a law of the Legislature.

(2) The salary and allowances payable to the Governor shall not be reduced during his continuance in the office of Governor and shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

Section 6. The Legislature of Southern Rhodesia shall consist of Her Majesty and a Legislative Assembly.

Section 29. (1) No Bill shall become law until—

- (a) the Governor has assented thereto in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf and has signed it in token of such assent; or
- (b) in the case of a Bill which under the other provisions of this Constitution is required to be reserved, Her Majesty has given her assent thereto and the Governor has notified the same by proclamation in the *Gazette*.

(2) A Bill shall be presented to the Governor for assent when it has been duly passed by the Legislative Assembly, subject always to compliance with any other requirements of this Constitution that apply to such Bill.

(3) When a Bill is presented to the Governor for assent he shall declare either—

- (a) that he assents or refuses assent thereto; or
- (b) in the case of a Bill which under the other provisions of this Constitution is required to be reserved (but in no other case) that he reserves the Bill for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure.

(4) In every Bill presented to the Governor for assent, the words of enactment shall be as follows:—

'Be it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia.'

Section 32. (1) Any law of the Legislature which has been assented to by the Governor and which appears to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom—

- (a) to alter to the injury of stockholders any of the undertakings given by the Government of Southern Rhodesia at the time of issue of any Southern Rhodesia Government stock registered under the Colonial Stock Act, 1877 (a), or any Act amending or replacing the same; or
- (b) to involve a departure from the original contract in respect of any such stock; or
- (c) to be inconsistent with any obligation imposed on Her Majesty in relation to Southern

Rhodesia by any treaty, convention, agreement or arrangement relating to any country or international or similar organisation, may be disallowed by Her Majesty within six months from the date of the Governor's assent thereto.

(2) Whenever any such law has been disallowed by Her Majesty, the Governor shall cause notice of such disallowance to be published in the *Gazette*.

(3) Every law so disallowed shall cease to have effect as soon as notice of such disallowance is published as aforesaid and thereupon any enactment repealed or amended by or in pursuance of the law disallowed shall have effect as if such law had not been made. Subject to the foregoing provisions of this subsection, the provisions of subsection (2) of section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (b), shall apply in relation to such disallowance as they apply in relation to the repeal of an Act of Parliament.

(4) In this section "Southern Rhodesia Government stock" means stock forming any part of the public debt of Southern Rhodesia.

Section 42. The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia is vested in Her Majesty and may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Governor or such other persons as may be authorised in that behalf by the Governor or by any law of the Legislature.

*Section 49** (1) The Governor may, in Her Majesty's name and on Her Majesty's behalf—

- (a) grant to any person concerned in or convicted of any offence to which this section applies a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions; or
- (b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, from the execution of any sentence passed on that person for such an offence; or
- (c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for

* The equivalent section, Section 58, of Cmd. 1400 reads: "Prerogative of mercy in respect of offences against any law in force other than a law of the Federal Legislature will be exercised on the advice of the Governor's Council." (i.e. on the advice of the Rhodesian Prime Minister and certain members of his Cabinet.)

that imposed by any sentence for such an offence; or

- (d) remit the whole or part of any sentence passed for such an offence or any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to Her Majesty on account of such an offence.
- (2) The offences to which this section applies are offences against any law in force in Southern Rhodesia other than a law of the Federal Legislature."

In short, Section 111 purportedly conferred upon Her Majesty in Council powers to intervene almost *ad lib* in the affairs of Rhodesia. In particular, there was thus purportedly reserved to Her Majesty in Council (which is in reality the British Government) the power *to alter the Legislature and Executive of Rhodesia at whim*.

Why was Section 111 omitted from the two White Papers? Can any fair-minded person really believe that if this had been put to the Rhodesian Electorate, that Electorate would have strained at the gnat of the "reserved powers" whilst swallowing the camel of Section 111?

In *Focus on Southern Rhodesia* (Stuart Manning), Dr. M. I. Hirsch* wrote:—

"The final blow in this issue (of Independence), however, was the inclusion in the completed Constitution—Chapter IX—Amendment of the Constitution—of Clause 111 which stated: 'Full power and authority is hereby reserved to Her Majesty by Order in Council to amend, add to or revoke the provisions in Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 29, 32, 42 and 49 and this Section and any Order in Council made by virtue of this Section may vary or revoke any previous order so made.' The power thus retained includes authority to amend, add to or revoke the sections that appertain to the Legislature, assent to Bills, power of disallowance and executive powers. (By a proviso, exercise of this authority is specifically restricted to the sections enumerated compared to the more general power in the 1923 Constitution.)

But this was not agreed to by the Conference

* A former Member of the Rhodesian Parliament, and a Southern Rhodesian Government delegate to the 1961 Constitutional Conference.

nor was it part of the White Paper put to the Electorate. Only Sir Edgar can fully explain why it was accepted in the government to government parleys over the final drafting—whether he was forced into it at a late stage, unaware of it until it was too late, or badly advised and outmanoeuvred in the legalities.

It was, and is, explained away as being of theoretical importance or safeguarded by the Convention and as not entitling the United Kingdom Government to do what it likes with the matters listed. But it is a written record of authority for a British Government to make vital constitutional changes unilaterally.

As in the previous instance of Sovereign powers exercised through the Governor, this is in direct contradiction to Mr. Sandys' assurances at the time that written United Kingdom powers would, in future, be related only to stockholders' rights, the position of the Sovereign and international obligations. It cannot be justified by the argument that in any event United Kingdom inherent power to legislate still exists. This is a written right, written after the alleged conventions of non-interference were established and in contradiction of them.

The Electorate was, and I was, led to believe that the elaborate local mechanism established by which further constitutional changes would take place was to replace the United Kingdom written right to do so entirely, just as the Declaration of Rights and Constitutional Council replaced the United Kingdom reserved powers. A British right to by-pass this local mechanism in any respect makes it appear pointless."

In addition to the above, I was to ascertain that, in the Opinion of an eminent Queen's Counsel:—

1. In legal theory the power reserved by Section 111 could be used to *increase* the extent of Her Majesty's reserved powers.
2. The Royal Prerogative Powers were still vested

in Her Majesty to declare war, to make peace, to annex territory, to make treaties and to send and receive diplomatic and consular representatives—it is true, though, that older Commonwealth countries, generally regarded as independent, have been content to remain in the same position.

3. The effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, was and is to confirm the theoretically unlimited power of the United Kingdom to legislate for the Colonies, and this theoretical power continued in respect of Southern Rhodesia.
4. Established conventions did not appear to have the force of law in the older Dominions before 1931; and, equally, the Convention did not have the force of law in Rhodesia or in England. If the United Kingdom Parliament had passed an Act expressly applicable to Rhodesia, the Courts both in England and in this country would have been obliged to regard it as valid, and they would not have been able to undertake an enquiry into the extent of the Convention, or whether or not it had been observed before the passing of the United Kingdom Act.

Indeed, it should be further pointed out that conventions are only established by the passage of time; and here was a brand-new assertion that British intervention in Rhodesian affairs was legitimate.

The Rhodesians, including myself, were indeed fooled to the very top of their bent!

In the interests of national unity and of amity between the races, the predominantly white Rhodesian Electorate had by a two-to-one majority accepted a new Constitution that made inevitable an African majority in their Legislature—surely as magnificent a moral decision as has ever been made by any electorate in the entire history of mankind?—only to find . . .

1. That African nationalism rejected that gesture

with terrorism, arson, foul and repulsive murder, and the language of the gutter.

2. That the "Independence" that they had been promised was simply part and parcel of a squalid confidence trick; and that, under United Nations pressure, for example, the United Kingdom Government could still at any time have imposed legislation upon Rhodesia.

With this despicable hoax so clearly in mind, and with the knowledge that the British Labour Party did not even go so far as to accept the constitutional proposals for Rhodesia as contained in the two White Papers, is it to be wondered at that Rhodesians were not, and are not, disposed to place much reliance upon Mr. Wilson's statement of the 11th December, 1965, that he proposed to adhere to those principles "which have throughout inspired the approach of successive British governments" ?

CHAPTER 7

THE "SINS" OF THE RHODESIANS

Cecil John Rhodes in 1898 laid down the principle of "Equal rights for all civilised men"; and ever since that time this has been the political philosophy of the Rhodesians. It is true that, just as Christians often do not quite live up to the creed by which they profess to live, the Rhodesians have not, either, always entirely lived up to this principle; but, by and large, they have, when tested, proved that they have indeed had the qualities of reasonableness and common sense to accord not only equal rights to every civilised man, but also the opportunity (so far as it lay in their power) to every man to *become* "civilised".

To understand the attitude of the Rhodesians fully, it is essential to go back to the early days when the Pioneer Column, which consisted mainly of people of British stock, peacefully occupied Rhodesia* in 1890. The Pioneers then found an indigenous population of considerably less than half a million, living in huts made of sticks, mud and thatch, and subsisting by herding cattle and cultivating small fields, which they abandoned when the soil became exhausted.

The entire indigenous population was illiterate, their technology was equivalent to that of the Britons in 55 B.C. when the Romans arrived, their personal hygiene was far from irreproachable, their knowledge of medicine rudimentary and confined to the use of a few herbs, and even the very concept of money was totally unknown to them—they measured their wealth only in cattle, and they one and all believed in witchcraft.

Perhaps one of the silliest modes of expression ever coined is that people are penalised "merely because of the colour of their skins". If the colour of a man's skin

* Since Northern Rhodesia is now named "Zambia", for simplicity's sake I have throughout the rest of this book, where there is no danger of confusion, referred to Southern Rhodesia simply as "Rhodesia".

were all that entered into problems of a sociological nature, their solution might be much easier: in fact, far more was involved. When the Pioneers arrived in Rhodesia they found four almost insuperable barriers separating them socially from the indigenous peoples: (1) considerations of hygiene, (2) the language barrier, (3) the almost total ignorance on the part of the African of anything other than tribal custom, and—likewise—(4) the European's ignorance of tribal life.

It is a commonplace amongst sociologists that social attitudes tend to linger on, long after any good reason for the existence of these attitudes has disappeared; and it is hardly surprising that this should also happen, to some extent, in Rhodesia; but, in any event, the reasons for these barriers have, even today, by no means entirely passed away.

Large numbers of the African people have never used a privy, toilet paper or handkerchiefs in their lives; and, living in a mud hut with a fire burning in the centre of the floor (there is no fireplace), with the nearest water supply a stream a quarter of a mile away, it is difficult—if not impossible—for rural (i.e. the majority of) Africans to maintain standards of hygiene acceptable to the European. Added to which, not being as sophisticated in regard to medical matters as the European, large numbers suffer from, not merely one, but several—perhaps communicable—ailments.

Happily this state of affairs is passing away; but readers outside Africa would do well to remember that the disinclination of the white Rhodesian to share amenities does not, basically, spring from mere vulgar prejudice: it finds its origin, fundamentally, in an almost instinctive desire to preserve standards in this regard.

For such other defects as he may possess, the African is by no means necessarily to blame. Controversy always has raged and possibly always will rage as to the degree to which a man's ability is due to hereditary or to environmental factors. Nevertheless, what is universally accepted is that the man who has been to a good school and to a good university has a very much better start in life than the man who has not. In short, the "know-how" that a man absorbs, often almost

unconsciously, from his early environment—including his family background—may have a most decisive influence upon his competence; and, even amongst the most sophisticated Englishmen, it is held to be of inestimable advantage to have gone to a "good" school such as Eton or Harrow, since the subtle influence of these institutions, so it is believed, leaves their products for ever after in some vague and undefined, and yet quite appreciable, way "better" than their fellows.

And when the affairs of Africa are considered, therefore, it must never be forgotten that *THE FAMILY AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF POSSIBLY THE MAJORITY OF AFRICANS IS STILL EXTRAORDINARILY PRIMITIVE, AND THAT THE AFRICAN, IN MOST CASES, HAS NOT HAD THE ADVANTAGES OF AN EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EQUIVALENT EVEN TO THAT OF THE ENGLISH PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILD.*

And, when we come to consider European attitudes, a most unfortunate paradox arises: the local Rhodesian invariably sees the African at his worst, whilst the visitor from overseas invariably sees the African at his best. Hence the views concerning the African of the white Rhodesian and of the white overseas visitor tend to be so ludicrously far apart that they might almost be speaking of different races.

The typical two-week visitor to Africa, who thereafter for the rest of his life presumes to set himself up as an authority upon all things African, as often as not only meets the African in the conference room and at the cocktail party. He thus meets only the comparatively few relatively well educated and cultured Africans, when they are wearing their best clothes, when they are on their best behaviour, and when they are discoursing on the subject which may be the only subject that they know anything about—politics. How can an overseas visitor possibly know, for instance, as the Rhodesian may do, that the suave political leader with whom he is chatting is in fact a failed auctioneer, only rescued from his financial troubles by the contributions of political supporters?

On the other hand, the local Rhodesian, due to social barriers that have arisen for the reasons already stated, may never have the opportunity to meet a really intelligent and cultured African, and is hence compelled to judge all Africans from his knowledge of his own domestic servants and from his contact with those he meets in the hurly-burly of commerce and industry. It is one of the tragedies besetting the Rhodesian scene that the two races have thus to some extent been strangers to one another.

Nevertheless, the white Rhodesian possibly has a far shrewder notion of the present character and capabilities of his African counterpart than can ever be gained by an itinerant British M.P., by a journalist from overseas seeking only a sensational story, or by a university lecturer shut up in the ivory tower of a university college. The white artisan is able to contrast the quality of his own work with the quality of the work turned out by the black artisan. The police officer contrasts in his own mind the reliability and competence of European and African policemen. The white farmer or manufacturer has direct knowledge of how the African labourer handles a tractor or a cotton loom. The white banker and the white merchant are very much aware of just how good a "business risk" his African customer is.

This brings us to the first "sin" of the white Rhodesian . . .

"Sin" No. 1. A Realistic Appraisal of his African Colleague.

While one is always on dangerous ground in generalising concerning national characteristics, many Africans would themselves be the first to concede the points made in this Section.

Firstly, the average African has an acute sense of justice. If the facts are put fairly and squarely to him (all the facts, and not a distorted version of the facts), he will accept an equitable solution even if it is to his own immediate disadvantage.

This characteristic (I am here speaking primarily of the Mashona—I have not had much contact with the

Matabele) springs from his tribal custom whereby matters of moment are discussed at the village *dare* (meeting) and the general consensus of opinion accepted.

It is this custom, one may comment in passing, that is regarded as the justification for what African leaders like to term "African Democracy"—one-party rule by consensus of opinion. This argument does not hold water, however, since to obtain a consensus of opinion at a small village meeting is a totally different matter to obtaining a consensus of opinion on a national scale. Indeed, the British party system is in fact a mechanism devised for the obtaining of just such a national consensus.

Secondly, I have always found the African to be, *within the scope of his knowledge*, a realist. It is, for example, in my experience comparatively rare for a client involved in a criminal case to refuse to plead "Guilty", when advised that it would be pointless to do otherwise.

Thirdly, in matters concerning their own families I have found that, generally speaking, Africans display a degree of responsibility that puts the European to shame. The vast majority of African men, one finds, are giving financial assistance to elderly relatives or other dependants, or assisting to educate brothers—even though their own assets and incomes may be small; and when an African is in trouble, innumerable relatives gather round and raise sums for the legal expenses of the man in trouble that are, in proportion to their assets and incomes, enormous.

The converse to this is that Africans, by European standards, manifest the highest degree of irresponsibility in having children. The desire to have children is a part of the Mashona religious outlook; and, under tribal conditions when land was plentiful, children were virtually self-sustaining since they could always be put to work hoeing fields or herding cattle. In a modern urban economy this is no longer so; the African has not yet been able to make the necessary mental adjustment; he feels himself morally *entitled* to have as many children as he likes, whatever the circumstances, and the startled European will find an unemployed African, with no

means whatsoever, to be the proud father of half-a-dozen children or more.

In this sense of justice and of responsibility of the ordinary African, and of realism within the range of his knowledge, lies one of the main hopes of Rhodesia; but, on the other hand, the typical African has grave defects.

Firstly, he has very little "money sense". This was illustrated on a national scale in the manner in which President Nkrumah managed to wreck the economy of Ghana within a very short space of time; and, again, this lack of "money sense" is attributable to the African's tribal background—the simple fact being that money played no part whatsoever in the African's traditional tribal background. It was unknown to him. As did the early Romans, he measured his wealth in cattle.

This African lack of money sense constantly dismays the European. The embezzling by Honorary Secretaries of the funds of voluntary associations is a commonplace. The loaning of moneys to the average African businessman is a hazard to which few Europeans will commit themselves, and numerous Africans venture into business with only the haziest of notions, if any at all, of the distinction between turnover and profit, and of the importance of allowing for depreciation.

Secondly,—and this is where the average white Rhodesian parts company with the "ivory tower" and "two-week visitor" writers about Africa—the person who has never lived and worked in the hurly-burly of commerce, industry and agriculture with the African can have little idea of how lacking the average African is in plain, ordinary, common or garden *competence*.

This question of competence has three facets to it, which are as follows:—

(i) *Competence in regard to work in hand.*

The reason for the incompetence, by and large, of the African in regard to affairs of everyday life is, quite simply, that he is a fish out of water. He has been subjected to an abrupt transition from a primitive and rural village culture to a highly sophisticated and

Europeanised Western industrial economy. He has, in his formative years, had little or no access to that general heritage of "know how" that is almost always available to the European. The "emergent African" finds himself wearing European clothes, using European furniture and utensils, living in a European house, driving a European motor car, reading European type-script and print—he is in an environment totally and completely different to that of his forebears.

This fact is illustrated by the following:—

- a) Mr. Adv. Dumbutshena is a highly intelligent and educated barrister, who is openly in sympathy with the best African nationalist aspirations, and he was one of the co-signatories to Mr. Todd's letter requesting that the United Kingdom Government suspend Rhodesia's Constitution.*

On page 80 of *The Price of Freedom*, published by Stuart Manning, Mr. Adv. Dumbutshena writes:—

"Our (Rhodesian) industrialisation is better than that of most African States. There is, moreover, a substantial white population with the technical know-how, the skills and the professions which will make a dignified contribution to our own development efforts. Many African States are obliged to import their skills at fantastic salaries. In this country, importation of skills would be at a minimum."

As will be seen in Chapter 10, European salaries in Ghana are still higher than in Rhodesia, and it is a clear admission of lack of African skill that European skill should be so much in demand.

- b) Western contributions to "underdeveloped" countries are a commonplace. This question arises—how long are these countries going to go on *remaining* "underdeveloped"? Rhodesia has, because of white leadership, stood sturdily on her own feet since 1923 and is, together with the Republic of South Africa, perhaps the most "developed" country in Africa.

* See Chapter 9.

- c) The contributions of African-controlled mining, agriculture and industry to the cash income of Rhodesia have been negligible.
- d) The plain fact is that, today at any rate, the African is quite simply *not anywhere near as competent* as the European. As an agricultural worker, as a general dealer, as a bus owner, as a carpenter—in almost any sphere of activity that one can name—the average European worker is many times more skilful than the average African worker. Indeed, the story goes that a particular African President, having proudly announced the "Africanisation" of his national airways, was horrified to find that the crew of his own personal plane had also been "Africanised", and immediately countermanded that particular order!

The reason for this is quite simple. To an African who has passed his childhood in a mud hut, the simplest and most crudely-made house seems a veritable palace. To a man who has been brought up in dwellings without furniture, the most roughly made bed or table or chair seems a veritable miracle. One does not say that the African will *continue* to be less competent than the European, particularly when his environment as a whole changes, but the fact remains that at the present time he is markedly less competent.

(ii) *Competence in regard to the anticipation of eventualities.*

One could hardly hope to find this point more aptly illustrated than where Adv. Dumbutshena says at page 83 of the book already quoted:—

"The conclusion one comes to after following international thinking over these matters is that every nation has a right to govern itself, no matter how badly, and that from the ruins of misgovernment a more stable and democratic system of government will result."

1. See Chapter 10.

This, with the greatest respect, is political adolescence* — that of youth which, having never yet known the hardships and vicissitudes of life, takes the material successes of his parents, their comfortable way of living, their house, servants and motor car all for granted; loses them all; and ends his life glad to fill his belly with the husks that the swine do eat.

This is precisely what terrifies the European about the outlook of so many an African. He lives regardless of consequences. He is quite prepared to take the motor car of state and drive it with gaiety, zeal and enormous gusto—straight into the ditch.

A further fact is this: fifty per cent of the Africans in this country are at most 17 years old, and if the nationalist principle of "one-man-one-vote" were followed at the present time, within five years the control of the country would rest in the hands of young people aged twenty-one. I, for one, should hate my destiny to lie in the hands of young people as foolish as I myself was at that age.

A good quality and a bad quality of the ordinary African public is its capacity to place implicit and uncritical trust in leaders; and dishonest people can easily mislead in such circumstances.

What does not appear to enter the thinking of Adv. Dumbutshena and others is that *once freedom is lost, it may be lost for ever*. Adv. Dumbutshena cheerfully invites the white Rhodesians to play Russian Roulette with their civil liberties and with the personal safety of their families. Particularly in view of what is said in Chapter 8, perhaps he will pardon them if they respectfully decline that offer.

The point often overlooked by Western observers and by Africans themselves is that a Communist "Scramble for Africa" is now taking place; and should either Communist Russia or Communist China succeed in gaining political control over Rhodesia, it would take little short of a World War to effect Rhodesia's liberation.

(iii) "*Character Competence.*"

Democracy is no more than a collective manifestation of the national characteristics of the individual.

* And the policy, at the time of writing, of Mr. Harold Wilson.

The stability and other characteristics of a particular "democracy" will reflect the characteristics of the average person in that country.

The following may be said of the character of the British people as contrasted with the character of the average Rhodesian African:—

a) *Adherence to Tradition.*

The British House of Commons is perhaps the most tradition-riddled edifice in the entire world. Its members would not dream of acting in any other than a set, traditional way; and the same applies to the average British voter.

The value of and *raison d'être* of, and for, tradition is that it comes into existence as a result of constant trial and error. It is, by and large, an embodiment of what innumerable people down the ages have found to be the best way of doing things. Often the original reason for the introduction of a particular tradition has been completely forgotten; and it is difficult, if not impossible, for the individual to ascertain, even with a great deal of time and effort, the reason for the existence of that tradition. Yet, in actual fact, if that particular tradition were not followed, the consequences might be most undesirable.

Now, if one wishes to have western democracy, one must accept the *machinery* of western democracy. One cannot buy a motor car, discard its "innards" and still expect it to work. Yet this is precisely what the African nationalist tries to do. The following analysis of the western-type two-party system was printed in the *Malawi News*, the official organ of the Malawi Nationalist Party, on the 26th November, 1960:—

"For in a typical two-party system, you have two parliamentary factions—one dedicated to 'doing' and another dedicated to 'undoing'. . . . So from its very birth every law proposed and passed by a Government has bitter foes to see to its immediate or ultimate annihilation. It is a system of Government with a built-in

subversive mechanism. Under it a State works with, and finances, forces of its own destruction (but) Africa must evolve systems that suit her people's attitudes and temperament."

The African thus *cannot see* the necessity for certain traditions of western democracy. Democracy for him is an untried experiment, a mere leap in the dark. He is accustomed to the traditions of his own political tribal structure, which of course operates on a very much smaller scale, and is not necessarily effective in a wider sphere; and hence the African neglects to adhere to certain of the important traditions of democracy and—it ceases to be democracy, perhaps for ever.

b) *The Roman Influence.*

It has been remarked that there is a distinct difference between those countries in Europe that have a Roman heritage and those that do not.

Briefly, Rome recognised the desirability of reference to certain universal norms of conduct—that is to say, she recognised the need for the formulation of abstract principles to be applied to the governing of nations. These Roman norms were evolved in consequence of the evolution of Rome from village to empire. The law and custom of the Shona peoples, on the other hand, evolved, not by reference to universal applicable principles, but by reference to the needs of small communities of families.

The Shona criminal law, for instance, was not criminal law as the western nations know it: it was a system whereby the offender was expected to compensate the injured party—ideal, one might say, for offences committed within the ambit of village life, since unlikely to leave a legacy of grudges. It is quite unsuitable, however, for enforcing the observance of duties demanded by the collective needs of the community, such as municipal regulations imposed in the interests of public health.

Similarly, it was a recognised practice in tribal life to pay those in authority for favours received.

This was, in essence, a form of fee and the manner in which the public authorities were paid, and so quite proper under tribal conditions. However, when this outlook is transplanted to the larger context of national affairs, it manifests itself in the form of bribery and corruption, this again being simply an undesirable by-product of the conflict of cultures.

Again, because of its Roman legacy, if the Briton disagrees with a political opponent, he hales his opponent off to the forum in order to argue matters out: but the African tends to knock his political opponent on the head.*

c) *The Christian Influence.*

It must never be overlooked that the Shona religion is a form of spiritualism, and that witchcraft still plays a fundamental role. The European, for instance, attributes all illness to empirical factors; the African has a marked tendency to attribute illness to the activities of the *muroyi*—the witch.

That this factor is very much to the fore-front of the African mind may perhaps be gauged from the following extract from the *Hansard* of Zambia of the 28th July, 1965:—

"Mr. Mwila: ... Lastly, Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. Minister of Health and I hope that the hon. Minister of Health will think a little more and spare one of those small hospitals or rural clinics which are not allocated to any other place and give it to Luwingu because we are very many there. But before ending these remarks I would like also to ask him to think about, and this is very serious, to think very seriously about allowing witchdoctors in hospitals.

Mr. S. Wina: Ah!

Mr. Mwila: This is very important.

* As is happening, as I write, in Lagos, where bad government has brought 12 deaths on the eve of a conference convened to condemn "bad government" in Rhodesia!

Interruptions.

Mr. Mwila: By witchdoctors, I mean doctors who have an approved knowledge of divining, finding the cause . . .

Interruptions.

Mr. Speaker: Order, Order!

Mr. Mwila: . . . finding the cause of a disease whether it comes from an old ancestor or a ghost." . . .

As the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya illustrated only too horribly, the rule of the witchdoctor leaves the African vulnerable in certain ways in which the European is not.

Above all, democracy may surely be described as a befuddled, muddled striving towards the practical political implementation of the Second Great Commandment "Love thy Neighbour . . .", and it is to be doubted whether democracy can hope to survive amongst those who do not, ostensibly at any rate, make the implementation of that Commandment a conscious goal of living.

It would, of course, be absurd and presumptuous to declare that the present lack of competence so widespread amongst Africans cannot be overcome: but it does appear to be reasonable to suggest that it can best be overcome through the European and the African working side by side together, with the consequence that over the years the African will be enabled to absorb the western cultural heritage and make it his own.

"Sin" No. 2. The Character of the White Rhodesian.

For some strange reason the white peoples outside Africa tend to regard the white man in Africa as some peculiar ogre. This has been most aptly put by Mr. Peter Gibbs in *Avalanche in Central Africa*:—

"There seems to be a popular, almost world-wide impression that the white people who have come to settle in Africa over the years, whatever their origins, are of some special breed and that they all share certain common but very circumscribed mental and moral characteristics. Whenever the white settlers, as they are called, are mentioned the implication is that mentally and morally they are

quite different from people in other parts of the world, that they think differently and that they act differently, and that the way they think and act is governed by a mentality which is common to all of them; that without that mentality they would never have qualified as settlers. It is almost as if they had had to satisfy a selection board.

What these critics of the white settlers imply of course is that if they themselves had gone out to Africa and if they themselves were now in the position of the Europeans there, they would have behaved quite differently, and they would in fact have displayed a degree of mental and moral superiority so that there would be none of the unfortunate problems that beset the continent today . . .

The truth is that the people who have settled in Africa over the years have not necessarily been on the average any better or any worse morally and mentally than any particular group of people anywhere else in the world; there have been good and bad among them in the normal proportions of human frailty."

The white Rhodesian has, indeed, as much common sense as white men anywhere else. In 1961 he voted in favour of the Constitutional Proposals, because he believed that this would result in national unity and harmonious relations between the races, even though well knowing that the Constitution so envisaged would eventually place the predominant voting power in African hands.

It is most unfortunate that both the African nationalists and the British Government of the day had the incredible folly to destroy this European good will so manifested.

Despite this—and I speak as a man who had to face white audiences on political platforms in Salisbury only last year—I am convinced that the European voter is reasonable enough and has enough common sense to take whatever steps may really be necessary in the interests of the country as a whole.

It is not to be wondered at that these reservations

of the white Rhodesians in regard to their black colleagues have become embodied to some extent in the political, economic and cultural patterns of Rhodesia; yet, when the situation as a whole is considered, few will contest—if they are at all open-minded—that the Rhodesians, by and large, have been extraordinarily just and sensible, and if we survey dispassionately the fields of so-called "racial discrimination" it will be seen that the white Rhodesians have not done a fraction as badly as the ethical bigot would have the world believe.

"Sin" No. 3. Job Discrimination.

When Rhodesia became a Self-governing Colony, and for many decades thereafter, there were two strata in the Civil Service—an upper and a lower—the upper being confined to Europeans. The plain facts of the matter are that, prior to the last war, there were in all probability no Africans at all qualified in any way to fill any but the most humble posts in the Civil Service. This has now been amended, and entry to, and advancement in, the Rhodesian Civil Service depends entirely upon merit and not upon race.

"Sin" No. 4. Education.

The enemies of Rhodesia allege that white Rhodesians have discriminated against the African in educational matters. A point that should be made immediately, however, is that the thirst for education on the part of the African is a relatively recent phenomenon—in the writer's own boyhood he remembers many Africans who were not particularly concerned to send their children to school and who, incidentally, feared hospitals as "places where people are sent to die".

The European has been criticised for having segregation of races in the schools, but it must be remembered that the difference between Rhodesia and the United States, for instance, is that in the United States the Negro is in the minority, whereas in Rhodesia it is the European who is in the minority—added to which, in the typical African family there are far more children than in the typical European family. If the European child were compelled to share the same class-

room as African children in junior school, the European child would probably find itself out-numbered twenty to one, or more, by African children who could not even speak English properly. Thus European parents (perhaps recent immigrants from England) would find to their dismay that their own children were growing up unable to speak even reasonable English.*

In regard to education, the African has everything to gain and nothing to lose—his forebears had no schooling whatsoever, and any schooling he does receive is progress; but the European has centuries of tradition to lose, nothing to gain. The vocabularies of African dialects are so meagre that instruction in African schools has to be in English; since it is not their mother tongue, African pupils and African teachers alike tend to flounder; and to provide European teachers for all African schools is not economically feasible. Any European child (I myself, for instance) taught in such a school could hence receive only an inferior education and grow up unable even to speak his own mother tongue properly. The consequent degeneration of the European (probably *below* the level of the African, that being nature's way) would slow the country's progress—resulting, perhaps, in virtually no education for anyone at all.—It is, after all, taxes upon European enterprise that finance European education—and a great deal of African education as well. To have separate European and African schools in order to preserve European standards, and to raise Africans as rapidly as possible to these standards, is therefore merely plain common sense.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the white Rhodesian is to be praised very highly indeed for the educational facilities that he has in fact made available to the African. When it suits our enemies, they jeer at the white Rhodesians as only equalling in numbers

* Sir Michael Blundell in an article in the Rhodesia Herald of the 13th January suggests, writing of Kenya, that white Rhodesians must be prepared to make the following "adjustment": "Our numbers relative to the African population are so few that Government-maintained education of high standard, suitable for most European families, has gone by the board. We have to plan to send our children overseas, and this has driven away many of our younger families."

— So Rhodesians are expected to send their children 5,000 miles from their homes to school !

(70,000 pre-war and 200,000 post war) the population of a small English town, and they marvel at their temerity in daring to claim to be able to rule four million Africans. When, however, the opposite point of view suits our enemies, they ask sneeringly why we have not done more to educate the indigenous peoples of Rhodesia.

The truth of the matter is that Rhodesia has a better record in this regard than any country north of the Limpopo, even though at the present time at least half the population of Rhodesia is less than eighteen years of age. The ratio of children at school to total population is as follows in the following countries:—

Ethiopia	1:108	Dahomey	1:20	
Mali	1:61	Tanzania	1:18	
Liberia	1:40	Algeria	1:12	
Guinea	1:24	Malagasy	1:11	Great Britain 1:5
		Ghana	1:8	Rhodesia 1:6

Indeed, any Briton who has the effrontery to criticise Rhodesian achievements in the field of African education will find himself on very shaky ground indeed. The *Comparative Survey of Native Policy*, presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in 1951, reveals that *in pre-Federation days*, the amount spent annually per head on African education in the COLONIAL OFFICE Territories of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was 6/- and 18/11 respectively, whilst in wicked SELF-GOVERNING Southern Rhodesia the amount was 27/3.

One also discovers from the 1956 Revised Edition of Lord Hailey's *An African Survey* that the figures for African enrolment in Primary and Secondary Schools in the three territories in 1952 were as follows* :—

	<i>Primary Schools.</i>	<i>Secondary Schools.</i>
Nyasaland	224,600	362
Northern Rhodesia	156,164	1,210
Southern Rhodesia	259,573	9,194

"Sin" No. 5. *Land.*

Rhodesians are criticised because of the division of

* The UNESCO statistical year book shows that, in 1960, in 59% of the countries of the world less than half the children between the ages of 5 and 19 went to school.

land into separate areas for the two racial groups. The reason for this, again, is largely historical.

The Land Apportionment Act, of which so much is said, was introduced in 1930 in consequence of a report of a Royal Commission headed by Sir Morris Carter,* which advocated its introduction on the grounds that it would tend to obviate friction between the races; and it was anticipated that each race would develop its own distinctive economy in its own area.

This did not in fact prove to be correct, since the European areas went ahead, whilst the African areas stagnated, with the consequence that there was a tremendous influx of Africans into the European areas, raising immense problems in regard to habitation.

By 1930, when the Land Apportionment Act was introduced,** the African population had multiplied to some 936,000, and—with the implementation of the Land Apportionment Act in that year, 28,933,362 acres of land were set aside *for the sole and exclusive use* of the African—30 acres of land for each man, woman and child! Could they then really complain of being ill-used?—How many Englishmen have the privilege of owning 30 acres, let alone 30 acres for each member of the family?

The introduction by the whites of law and order, together with medical services, led however to a population explosion of the blacks (Americans, particularly Redskins, please note!) and by 1964 the black population of Rhodesia had increased to four million, at which stage a total of 46 % of the total land surface of Rhodesia had been set aside for their sole and exclusive use.

How well did the black Rhodesians make use of the land allocated to them?

Statistics reveal the following: although in 1964 this 46 % of the land surface of Rhodesia was reserved to the use of black Rhodesians, only 6.5 % of the total £62.2 million agricultural cash output of Rhodesia was

* It was, in fact, the United Kingdom Government itself that appointed the Chairman—Sir Morris Carter—and two other members of the five-man Carter Commission. Only the remaining two, virtually *ex officio* members—the Chief Native Commissioner and the Surveyor-General—were appointed by the Rhodesian Government. The Commission was unanimous in reporting that all sections of the Rhodesian community—including the missionaries and those Africans whose opinions could be ascertained—were in favour of territorial segregation.

** The United Kingdom Government being then a Labour Government.

produced by African farmers, and likewise, only 1.66% of the £54.3 million industrial output of Rhodesia was produced by African industrialists. It should be remembered, in considering these figures, that the African Tribal Trust Areas contain some of the finest tobacco land in Rhodesia, and tobacco has long been Rhodesia's principal export.

However, more significant, any Rhodesian, whether white or black, is permitted to peg mining claims wherever he likes in Rhodesia; and, of the total £16.9 million mineral output of Rhodesia in 1964, only an insignificant amount came from African-owned mines.

In my view, the Land Apportionment Act is an archaism, particularly in regard to commercial and industrial areas—although it has already been substantially repealed in regard to rural areas, since it is possible now for Africans to buy farms in what was formerly purely European farm land.

Nevertheless, the misgivings of white Rhodesians concerning the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, particularly in regard to residential areas, are easy to understand—and will be well appreciated by those Londoners who have had the misfortune to live in close proximity to houses taken over by coloured people in the Notting Hill area of London. Rhodesians fear that a similar process of deterioration might take place in their own housing areas, and cause their own homes—in which they have often invested a lifetime's savings—to become of little value, whether economically or otherwise. One may feel that these Europeans are indeed being a little too fearful, yet one is able to appreciate their point of view, and to understand that, if and when the Land Apportionment Act is repealed in respect of such European residential areas, that repeal should be a staged one, accompanied by proper safeguards.

"Sin" No. 6. Hospitals.

The white Rhodesians are criticised for wanting to be amongst their own kind in their hospitals. I make no apology whatsoever for defending their attitude. When a person is sick, particularly very old people or

very young people, they are then extremely sensitive and liable to be affected by little things, and in such circumstances it is only right and proper that they should be amongst those of their own race, whom they know to subscribe to the same ways of thought as themselves and to the same patterns of behaviour (e.g. in modulating the voice).

The fact remains, that in regard to providing medical facilities for the African, the Rhodesians again have a record that is possibly unequalled in the world and in which they can take an unqualified pride. A free health service was introduced for the African people in Rhodesia at least two or three decades before the British people themselves introduced their present State health service in the United Kingdom; and, even though of recent years a small charge has been introduced for attendances because the load was becoming too onerous, the services are still available free of charge for those who cannot afford to pay for them.

Let it not be thought, either, that the equipment in these African hospitals is necessarily inferior. Salisbury's Harari African Hospital, for instance, possesses certain equipment that the Salisbury General Hospital does not possess, thus making it necessary for Europeans, too, to be operated upon in that Hospital.

"Sin" No. 7. Recreation.

In regard to recreation, again: recreation is recreation. If a man wishes to be among his own race when taking part in recreation, why should he not be?—there are also the factors already mentioned on page 53. Despite this, Rhodesian sportsmen tend, increasingly, not to bother at all about race—Rhodesia's international athletic and football teams, for example, contain both white and black Rhodesians.

"Sin" No. 8. The Qualitative Franchise.

The enormous difference between Africa and Britain (and America), if I may reiterate this, is the fact that in Britain the African is in the minority, whilst in Africa it is the European who is in the minority. Yet, even though the coloured races are in such a minority in Great Britain, the British Parliament has nevertheless

thought fit to introduce "apartheid" by means of a Commonwealth Immigration Act which will effectively limit the number of coloured peoples arriving in England from the West Indies and elsewhere. If with such a tiny minority of coloureds in Britain, the British feel it necessary to exclude coloured peoples in order to preserve their standards, how much more so is there cause for concern amongst white Rhodesians in regard to the preservation of their own standards in Rhodesia?

For the preservation of standards involves, amongst other things, the preservation of standards of integrity, of hygiene and of competence. It involves maintaining the Civil Service, Commerce and Industry free from corruption and incompetence.

In order to preserve these standards, the white people of Rhodesia have traditionally adopted the solution—and this is their major "sin" in the eyes of African nationalism—that a man is only entitled to vote if he is able to prove himself able to use that vote properly. Broadly speaking, two tests have been laid down. The first is an educational test, and the second an income and property test.

Rhodesians have insisted that a man, if he is to be permitted to vote, must at least know just enough English to be able to fill in the necessary application form for enrolment as a voter.

The other qualification is that the would-be voter must have acted responsibly enough in his own life to have reached a reasonable level of income, or to have acquired possession of a reasonable amount of fixed property, the argument being that ownership of either income or property indicates, firstly, that the person concerned has exercised prudence and responsibility in the earning of it and—secondly—that, in order to keep it, he will do all in his power to ensure that he uses his vote responsibly.

It must be stressed, however, that the qualifications for the vote in Rhodesia are, and always have been, *COMPLETELY NON-RACIAL*. Any Rhodesian, white or black, is entitled to a full vote providing that he or she is (1) a Rhodesian Citizen, (2) of two years' residence, (3) over 21, (4) (except in the case of Chiefs and Headmen)

possessed of sufficient knowledge of English to be able to complete and to sign an application to be registered as a voter, and (5) possessed of one or other of the following sets of qualifications (wives take the qualifications of their husbands in this respect):—

"A" Roll

- (a) Income of not less than £792 during each of two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, or ownership of immovable property of value of not less than £1,650.

OR

- (b) (i) Income of not less than £528 during each of two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, or ownership of immovable property of value of not less than £1,100; *and*
(ii) completion of a course of primary education of a prescribed standard.

OR

- (c) (i) Income of not less than £330 during each of two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, or ownership of immovable property of value of not less than £550; *and*
(ii) four years' Secondary education of a prescribed standard.

OR

- (d) Appointment to the office of Chief or Headman.

With one in every six Africans at school, with 46 % of the land surface reserved exclusively to the use of Africans, and with less than 100,000 European voters, there must surely be something intrinsically wrong with the African if he is not able to out-vote the European in the reasonably near future?*

Again, I make no apology for the fact that in Rhodesia it is necessary to have qualifications in order to be able to vote. We the Rhodesians simply feel that the voter to whom we entrust the future welfare, the very lives, of ourselves, our wives and our children, should at least know what he is doing when he casts his vote. After all, in Great Britain itself the universal

* I imagine that almost every single one of my readers will be able to meet these educational and/or financial standards.

franchise only came into being after centuries of gradual evolution, and the state of "one-man-one-vote" was only reached in Britain itself as late as the 1960's. It is the wildest form of ethical insanity to believe that, because the principle of "one-man-one-vote" works successfully amongst the relatively sophisticated British Electorate, it should also be successful when applied to ignorant illiterates, who do not even know what a vote IS, let alone how to use it wisely in the context of a modern industrial and commercial economy. If you expect to have the *right* to vote, you must also, surely, recognise the *duty* to be fit to use it wisely?

Yet this is the principal "sin" of the Rhodesians in the eyes of African nationalism; and in truth and in fact, the clique of African nationalist leaders know well that a qualitative franchise is the surest way to maintain wise government, and that the responsible African in Rhodesia who has made a success of his own life, and who is hence qualified for the vote, is unlikely to be impressed by the excesses of gentlemen who, unable to succeed either in agriculture, industry, commerce or the professions, seek a political short cut to influence and to affluence.

If the British Government (or the American Government as well, for that matter) had really wished to convert Rhodesia into a full democracy in every sense of the word, the path has always been open to her, simply by *MAKING SUFFICIENT MONEYS AVAILABLE TO THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT FOR AFRICAN EDUCATION.*

Did she do this?—No!

In 1960 alone, Britain contributed £164 million in aid to various countries of the world, and various Iron Curtain countries have—at one time or another—been recipients of that aid.

Apart from certain donations to the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which were very welcome, Britain has, however, during the entire post-war years, only donated a total of £4 million in aid to Rhodesia; and this was only made in order partly to repair the financial prejudice suffered by Rhodesia in

consequence of Britain's decision to dismember the Federation.

Contrast this with the millions lavished in "aid" by Britain on the newly "independent" countries of Africa.* Rhodesians have sturdily paid their own way and are not beggars by disposition; but it distresses them to see their mother country paying more in "aid" to Zambia today in order that Zambia may assist in destroying Rhodesia, than our "mother country" has ever paid to her own "colony".

I may perhaps be pardoned for mentioning, in conclusion, that during the Second World War nearly 10,000 Rhodesians joined the Forces, including 2,400 in the Royal Air Force and the Southern Rhodesia Air Force. Out of its comparatively small white population, the country gave 15%—which on a *pro rata* population basis was more fighting men than any other Commonwealth country. Indeed, Rhodesians can proudly boast that the official reason given for the introduction of conscription in Rhodesia was that *too many* Rhodesians sought to join up, and it was necessary to restrict the flow of volunteers lest the economy be brought to a standstill. Of that 10,000, many of whom had extremely distinguished war records, nearly a tenth were killed or died on active service.

Yet, because of our "sins", Mr. Wilson did not, on the 11th November, 1965, see fit to honour Rhodesia's war dead.

* In the financial year 1964/65, Britain gave £14.8 million to Kenya, £9 million to Malawi, £4.5 million to Zambia, £30 million to India, and a total of £127.1 million to the Commonwealth as a whole.

CHAPTER 8

THE 'FREEDOM' OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

"The first freedom that Rhodesia needs to achieve, the foundation of all the others, is freedom from fear."

— *The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson to the Rhodesians on the 30th October, 1965.*

"It is obvious to us, Sir, that however much truth we can speak today, it is not the intention of you, our honoured guest, to be satisfied with what we know to be the truth. If we take you to the graves of these people who have been killed, you will not be satisfied that they have been killed by these nationalists. If we show the graves of the children of our people who have been killed by these people, you will not be satisfied. If we show you the churches, the dip tanks and our schools that have been damaged by these people, you will not be satisfied . . . Sir, if it is your wish to hand over to the nationalists, well we cannot stop you; but all I can say is that if you do the time will come when the person who is about to die will point his finger at you."

— *Rhodesian Chiefs to Mr. Arthur Bottomley at the Domboshawa Indaba of the 2nd March, 1965.*

If Britain and the United States are to act responsibly in Africa, it is essential that Britons and Americans should ask themselves two questions:—

1. From the point of view of sheer naked British and American self-interest, are not Britain and America, by supporting the African nationalists in Rhodesia, actually assisting the enemies of Britain and the United States—the Communist countries—to extend their influence still further in Africa?

2. From an ethical point of view, is the "freedom" that the African nationalists in Rhodesia offer to their fellow Africans *really* freedom?

It is not easy, ever, to prove that any particular organisation is Communist controlled or influenced, since those in an organisation with Communist affiliations tend to keep their identities concealed; but the first question that one is compelled to ask in regard to African nationalism in Rhodesia is: "Where do the large sums of money come from that African nationalists in Rhodesia have to spend?"

The African nationalist organisations in Rhodesia have certainly had very large sums of money indeed available to them. The leaders have been enabled to travel extensively and to live like kings. When the National Democratic Party was banned, some £80,000 worth of assets was confiscated, and the banning of the Zimbabwe African People's Union brought the confiscation of a further £40,000 in assets.

To trace the movements of money in the modern world is extremely difficult—as Mr. Wilson has found; but, although certain funds have no doubt come from "liberal" organisations in the West, there is little doubt in the minds of the well-informed that the bulk of the finances for African nationalist movements in Rhodesia is derived from Communist sources.

Secondly, it is well known that many African nationalist leaders have travelled extensively behind the Iron Curtain. Indeed, a former nationalist once told me with considerable amusement how he once travelled widely behind the Iron Curtain under the auspices of the Communists, whilst his hosts in Britain fondly imagined he was engaged in paying a visit to the United Nations Building in New York.

Thirdly, Russian literature, and Russian-made hand grenades, plastic explosives and detonators have been found in Rhodesia; and a number of saboteurs arrested in Rhodesia claim to have been trained in Russia, China and North Korea.

Fourthly, the general pattern of Communist infiltration throughout Africa would make it very surprising

if there were not also attempts at infiltration, behind the stalking horse of African nationalism, into Rhodesia. A few of the many items that tend to indicate widespread Communist influence in Africa are:—

1. The large part that Communists played in the Zanzibar civil war after Zanzibar achieved "Independence".
2. Chinese instructors help train the Tanzanian army.
3. The vast interest-free loans made by China and Russia to such countries as Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana.
4. The Chinese "advisers" to be found in many African States.
5. The enormously powerful broadcasts being constantly beamed from Peking into Malawi and Rhodesia.*

While it is perfectly true that the majority of African nationalists are, in all probability, by no means conscious supporters of Communism, that is not the danger. As Mr. B. G. Paver points out** :—

"What the eye does not see the heart does not grieve over, and what the mind does not comprehend it cannot be concerned with. Anarchy, thanks to the intervention of the white man in Africa, has been dead for so long that it never occurs to the African demagogue that there is any relationship between home rule and responsibility for the security of the boundaries of his home. He simply assumes that home rule postulates the privilege of exercising irresponsibility, while a benign omnipotence in the form of the European continues to prevent interference from without, and regulates twentieth-century external affairs beyond his ken."

The real danger is that by becoming dependent upon Communist support in many spheres the African nationalist may unwittingly become the tool of Communism, falling so deeply under Communist control that he may never be able to break free thereafter.

One further fact that should have certainly put the

* See "The Puppeteers" by Harold Soref and Ian Grieg (Tandem Books) for further facts concerning the extent of Communist influence.
** "His Own Oppressor" (Peter Davies).

governments of Great Britain and the United States upon their guard is that the techniques of African nationalism have been virtually identical, with adaptations to local conditions, throughout the length and breadth of Africa. While, for instance, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was in existence, it was quite obvious to any observer that the periodicals produced by the various nationalist organisations employed identical techniques, clearly controlled by one mind, or by one group of minds—the African nationalists in Rhodesia, for instance, certainly did not think up these ideas for themselves; and a reasonably wary Western government should be quick to ask itself: "Then who did?" There are grounds for suspecting that the answer to that question is: "Moscow or Peking."

In a nutshell, apart from simply promising material advantages, African nationalist (and "racialist" would be a better word than "nationalist") techniques consist in (1) the polarising of love, of (2) hate, and (3) the inducing of fear.

It is important to examine these techniques in a certain amount of detail if Western observers are to be able to decide whether African nationalism commands the kind of "popular support" commanded by, say, a Hitler or a Mussolini or a Stalin—or the kind commanded by an Eisenhower or a Kennedy.

1. The Polarising of Love.

(a) The Saviour Figure.

The first essential for the creation of a successful African nationalist movement is the creation of the "Saviour Figure". Chipembere wrote to Dr. Banda: "Human nature is such that it needs a hero to be hero-worshipped if the political struggle is to succeed". Such a Saviour Figure has been created for almost every state in Africa—Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Banda, Kaunda, etc., and the most extravagant adulation is lavished upon the Saviour Figure. Dr. Banda was, for instance, described in the *Malawi News* as "your Messiah, the Indomitable and Invincible Kamuzu".

(b) *The Creation of a "National Identity".*

Western observers are inclined to overlook the point that there were, in fact, no "nations" as such in Africa prior to the advent of the white man. The present boundaries of the African States are the white man's creation. When the white man arrived in what is now Rhodesia, so far from there being any black "nation", the Matabele and the Mashona tribes formed two distinct groups, occupying different parts of the country, with the warlike Matabele preying continually upon the Mashona. Many of the kopjes throughout Rhodesia have crude stone fortifications built by the Mashona in order to resist the attacks of the Matabele.

African nationalism has, despite this, set out to salvage such common cultural traditions as have existed; and, where no such tradition has existed, to *create* one.

(i) *Re-naming the Country.* It is regarded as essential to give the country a nationalist name. Sometimes the name chosen can be to some degree justified, such as—perhaps—giving Nyasaland the name "Malawi". At other times the name chosen is entirely arbitrary.

The name "Zimbabwe" that Rhodesian nationalists have chosen to give Rhodesia is, for instance, an anglicisation (of all things!) of a Shona word meaning a "stone house", which was used to denote a number of stone ruins dotted around Rhodesia, and particularly the mysterious ruins near Fort Victoria known as the Great Zimbabwe Ruins. The origin of these ruins has become the subject of a vast literature; and whether the ancestors of the present Rhodesian African nationalists, who lived in huts made of poles, mud and thatch, had anything to do with their erection is a matter for speculation. In any event, it is of dubious etymological propriety to name a *country* a "Stone House".

(ii) *Dress.* The African nationalist finds it essential to devise a "traditional" dress. Since the ancestors of many of the tribes of Africa wore only skins, this has naturally sometimes presented certain difficulties. President Nyerere, I strongly suspect, so far from wearing a traditional *tribal* garment, has elected to wear, instead, the typical costume of the Arab slave traders who

preyed upon his tribe before the white man came. Mr. Joshua Nkomo has been compelled to resort merely to a fur hat, possibly deeming a fur loin cloth inappropriate.

(iii) *Customs, Songs and Dances*. These, save for specially written nationalist songs, are usually legitimate enough; and a wise Rhodesian Government would itself foster these as part of our cultural heritage.

(c) *The Slogan*.

The slogan is one of the most effective of all propaganda devices, since an apt slogan replaces thought and dispenses with the need for argument. Such slogans are:—

(i) "*Freedom*". It is entirely the validity of this slogan that this book is questioning. Were the mass of Germans "free" to support Hitler, or the mass of Italians "free" to support Mussolini?

What, indeed, is the validity of the Double Standard that western politicians commonly apply to Africa? If a man is *not* free in a one-party state in Europe, such as Nazi Germany, why should a man be regarded as "free" if the one-party state in which he lives happens to be in Africa? If an African is regarded as *not* "free" because he lives in a country in which there is a common, but qualitative, franchise, why should he be regarded as any the more "free" if he lives in a country where, if he does not do exactly what he is told, he is knocked on the head?

The use of this word "Freedom" is thus an example of the empty promise so beloved of demagogues which, when "fulfilled", proves to be of no substance.

(ii) "*One-man-one-vote*". What history has established beyond all doubt is that attempts to put this principle into practice in Africa do indeed result in "*One-Man-one-vote*"—that is to say, one man has the *only* vote—be his name Nkrumah, Nyerere, or Banda. What is so difficult for the Rhodesians to understand is why the ethically insane find a Dictator in Europe abhorrent, yet a Dictator in Africa the normal thing. Why on earth a dictatorship should, with all the weird terminological

distortion of George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, be termed "African democracy" when it happens to be an African dictatorship, is extremely puzzling; and, if the British and American public accept such shoddy political and ethical thinking, they will surely have only themselves to blame if their interests in Africa are totally annihilated and Africa becomes a Communist arsenal.

(iii) "*Majority Rule*". Little did I think that I would ever live to see the day when I would hear a British Prime Minister employing this phrase! How true it is that slogans can take the place of thought!

Was there ever "majority rule" in Hitler's Germany?—Presumably on the criteria applied by African nationalism and by Mr. Harold Wilson the answer could be "yes"!

2. *The Polarising of Hate.*

(a) *Creating a Sense of Injury.*

A perfect example of the manner in which a sense of injury is created is the use to which Rhodesian nationalists put the Native Land Husbandry Act; and, if such sophisticated gentlemen as Dr. Terence Ranger a University Lecturer in History, and Mr. Clyde Sanger a journalist, are (apparently) deceived,* will not the simple, ignorant and illiterate peasant be the more deceived?

(b) *The Pejorative Epithet.*

Like the slogan, the pejorative epithet takes the place of thought and of argument, and canalises hatred in certain directions. Words like "imperialism", "stooge", "sell-out" and "tshombe" have enormously strong emotive overtones; and tend to create, almost instantaneously, hatred of those often completely innocuous individuals against whom they are directed.

(c) *The Distortion.*

It is reasonably easy to legislate against the pejorative epithet and similar methods of polarising hatred; but, without banning outright the publication concerned, it is very difficult indeed, if not impossible, to legislate against distortions. The play upon words whereby one

* See Chapter 10,

describes oneself as "firm" but the other man as "obstinate", and so on, is well known;* and every newspaperman is aware that the attitude of the general public towards a particular happening will largely depend on the manner in which it is reported, and that public attitudes can be materially influenced by a deliberate decision to print only facets of the news.

The story is told in the biography of the well-known British criminal lawyer, Marshall Hall, that he chanced to incur the wrath of the proprietor of a particular newspaper. That newspaper thereafter printed only reports of the cases that Marshall Hall lost, and not a single report of any case won by him. Marshall Hall found that this damaged his practice substantially, and he was eventually compelled to go to the newspaper proprietor and beg for mercy.

The newspaper had done nothing illegal. It had not printed a single falsehood. It had acted completely within its rights and within the law. Yet it had succeeded in conveying to the general public that Marshall Hall was an incompetent barrister, and had thus shown itself able to ruin a man's career by printing only a particular selection of the news.

Similarly, in its issue of the 26th August, 1962, in which it reported its own imminent banning, the *Daily News*, a Rhodesian newspaper for African consumption owned by Mr. Roy Thompson (who, on his own boast, publishes newspapers only in order to make money) declared in an editorial: "The *Daily News* staff has always acted within the highest ethics of its profession."

In the middle page spread of that same issue, the *Daily News* carried a report of the installation of street lighting in the African township of Highfield, Salisbury.

There can be little doubt that the residents were most appreciative of the provision of this amenity. But *this is nowhere stated, nor even hinted at.*

Instead, the *Daily News* chose to describe, with the assistance of three appropriately pathetic photographs, averaging in size 24 square inches each, how: "Mrs.

* One can go quite a long way merely by continually publishing flattering photographs of one's friends and unflattering photographs of one's enemies!

Joyce Matarutse looks at one of her three mango trees felled to make way for street-lighting." "Three-year-old Regina Phineas holds a stalk of bananas cut down during the clearance of ground for street lighting at Highfield." "Mrs. Sophia Mandizha said: 'Look at my twisted fence poles damaged when they felled a big, beautiful tree under which I used to sit whenever it was hot.'"

All perfectly legal! But the manner of handling this item of news, an example taken at random, is surely *conducive towards the transforming of the emotions of appreciation and gratitude of simple people into emotions of grievance, resentment and antipathy?*

(d) *The Lie*. The lie has always been a weapon of the politician, but the average Briton would hardly credit the bizarre type of lie that can find credence amongst the masses in Rhodesia. The National Democratic Party was spreading the story, *which was actually believed*, that the Rhodesian Government was causing arrows to appear upon Africans, who were then taken to Salisbury where they turned into animals and were made into corned beef!

3. *The Inducing of Fear.*

(a) *The Claim of Inevitable Victory*. Nationalist organisations always make a point of exaggerating their own strength. Nationalist reports of nationalist meetings always multiply the numbers present. African nationalism thus constantly claims to be the "band wagon" and hence, by implication, that it is folly not to support the party certain to succeed.

(b) *The Jeer, the Insult and the Pillory*. Jeers and insults are unpleasant enough, but the verbal pillory is a spine-chilling modern refinement. In a National Democratic Party publication, we find this comment: "Certain Africans are said to be happy to have soldiers in their houses. I haven't seen anyone except a certain P . . . P . . . But surely this P . . . should learn to be honest with himself. Lying will not get his increment." Thus the unfortunate P . . . (his name was given in full in the original) was as effectively pilloried

in print as any malefactor in a market square of Olde England.

(c) *Physical Violence.* Of all the tactics adopted by African nationalism, this is the most nauseating—its apparent reliance upon assault, arson and destruction, and deliberate murder.

When the National Democratic Party was banned, the outrages officially attributed to that organisation included incitements to violence, wholesale arson, organised civil disobedience, and destruction of property.

And, when, in September, 1962, the Zimbabwe African People's Union was banned, the Rhodesian Government issued a White Paper entitled "The Zimbabwe African People's Union (Z.A.P.U.)" in which details were given of outrages that took place between the 1st January, 1962, and the 15th September, 1962, and which included 33 petrol bombings (almost entirely of Africans and their homes), the burning of 18 schools (for African pupils), the burning of 10 churches, the destruction of agricultural installations and other amenities for rural Africans, 14 violently criminal acts against Africans in one month, a list of 21 convictions of Z.A.P.U. members, and 27 attacks on communications.

Let us define a "security offence" as any politically instigated or motivated offence against any person, any property, or against the State, with the object of bringing about an unconstitutional change in government.

It is, of course, impossible to attribute all the political offences committed in Rhodesia to the various African nationalist organisations then in existence, or to their supporters; and the writer would be reckless indeed were he to make any such allegation.

Nevertheless, it is quite clear that a very large number of individuals convicted for the committing of such offences were in fact proved to be supporters of African nationalist organisations. Further, figures obtained from official sources show that when the Zimbabwe African National Union and the People's Caretaker Council were formed in August, 1963, the number of security offences committed in Rhodesia rose from an average of 71 a month for the period April,

May, June and July of that year to 230 a month for the period August, September, October and November. That is to say, the number of such offences trebled.

Similarly, in 1964, in the four months *prior* to the banning of Z.A.N.U. and the P.C.C. there was an average of 651 security offences a month, but in the four months *after* the banning of the P.C.C. and Z.A.N.U. the rate decreased to 204 per month, dwindling from 835 in July to 117 in December.

It is of some interest to note that Z.A.N.U. supporters were not in the least loth to report to the police the criminal activities of the P.C.C. supporters, and that, equally, the P.C.C. supporters were nothing loth to report the activities of Z.A.N.U. supporters—but both groups strongly objected when Africans who were supporters of neither faction sought police protection. It must, hence, be emphasized once again that these offences were predominantly attacks by African nationalists upon other *Africans*, and that a number of these offences were committed in the course of political warfare between the two African nationalist organisations.

The Rhodesian Government has been severely criticised in various quarters for introducing the system of detaining particular politicians without trial. This, the critics argue, is a flouting of the Rule of Law.

But, *firstly*, those that organise political crime take care not to become involved themselves. Murder by proxy is fairly easy in Africa. The principal instigators of political crime simply tell someone else to tell someone else to tell someone else to commit the offences—the chain is made so lengthy that proof of guilt cannot be extended back to the primary instigator of the offence; and the actual perpetrators of criminal offences only commit them, not uncommonly, because they fear the consequences if they do not carry out the instructions so conveyed to them.

Secondly, even if the principal offender is detected, the witnesses are subjected to such intimidation that they are as often as not afraid to give evidence. Those who have the misfortune to have to take part in criminal

trials of a political nature well know that the predominant atmosphere is fear—fear on the part of the witnesses that they will, eventually, themselves be the victims of reprisals.

Thus the authorities are often left in the position of well knowing that a particular individual is the instigator of a series of political crimes, but that the possibilities of securing a conviction against him are very small. They have no alternative other than to detain him without trial.

What else is a government to do in such circumstances?—the United Kingdom Government has itself not hesitated to jail innumerable political offenders in the same fashion when this seemed necessary; and indeed, so I am advised, a great deal of Rhodesia's so-called "repressive" legislation is modelled on legislation for Ireland!

And one mistake my readers must not make is thinking that the offences in question are at all nice. Statistics concerning such matters do not have much effect on men's minds: it is the individual case that horrifies.

In the following pages are a few photographs of actual murders committed in the name of African nationalism in Rhodesia in the past few years. How many Britons would care to expose their wives and children to this? . . .



Sub-chief N . . . — shot through the heart with both barrels of a twelve-bore shotgun.

The Calculated Murder of a Chief.

By refusing to "co-operate", Sub-chief N. incurred the displeasure of a body that claimed to be the Committee of the banned People's Caretaker Council in a particular Tribal Trust Area; and two men were appointed to murder him.

They travelled 150 miles from Salisbury to the Chief's village in the Rusape District, which they reached late at night on the 10th October, 1964, when everyone was asleep.

They tied up the doors of the thatched huts in the village from outside with wire, imprisoning the sleeping occupants. They then set fire to the thatch.

Then they went to the Chief's small house. He was asleep at his wife's side. They leaned in through the window and, by the light of a torch, shot him with both barrels of a twelve-bore shotgun through the heart.



David Dodo — clubbed to death.

An African Police Reservist is Clubbed to Death.

David Dodo was an African Police Reservist. His crime was that he had, as a Police Reservist, just given evidence in a criminal trial in Salisbury on the 14th September, 1964.


On his way home that afternoon he was clubbed to death.

Subsequently, two supporters of the People's Caretaker Council were convicted and sentenced for their part in this attack.

Such are the risks that African Police Reservists have run in upholding law and order, and yet *there are 6,000 African Police Reservists in Rhodesia today.*

These men, it must be emphasized, are simply members of the African public who have indicated their willingness to undertake police duties when their ordinary day's work is over. Surely their existence, of itself, refutes the claim of the African nationalists to represent *ALL* Africans in Rhodesia?

Further, it will be seen that when one says "the witnesses were intimidated", the word "intimidated" is not just an empty word—the possibility of being murdered in this fashion is threat enough to appal even the most courageous.



Moses Mudene — clubbed to death.

Nationalist Eat Nationalist.

Each of the two banned nationalist organisations in Rhodesia—the People's Caretaker Council and the Zimbabwe African People's Union—claims to represent *ALL* the African people; and yet a large number of the "security offences" in Rhodesia have been committed in the course of clashes between the rival organisations.

One such victim was Moses Mundene. On the evening of Thursday the 18th June, 1964, a procession consisting largely of P.C.C. supporters wound its way through Mambo Township, Gwelo, singing political songs.

A group of Z.A.N.U. supporters put the procession to flight and beat Moses to death, crushing in his skull with knobkerries.

This illustrates that Africans, if given the opportunity, will support *more than one* political party. However, under African nationalist rule—as we have seen, for example, in Kenya—if one nationalist party comes to power, it proscribes the other party and declares the country a One-party State.

Is this "*Freedom*"?



Batoni Manda — paraffin was poured over him and set alight.

Nationalists will Kill on mere Suspicion.

Poor Batoni Manda was a humble immigrant working man from Malawi. His only crime was that he was suspected of having been sent by Dr. Banda from Malawi to liase with Z.A.N.U. and to "spy" on the P.C.C.

At 6.20 p.m. on the 17th June, 1964, a group of men forced their way into Batoni's room, hit him on the head, poured paraffin over him, and set him alight. He died in hospital next day from a fractured skull and 60% burns. The white patches on his body in the photograph are where the skin was burned away completely.

Essential Crown witnesses *who had witnessed the attack* were intimidated and refused to implicate the alleged accuseds, *going back on statements made to the police.*

Do the ethical bigots suggest that men known to be committing foul crimes like this should be left at liberty to continue such crimes—simply because they have successfully managed to terrorise witnesses into not giving evidence against them ?



Ernest Veli — stabbed to death.

The Completely Innocent Suffer Equally.

On the night of the 13th February, 1964, Mr. Joshua Nkomo was holding a meeting at 5, Malisa Road, Mambo Township, Gwelo.

Ernest Veli, a 19-year old lad, simply happened to be sauntering by; and a group of the P.C.C. supporters alleged to be "guarding" Mr. Nkomo caught his arms and accused him of belonging to Z.A.N.U. Before he could reply he was punched in the face. He broke away and ran. Two of the "guards" caught his arms, while a third stabbed him in the chest with a knife. Then they kicked his body about on the ground, until they realised that he was dead. His body was then tied on a bicycle, carried away, and dumped.

In the words of the Chief Justice of Rhodesia (with two other Judges of Appeal concurring): "The killing was a deliberate and brutal one. It was committed for no other reason than that the appellants believed that the deceased belonged to another political party and his presence in the neighbourhood at the time was resented."

One wonders whether Ernest Veli would have thought that this was "Freedom"?



Evangelista — murdered with petrol bombs.

Neither are Women and Children Spared.

At 2 a.m. on the 24th November, 1962, petrol bombs were thrown into Cottage 2239, New Highfield, Salisbury.

A young African woman, Evangelista, was taken to hospital suffering from 65% burns. She lingered on for more than a fortnight, and died on the 11th December.

Would Evangelista think this "*Freedom*"?

And the white Rhodesian's Turn?

The technique of African nationalism throughout Africa has been to concentrate upon subjugating the *African* FIRST. Only when this has been successfully accomplished is attention turned to the European.*

In Rhodesia, only one European has, to date, been the victim of a politically inspired murder: Petrus Johannes Andries Oberholster. He was clubbed and stabbed some ten times.

In Mrs. Oberholster's own words:—

"In the afternoon of Sunday the 4th July, 1964, we were returning from Umtali to our home at Silverstreams Wattle Factory. My husband was driving, and our four-year-old daughter, Elizabeth, was standing on the front seat between us. It was about six p.m. as we climbed the hill towards Skyline Junction; but, although it was getting dark, we did not have our lights on as we saw the road block—big stones.

We could not cross over it, and they were right across the road; so my husband stopped to take the stones away. As he stopped, he got out and they threw stones at him. I can remember seeing four Africans around the car. They came up to him, and I saw the one raise a knife above his head and stab downwards at my husband. It was so quick and all in such a rush that I did not see how many times he stabbed. It was quite a long knife.

Stones were coming from all round. I could not see very well. They broke the windscreen with stones. I got a stone on my jaw.

They threw petrol over my husband and in my eyes. I can't remember if they had it in a bottle or what. After a while, I said 'Let's go or they will pour petrol over us.'

He said 'I can't. They have stabbed me in the chest.'

* Although, in the absence of interference by Mr. Wilson and his collaborators, the Rhodesians are perfectly capable of maintaining law and order.

I said 'Please try', and so he did.

He closed the door, started the car, and drove over the stones. He drove until the car turned over in the ditch onto its side.

They ran up to the car and tried to put fire to the car. They threw matches on and in the car. Too bloody inside I think for matches to ignite—too much blood inside.

He sat on my lap when we fell over.

I said 'Please, you are too heavy. I can't get out.'

He said 'Can't you open the door?'

I said 'The car is on its side.'

He got up, flung the door open. He stood up until he could no longer stand.

As they tried to put fire to the car, it caught alight on the roof. I rubbed it with my hand to put it out.

I first thought I'd put the little girl out. Then I thought it would be dangerous, so we sat down. My husband then sat down as he could stand no longer.

I then saw the lights of the other car coming. I stood up slowly and so stopped it and asked for help. I put the girl out and the man asked me to get out.

I spoke to my husband, taking his arm; but he did not answer me. So I got out and I said 'What shall I do about my husband?'

He said that there was nothing that could be done, but that we should phone the police."

It must be emphasised again and again and again that 99 % of the victims of African nationalist terrorism have been *Africans*.

If, then, it is indeed "Freedom" that the African nationalists offer to the African, why should it be necessary for the African nationalist to wage a campaign of terror against fellow *Africans* ?

It is a question worth repeating, not once, but a hundred times ...

IF IT IS REALLY FREEDOM THAT THE NATIONALIST OFFERS, WHY IS IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO WAGE A CAMPAIGN OF TERROR AGAINST HIS FELLOW AFRICAN?

The truth is surely that the "Freedom" offered by African nationalism is not freedom at all? —Its leaders are self-elected; and, once they achieve power, that power is totalitarian power.

The pattern is well known. Within months of "Independence" the new ruler of an African State publicly announces that what suits Africans is, not "European Democracy", but "African Democracy"; and that henceforward his State will be a 'One-party State.

"Freedom" has come to yet another part of Africa!

CHAPTER 9

TODD AND WHITEHEAD

Mr. Garfield Todd.

On the 11th January, 1958, when Mr. Garfield Todd, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, returned from holiday, his entire Cabinet tendered their resignations. A Congress of the ruling political party, the United Federal Party, was held on the 8th February, and Mr. Todd was ousted from the leadership of the party in favour of Sir Edgar Whitehead, Rhodesia's representative in Washington at the time, who became Prime Minister.

Mr. Todd's downfall is, and has been, often cited as proof of the "illiberality" of white Rhodesians; and it is essential that the record be set straight.

All the Ministers in Mr. Todd's Cabinet addressed the Congress—Sir Patrick Fletcher, Mr. G. Ellman Brown, Mr. A. R. W. Stumbles, Mr. (now Sir) Cyril Hatty and then Mr. H. J. Quinton, in that order—and explained their reasons for resigning. Mr. Todd replied, supported by Sir George Davenport, Mr. A. E. Abrahamson and Mr. A. D. H. Lloyd, in turn. Sir Patrick then spoke a second time.

I took notes of the main speeches as best I could, and I am refreshing my memory from these notes while writing this Chapter.

The three main charges that his Cabinet brought against Mr. Todd were as follows:—

1. He had sought to make himself the very symbol of liberalism in Rhodesia, by constantly exaggerating his own role in the introduction of liberal legislation, and by minimising the part played by others.
2. He was driving a wedge between the black man and the white man by making it appear that he was the champion of the black man against the white.
3. He had completely abrogated the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility by acting entirely on his own in the most vital matters, often without

bothering to consult the Minister directly responsible.

It is impossible to give here an adequate summary of five long speeches. Sir Patrick Fletcher declared that almost all the "liberal" legislation passed during Mr. Todd's term of office had been initiated prior to that term of office, and that Mr. Todd had been ably and loyally supported by all his Ministers in securing the passage of legislation, yet Mr. Todd had succeeded, by constant public pronouncements, in securing all the credit for this legislation for himself to the discredit of his own Ministers, so that it was invariably described as "Todd's".

Sir Patrick went on to criticise Mr. Todd for publicly attacking his political allies, Lord Malvern and Sir Roy Welensky, for raising expectations amongst the African peoples that it would be quite impossible—for economic reasons—to satisfy, and for indulging in such manoeuvres as discussing the dismemberment of the Department of Native Affairs with others without ever advising Sir Patrick himself who, as Minister of Native Affairs, was the Minister directly responsible.

The other four Ministers supported Sir Patrick. There had been complete harmony for the first three and a half years of Mr. Todd's government, they said; but Mr. Todd's attitude had changed in 1957, and there had been a series of incidents with cumulative effect, rising to a crisis in the making of an important industrial wage award by Mr. Todd without the requisite prior consultation with his Cabinet.

Mr. Cyril Hatty was visibly moved as he described how he had placed Mr. Todd upon a pedestal, and how it had even affected his health to find thereafter that his idol had feet of clay. There was no truth, declared Mr. Hatty, in suggestions that there had been an intrigue against Mr. Todd or that the "liberal" attitude of Mr. Todd was the cause of the dispute. Cabinet meetings were cut short or postponed and Mr. Todd never consulted his Cabinet concerning proposed speeches, so that it was with trepidation that Mr. Todd's Ministers opened the newspaper each morning in order to as-

certain what their leader had said the previous day.

Mr. Stumbles described Mr. Todd's growing disregard for discussion and collective responsibility. In Mr. Ellman Brown's words, backbenchers were blatantly ignored and Cabinet meetings were a farce.

Mr. Ellman Brown had himself prepared certain African housing schemes; Mr. Stumbles had steered the Franchise Bill through the House; and Sir Patrick had been personally responsible for four particularly liberal measures—yet Mr. Todd had taken the sole credit. In Mr. Ellman Brown's earthy but vivid phraseology, Fletcher had been Dan the Sanitary Man, and Todd had taken all the kudos.

A particularly vivid example of Mr. Todd's failure to keep his Cabinet advised of developments was that Mr. Todd, in his capacity as Minister of Native Education, had more than doubled the intake of African school pupils without advising his Cabinet, and, most particularly, the Minister of the Treasury—who, without warning, had thereafter to find the money for 5-600 additional teachers.

Mr. Todd defended himself eloquently and with spirit. He frankly admitted some of the charges, and apologised for them; and he minimised and excused himself of others. But—and this is important—what was also abundantly clear, both in press reports and at one stage at least in the Congress, was that either Mr. Todd, or all his former Ministers, were quite deliberately not telling the truth: Sir Patrick indeed stood up at one stage, whilst Mr. Todd was speaking, and said words to the following effect: "Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have requested me to state that what Mr. Todd has just said is a travesty of the truth."

I will confess that at the time I found it difficult to decide in favour of either group, but the subsequent actions of Mr. Todd have now left me in no doubt whatsoever. These actions were:—

1. Having pledged himself to support Sir Edgar Whitehead, he did not in subsequent speeches appear to me to honour that obligation.

The reasons for the resignation of Mr. Todd from the United Federal Party on the 24th April, 1958, are in dispute; and one account certainly has it that Mr. Todd was virtually compelled to resign from Sir Edgar's Cabinet because certain of his colleagues refused to remain in that Cabinet with Mr. Todd.

Nevertheless, having resigned, Mr. Todd formed a new Party on the 29th April, the United Rhodesia Party, and henceforward opposed his old Party bitterly. On the 9th February, 1959, Mr. Todd extended the United Rhodesia Party to form the Federation-wide Central African Party, with Sir John Moffat as its leader in Northern Rhodesia.

2. Mr. Todd's former Ministers, with the exception of Sir Patrick Fletcher who retired, remained in the United Federal Party and loyally supported Sir Edgar Whitehead in the implementation of policies that were just as "liberal", if not more so, than those of Mr. Todd.
3. Sir Edgar Whitehead himself said at Mazoe on the 30th April, 1965: "I have never before seen such a personality cult. Mr. Todd has claimed the credit for every section of development in Southern Rhodesia during his period as Prime Minister.
"He has claimed the credit for Southern Rhodesia's good race relations, but it was only in the last year of Mr. Todd's premiership that we had any troubles. Mr. Todd is the one man who endangered race relations."
4. It seemed to me that Mr. Todd's pronouncements after his fall from office became wilder and wilder and more and more irresponsible, fully justifying the remark made by Sir Roy Welensky on the 20th February, 1960: "I am getting a little tired of Mr. Todd's touring the world and posing as the champion of causes of which he took a very much more realistic and responsible view when in office."

Indeed, Mr. Todd had been speaking in Europe, in the United States, in the United Kingdom and

in Australasia, and in the course of his travels he is reported to have made the following comments:—

- (a) On the 24th May, 1959, he decried the proposed Kariba Dam Scheme, using the phrase "spectre of Kariba".
- (b) I think that it was at the same time that Mr. Todd said of the Preventive Detention Act that the Rhodesian Government was making unscrupulous use of its powers for political ends.

Mr. Todd held office as Prime Minister from September, 1953, until the 11th January, 1958; and in making such pronouncements, he no doubt preferred to overlook his own "firmness" in handling the Wankie Strike, his deportation of at least one European without trial, and—most particularly—the fact that it was his own Government that introduced the first so-called "repressive" legislation, the most important of these statutes being the Public Order Act (No. 31 of 1955), promulgated on the 2nd September, 1955.

- (c) On the 24th June, 1959, and the 8th July, 1959, Mr. Todd publicly stated that there should be no talk of Dominion status for the Federation and lent his support to the proposition that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be permitted to break away from the Federation.
- (d) On the 1st February, 1960, Mr. Todd solemnly declared, with some poetic relish:

"I say solemnly that our house is on fire—it is on fire with racial feelings and racial aspirations."

- (e) On the 23rd June, 1960, he is reported to have told a Shabani audience that Rhodesia then faced the "harsh reality of depression and unemployment".
5. The final step taken by Mr. Todd, which completely destroyed him politically in Southern Rhodesia, was reported in the Rhodesia Herald of the 27th July, 1960. Without deeming it necessary to consult

his own Party, Mr. Todd signed his name to a letter addressed to the British Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Lord Home, urging that the Southern Rhodesia Constitution be set aside and that a "democratic order be substituted for it", and urging that British troops be sent to the Federation to ensure this. The three other signatories to the letter were three leading members of the N.D.P.

Sir John Moffat instantly disassociated himself from the letter, and so did the leaders of the Central Africa Party in Southern Rhodesia; and Mr. Todd was compelled to resign from that Party shortly afterwards.

In thus acting in such fashion in concert with the leaders of an African nationalist organisation, without even consulting the leaders of his own Party, it seems to me that Mr. Todd fully corroborated the charges brought against him by his previous Ministers that he completely disregarded the principles of collective Cabinet responsibility; and, because of these subsequent actions of Mr. Todd, I am completely convinced today that it was not because he was a "liberal" that Mr. Todd was rejected by his Cabinet. With this final step Mr. Todd lost the support of even the most extreme of Rhodesian liberals.

Sir Edgar Whitehead.

As, possibly, the first person within the United Federal Party to have stated semi-publicly that Sir Edgar Whitehead should be replaced, my own reasons for so deciding may be of some interest.

The accusation that is levelled at the Rhodesians is—again—that they rejected Sir Edgar Whitehead because of his too "liberal" policy. It appears that Sir Edgar himself has chosen to strengthen that view, since he is reported to have said in the course of a television interview in Britain on the 15th November, 1965: "The moves that I was making to bring about a com-

pletely non-racial state were rejected in December, 1962, by a small majority."

Again, this is not true, and while it is painful to have to attack one's former leader, it is essential in the interests of Rhodesia that the record be set right. —What the Electorate rejected in 1962 was, not Sir Edgar's liberalism, but Sir Edgar Whitehead.

The tragedy of 1961 and 1962 was, quite simply, that Sir Edgar applied the mind of an Einstein to a situation demanding the capacity of a Bonaparte.

I myself first came to know Sir Edgar reasonably closely when I was accorded the honour of being selected to act as his chauffeur, personal assistant and sole travelling companion on a speaking tour of Rhodesia lasting from Wednesday the 12th July until Saturday the 15th July, 1961, in the course of which we travelled several hundreds of miles with Sir Edgar making speeches in support of the constitutional proposals at Fort Victoria, Shabani, Gwelo and Que Que.

A true anecdote may illustrate Sir Edgar's love of the devious.

As we sped along on the first leg of our tour, Sir Edgar began to tell me that the speed limit in the United States of America was strictly 60 m.p.h. (which I rather doubted); and that there was the system in that country that magistrates were available all day and all night, and any motorist driving more than 60 m.p.h. was immediately taken into Court and summarily fined one dollar for every 1 m.p.h. by which he had exceeded the speed limit.

I found it an interesting little comment, and continued gaily on my way.

Then Sir Edgar told me how Mr. McCrum, when driving Sir Edgar back from Marandellas, was embarrassed because there was a police car immediately behind and he could not drive fast.

I continued to drive as gaily as before.

Then Sir Edgar told me how, sometimes, there were drawbacks about being a Prime Minister—for one thing,

when one was travelling, the police in each village checked as one passed, and then radioed the news ahead to the next village. They could not, hence, fail to notice if the Prime Minister's car were exceeding the speed limit—Sir Roy Welensky had in fact been approached by the Commissioner of Police a short time previously and asked not to exceed the speed limit and so to cause embarrassment to his men.

Only then did I realise that I had just been subjected to a series of elaborate hints to slow down, and did so. Four days later, as we drove back to Salisbury, I remarked: "You know, Sir Edgar—I did not believe a word of what you said." Sir Edgar grinned. I later checked and found the latter anecdote to be completely untrue.

Those who came to know Sir Edgar at all closely came to have a great affection for him and an enormous respect for his intellectual powers, particularly his memory (which he may have developed in order to compensate for poor sight and poor hearing); but his chief intellectual defect may be summed up by the comment of a director of a national newspaper, who said to me that he had several times visited Sir Edgar in the hope of making suggestions to him that might prove valuable—"But what," he sighed wearily, "can you tell a man who knows all the answers already?"

Sir Edgar was, I understand, partly educated in Germany; and certainly he was possessed of certain mental traits commonly attributed to those of Teutonic origin. He was, for example, somewhat rigid in outlook, and would announce his political intentions—such as the time when he intended to hold the next general election—months ahead, thus depriving himself of the valuable tactical element of surprise.

I have, in Chapter 6, outlined the fiasco of the 1961 Constitution; but this I can affirm of my own knowledge (having heard Sir Edgar address public meetings on the subject of the 1961 Constitutional Proposals at the very least five times): everywhere he went, Sir Edgar gave his audiences (and myself) the impression that the proposed Constitution would bring full Independence

in the sense that *the United Kingdom Government would, if the proposed new Constitution were introduced, henceforward not be able to intervene in Rhodesian affairs*; and that the only restrictions that would bind Rhodesia *vis-a-vis* Great Britain would be in regard to international treaties, the *formal* position of the Governor as the Queen's representative, and the rights of stockholders under the Colonial Stocks Act.

Indeed, Sir Edgar assured me privately that Rhodesia would to all intents and purposes have Dominion Status; and he enlarged upon the paradox that it might even be said that Rhodesia, a mere one state within a federation of states, would have a greater degree of independence than the Federation of which it was a part.

It was not until May, 1964, when I had read Dr. Hirsch's *Focus on Southern Rhodesia* that I learned for the first time of the marked discrepancies between the proposed constitution as set out in the two White Papers and the Rhodesian 1961 Constitution as finally promulgated.

And it was not until December, 1965, when I eventually found time to read in the British *Hansard* the record of the Debates in the British House of Commons of the Constitutional Proposals and of the Constitutional Bill, that I finally came to realise that Sir Edgar Whitehead should have known all along that *the United Kingdom Government had at no time had any intention of granting Independence to Rhodesia*.

Why, then, if he *did* know this, did Sir Edgar lead the Rhodesian Electorate to believe that Rhodesia would be gaining her Independence?—and why should Mr. MacMillan's Government have co-operated with him in leading the Rhodesian Electorate into this belief?

The answer may perhaps be found in a remark made to me by Sir Edgar when we were near the dam wall of Lake MacIlwaine, on our way back from the tour round Rhodesia.

"You know," Sir Edgar mused, "if we get this Constitution through, the Dominion Party (which was then the Opposition) will never be able to get back into power again. It will be finished."

Did Sir Edgar Whitehead's anxiety to achieve this object blind him to the fact that *the United Kingdom Government was deliberately allowing him to use a false promise of Independence as a bait for destroying (as it and Sir Edgar thought) Sir Edgar's chief political opponents—the Right Wing parties in Rhodesia?*

Since the two main predominantly European parties were able to gain an almost equal number of votes from the predominantly European Electorate, Sir Edgar—so I believe—calculated that the African voters enfranchised by the new franchise provisions that formed a part of the new Constitution *would tip the balance decisively and permanently in his own direction:* and the so-called Build-a-Nation Campaign shortly to be mentioned, ostensibly established to promote harmony and good will between the races, was eventually to become little more than a campaign for the enrolling of African voters, which—if successful—might well have had the effect of totally destroying the Right Wing.

The British Government, anxious lest Rhodesia should pursue policies that would discriminate against the African on racial grounds (its policy elsewhere in Africa revealed that it considered the white man expendable), in my own belief thus used Sir Edgar *in order, so it believed, to ensure the destruction of those political parties that might promote such policies in Rhodesia.*

Sir Edgar Whitehead quoted the British *Hansard* on more than one occasion, so that he well knew what was going on in London; and it is difficult to believe that, with his acute intelligence, and with the information at his disposal as Prime Minister, he did not know that the "Independence" given in the 1961 Constitution, far from being "90% Independence", was in fact not true Independence in any sense of the word.

Be that as it may, the insertion of Section 111 into the 1961 Constitution went generally unnoticed in Rhodesia until too late, because the legislation introducing that 1961 Constitution was, not Rhodesian, but *British* legislation, which was never debated in the Rhodesian Parliament; and, before being entitled to hold forth on "illegal regimes" in Rhodesia, British parliamentarians would do well to examine their own

consciences in regard to this Section 111, and in regard to the false promises of "Independence" that were then made to the Rhodesians.

Certainly in 1962 I believed, and I believe that 99 % of the Electorate believed, that we had obtained our Independence in all but name; and it was in a frame of mind almost approaching amusement that I read in the newspapers that the new Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Field, had on the 18th June, 1963, moved the following motion in the Legislative Assembly: "That the House takes note of the exchange of correspondence between the Southern Rhodesia Government and the United Kingdom Government regarding the negotiations for the granting of full Independence within the Commonwealth to Southern Rhodesia upon the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland."

Was not the granting of such "full Independence" now a mere formality? Did not Rhodesia, to all intents and purposes, have full Independence already? Had not we, who had laboured so manfully to secure the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, already done all the spadework?

Only as the months passed did the bitter realisation come—to myself, to the entire Electorate—that the "Independence" we had gained in 1961 was not (formally, at any rate) "Independence" in any sense of the word whatsoever.

The Rhodesian Front chose "Independence!" as its battle cry, and the British Government was to find that—"this even-handed justice commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice to our own lips"—by so doing the Rhodesian Front was able to cause domestic issues to become apparently irrelevant in Rhodesian politics, to out-manoeuvre the liberals completely, and to destroy Sir Edgar Whitehead and those associated with him.

The temporary eclipse of liberalism in Rhodesia is hence in my view directly attributable to what I now believe to be this deliberate deception of the Rhodesian Electorate.

But my knowledge of the difference between the two White Papers and the eventual 1961 Constitution

was, on the 26th July, 1961, not yet; and, when we won the Referendum, we rejoiced. Dressed in Police Reserve uniform (for my unit of the Police Reserve was on duty that week from 4 a.m. to 10 p.m. each day), I was the last to leave the Prime Minister's residence to go on duty in the early hours of the following morning, leaving my car in the Residence grounds.

But the jubilation was short-lived.

The problem became Sir Edgar Whitehead.

Within the party, we all knew it, Sir Edgar WOULD NOT LISTEN.

We admired him, we liked him, we were—indeed—fond of him. But SIR EDGAR WOULD NOT LISTEN.

The simple truth is that, although Professor Einstein had a remarkable brain, and although Professor Einstein may have supplied much of the theory that made possible the development of the atomic bomb, no-one in his right mind would have placed Professor Einstein in charge of the Manhattan Project.

At the end of July, 1961, Sir Edgar appeared to have the world at his feet; and it is only fair to say that he and his Government secured the passage of a great deal of very sound legislation (which included an excellent Industrial Conciliation Act that Mr. Todd had been unable to get through Parliament), but blunder followed blunder . . .

There was, for example, the Build-a-Nation Campaign . . .

Excellent in conception, it was—so the Rhodesians were told—intended to be an all-out drive to teach to the populace of Rhodesia the basic elements of good citizenship, and to weld together the races in good fellowship; but it was, at the time, aptly described as an endeavour to spread a religion without a creed, without a bible, and without a prophet.

It was a muddle from start to finish.

The Campaign was supposed to be a non-party, a national, effort, and advertisements were placed in newspapers asking for voluntary workers. But what use

was made of those who volunteered?—In one part of Salisbury, at least, the letters of those volunteering were bundled up and sent without a word of explanation to the local Hon. Secretary of the United Federal Party Branch where they lay in a drawer until torn up or lost.

Full-time African "organisers" were employed to spread the gospel, and learned Queen's Counsel were requested to lecture these bewildered unfortunates on, virtually, the metaphysics of civics—it apparently did not occur to anyone that a brief resume of the reasons for the introduction of the Native Land Husbandry Act might be more valuable in promoting good will between the races than all the high level "civics" in the world. And, in the interests of promoting good will, the organisation became lost in trivial particularities—helping Mrs. X to find a home, or assisting to find employment for Mr. Y—when what was needed was (a) a clear conception of what the populace most needed to know, with (b) the utmost use of mass media in order to "get it across" to them.

The Campaign ended with a few full-time African organisers driving round Rhodesia in Land Rovers desperately trying to persuade as many Africans as possible to enroll as voters.

But this was by no means the chief reason for Sir Edgar Whitehead's unpopularity . . . Sir Edgar had never been a popular man. I well remember in my youth the farmers in my district fulminating concerning "Whitehead"—on matters in no way connected with race; and I shall now recount in some detail the affair which, in my view, was the beginning of the end for Sir Edgar Whitehead's Government.

At ten past seven in the morning on Sunday the 10th December, 1961, we Rhodesians heard Sir Edgar Whitehead make the following Broadcast to the Nation :-

"During the past few weeks there have been clear indications that intimidation has been stepped up beyond all bounds. No African who disagrees openly with the tenets of the National Democratic

Party is safe from molestation. They have attempted to impose a reign of terror against any opponent of the party. Those who remember the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany will understand only too well the symptoms.

If the Government of Southern Rhodesia permits the continuance of the N.D.P. as presently constituted, there can be no liberty or democratic life in the Colony under the new Constitution. Their history has been one of brutality and violence against anyone who disagrees with them. Their aim is a one-party state . . .

The party is abolished for the sins it has committed after two years of very fair trial. . .

Our new Constitution demands a spirit of tolerance and non-racialism which the late party has never been prepared to accept. We are determined to have a society in which everybody can express his own views without fear of violence from those who disagree with him . . . We are determined that the ordinary men and women in this country shall be able to express their political opinions free from the fear that one political party will burn their homes, offer them violence, or injure them in their businesses, and demand that everybody shall obey the dictates of a party controlled financially from outside the borders of Central Africa. With the new Constitution that has been granted to us we are determined to build a non-racial state in which people of all races can live in happiness together."

The following editorial appeared in *The Sunday Mail* on that same morning under the heading "The Only Way":—

"Sir Edgar Whitehead has taken the only course open to him in banning the National Democratic Party . . .

For months the public has impatiently watched Mr. Nkomo turn his Party into a major subversive organisation intent on destroying orderly government in this country.

The N.D.P. was rapidly becoming a strong-arm society directed by power-hungry and unscrupulous men and operated by thugs whose weapons of intimidation were the stone and the petrol bomb.

No civilised government could tolerate this for long. The democratic rights of freedom of movement and speech become a mockery when both are used with the intention of destroying democracy.

The N.D.P., which draws funds from sources with Communist affiliations, has been encouraged by the constant proof in Colonial Africa that violence pays.

Southern Rhodesia has embarked on a policy that must lead inevitably to the end of all race and colour discrimination. IT IS A POLICY THAT MUST ONE DAY ALSO LEAD TO A GOVERNMENT PREDOMINANTLY BLACK.

But the Government is determined that merit and merit alone shall determine when that day will be. ANY OTHER COURSE WOULD BE TO HAND THE COUNTRY OVER TO MOB RULE."*

But all this sounded, to the African public, too good to be true. An ordinary member of that public, working in his garden, said: "We are all glad. But we are not sure. You may have killed its name. But have you killed its spirit?"

His fears were to prove only too well-founded.

In the Press, the very next day—the 11th December—an anxious public read: "N.D.P. LEADERS ARE TO FORM NEW POLITICAL PARTY."—Mr. T. G. Silundika, the Secretary-General of the banned party, had said that the ban "naturally makes the formation of another organisation to carry on the struggle automatic"; and on the 12th December *The Rhodesia Herald* reported that "The Southern Rhodesia Government had 'no comment' to make last night on the announcement that a new political organisation would be formed by the leaders of the now outlawed N.D.P."

* The Editor's own italics and block capitals.

On the 13th December, the Herald reported: "The debate in the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly on the banning of the N.D.P. has not yet answered the question uppermost in the minds of many people—is the Government going to take steps to prevent a new party, with identical ideas of achieving its aims, arising from the ashes of the N.D.P.?"

Also on the 13th, the Herald reported: "NKOMO IN NEW PARTY TALKS.—The former leader of the proscribed National Democratic Party, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, met former executive members at Highfield today to discuss the formation of a new party."

On the 17th December, the Political Correspondent of *The Sunday Mail* described the alleged criminal activities of the National Democratic Party under the banner headline: "N.D.P. TERRORISM HAD SPREAD TO A FANTASTIC LIMIT IN S.R."

Yet what did Rhodesians find when they opened their newspapers on Monday the 18th December?

This . . .

Mr. Joshua Nkomo had announced the formation of a new party—the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union {Z.A.P.U.}—which contained several of the same Office Bearers as the N.D.P.

The Rhodesian public were stupefied! Here you ban a group of people as allegedly—to all intents and purposes — a gang of criminals. And then, having banned it, only a week later you allow the leaders of the alleged "gang" to proceed straightaway to form yet another "gang"!!!

To me that 18th December, 1961, was thus clearly the beginning of the end for Sir Edgar Whitehead in Rhodesian politics. British admirals have been shot for a great deal less.

This permitting of Z.A.P.U. to rise like a phoenix out of the ashes of the N.D.P. allegedly to wage a similar reign of terror until it was in turn banned on the 20th September, 1962, was perhaps the crowning ineptitude of Sir Edgar's Government (if one excludes the fiasco of the 1961 Constitution), but of subsidiary blunders there were many . . .

The whole essence and point of Sir Edgar's policy was that of promoting friendship between the races, largely by inducing the African populace to play its full part in constitutional government; but *Sir Edgar permitted the African nationalists to destroy any possibility of success of that policy:—*

1. With a total lack of administrative skill, he permitted purported African nationalists to wage a campaign of terror against the "moderate" African.

In combating that reign of terror, the police felt that they had little governmental support, and they were compelled to work enormously long and exhausting hours. They had to work week days, public holidays and weekends alike, when some elementary step, such as the prohibition of political activity on Sundays, would at least have brought some respite.

Obvious necessary steps were not taken. If a man were arrested for subversive activity, he was as often as not allowed out on bail and was thus enabled to continue his subversive activity for several weeks or months while awaiting trial; and, if convicted, he was often again allowed out on bail and permitted to continue his activities for a further several weeks or months while awaiting the hearing of his appeal. The maintaining of law and order became a joke; the police were in despair . . .

How was it possible for Sir Edgar to expect to gain any African support whatsoever when, through sheer ineptitude, he permitted a state of affairs to continue in which any African who supported him openly well knew that there was a strong possibility that he, together with his family, would be murdered?

2. The Government's propaganda effort, so sorely needed, was pitiful in the extreme; and, although the need for this was continually mooted at political congresses, there was no appreciable improvement.

3. The propaganda campaign of African nationalism was, on the other hand, permitted to flourish largely unchecked. The Rhodesian public soon came to feel that these men were being permitted to say what they liked—no matter how subversive—where they liked, and when they liked.

Sir Edgar Whitehead's failure to take adequate steps to counteract such propaganda made inevitable his own loss of African support, and contributed materially to his own subsequent defeat at the polls. The white Rhodesians were repelled by that failure, and the black Rhodesians (including potential voters) succumbed to the propaganda—especially to oft-repeated declarations that an African nationalist "take-over" was imminent, accompanied with threats as to what would happen to United Federal Party supporters when that "take-over" came about.

The first requisite of any government is that it should *govern*, and the feeling became general in Rhodesia that Sir Edgar's Government was permitting subversive elements to do almost what they liked; and to "get away with murder".

Perhaps partly as a reaction to the charges levelled against Mr. Todd, Sir Edgar's Government also carried the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility to ridiculous extremes. The smallest decisions were referred to full meetings of the Cabinet, with the result that the ordinary day-to-day conduct of government affairs was slowed down to an impossible degree. Indeed it was said at the time that a private meeting had been held by the Heads of all the Government Departments in order to consider the problem of how to counteract the constant delays in the taking of administrative decisions. Added to which, the entire country was of the opinion that certain Cabinet changes were imperative—but Sir Edgar chose to disregard that opinion until too late.

Towards the end of 1962, the unpopularity of the Government, and hence of the United Federal Party, was becoming so obvious that the Chairmen of the

various Branches of the United Federal Party were invited to a series of meetings held at Sir Edgar's official residence, Northwood, in order to discuss with Sir Edgar and the Standing Committee of the United Federal Party plans for improving the Party "image".

I personally suggested to Sir Edgar at one such meeting that where the Party was at fault was not so much in *policy*, as in *administration*—in the day to day administration of the affairs of the country.

Sir Edgar knew perfectly well what I meant. He chose to dodge the suggestion. A certain Mr. Paterson had just been engaged by the Government to investigate the organisation of the civil service of Rhodesia in order to ascertain how its administration might be improved. Sir Edgar chose to evade my point by replying that in consequence of the Paterson Report the functions of the Civil Service would be greatly de-centralised with a consequent marked increase in efficiency. That was not what I had meant, and Sir Edgar knew it.

It may have been at that meeting, or at a later one—but certainly also at Northwood—that the question of the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act arose. The 1962 General Election was beginning to loom ahead of us, and the repeal of this contentious measure was one of the proposed Party planks. Now, I believed then, and I still believe—and this can be confirmed by glancing at my own 1965 Election Manifesto—that the Rhodesian Electorate is prepared to accept a staged repeal of the Land Apportionment Act; that is to say, the Rhodesian Electorate is prepared to accept the repeal of the Act *providing it is done in such a way that their own homes, which do—after all—represent for many the major part of the savings of a lifetime, are not rendered worthless in every way by the sudden inrush of the backward masses.*

But Sir Edgar was not prepared to listen to any suggestions in regard to a staged repeal of the Act—it was to be all or nothing . . .

One of the final, and not altogether minor, ineptitudes in regard to that General Election of the 14th December, 1962, was its date. A very large proportion of the "B" Roll voters that Sir Edgar hoped would vote

for him were African schoolmasters. But, by polling day, the schools had broken up for the Christmas Holidays, the African schoolmasters had scattered to their homes throughout the length and breadth of Rhodesia, and they were nowhere to be found. Sir Edgar had chosen for the day of that General Election a day when large numbers of African voters—on whose support he relied—would not be available! The African support he had hoped for was not forthcoming—only some ten per cent of the 11,000 Africans then registered took the trouble to vote.

The once-mighty United Federal Party went down to defeat; and—in defeat—no leadership, nor policy even, was to be found. What became absolutely clear as time passed was that Rhodesia would not, ever again, accept the leadership of Sir Edgar Whitehead; and, what was more unfortunate still, the United Federal Party had dwindled so greatly that there was no obvious heir within its ranks.

I felt that my own position was becoming impossible. The Party had about half-a-dozen Regional Councils representing the different regions of Rhodesia; and it was at a meeting of the Salisbury Region Council of the United Federal Party towards the end of 1963 that I suggested that a change of leadership was essential, for without a change of leadership there was no hope whatsoever that the United Federal Party would ever again be returned to power. A number of those present supported me, and to my surprise I was elected a member of the Executive Committee of that Council.

I found, at the first Committee Meeting, that every single person present agreed with my views, but that not a single person present was prepared to do anything about it; and, feeling that I did not care to say things concerning my Party Leader that I had not said to him in person, I went to see Sir Edgar at the Legislative Assembly Building.

Sir Edgar, as always, was courtesy itself, offering me tea and seating me in a comfortable chair.

Then it began . . .

He was, explained Sir Edgar, terribly busy in Parliament these days. Geoff (Ellman-Brown) was too busy with his numerous directorships. Blair (Ewing) had accepted a post with an efficiency firm, it being a condition of his acceptance of the post that he should not stand for Parliament again.

And so it went. In that devious way of his, Sir Edgar ploughed steadily through the list of all possible contenders for the leadership of the United Federal Party, making it perfectly clear that, in his own opinion, he was indispensable. He must have spoken for half an hour. I did not get a word in edgeways. He made no attempt whatsoever to ascertain what was troubling me.

I think it was about a fortnight later, in December, that I publicly resigned from the Party.

The United Federal Party did elect a new leader at a Congress in the following year, but by that time the Party "image" was damaged beyond all repair; and, being able to choose the "Independence" issue as its main party plank, the Rhodesian Front was able to deliver the *coup-de-grace* to the Rhodesia Party (which for all practical purposes took the place of the United Federal Party) in the General Election of the 7th May, 1965, when the Rhodesia Party failed to capture a single "A" Roll seat.

Some eight months later I was to read an article by Sir Edgar published in *The Illustrated London News* of the 4th December, 1965. Sir Edgar stated his solution to Rhodesia's difficulties in the following words:—

"My solution—the only one I have been able to think of, for I have seen no practical solution put forward by anyone else—is a complete act of union between Britain and Rhodesia. I mean by this, the union should be so complete that Rhodesia will be just as much a part of the United Kingdom as Devon or Cornwall. Every Rhodesian man or woman, irrespective of race, would be able to elect their representatives to the House of Commons . . .

Many British people have expressed to me the fear that crowds of Africans would wish to come

to Britain in the event of an act of Union. This is an entirely unreasonable and false view."

These two passages from the article well illustrate Sir Edgar's qualities as a politician—a man with a golden tongue, with daring ideas, but totally out of touch with reality.

Britain has, with the Commonwealth Immigration Act, only just INTRODUCED *apartheid* into her portion of the Commonwealth. Large numbers of the British people are very happy indeed to condemn *apartheid* when it is five thousand miles away, but if there were the choice before them of a *pro-apartheid* political party and an *anti-apartheid* political party in respect of residence in Britain, there is little doubt that the supporters of *apartheid* would win. Sir Edgar has made the elementary mistake of believing that, because many Britons staunchly uphold moral rectitude at the expense of others, these same Britons will—necessarily—place moral rectitude first when it is at their own expense! I am of the opinion that Sir Edgar is totally mistaken in his belief that Africans would not flock to Britain. And, speaking for myself, I would rather see myself destitute than let Rhodesia become a mere British county—it perhaps didn't occur to Sir Edgar that some of us love Rhodesia.

CHAPTER 10

ETHICAL INSANITY IN ACTION

As suggested in previous Chapters, "ethical insanity" may take several forms: one may find oneself loving neighbour *more* than self; one may find oneself falling into the trap of seeking to apply so-called "good" principles without pausing first to consider whether, in the special circumstances, they can in fact be successfully applied; one may find oneself subscribing to the double standard; or else one's sympathies may be so one-sided that they completely distort one's vision.

The people of all nations depend for information upon the mass media—newspapers, periodicals, radio and television; and it is obvious that, if these mass media themselves paint a distorted picture, then an entire nation may be caused to become "ethically insane".

For the purposes of this study I have, most appropriately, taken the issue of *Time* magazine of the 5th November, 1965, which has a cover story entitled "*The White Man in Black Africa*", and which also has on its cover a portrait of Mr. Ian Smith. I have chosen to examine *Time* because it is a periodical with a world-wide circulation and one that I myself read every week. If grave distortions are to be found in a periodical such as *Time*, one may be sure that large numbers of people throughout the world will, in consequence, now be suffering to some extent from ethical astigmatism.

1. "*Loving neighbour more than self.*" —Is *Time* guilty of this ?

On its first news page, it declares: "Few Stateside Americans have been altogether aware of the scope and savagery of the war in Vietnam, or even perceived how deep in the thick of things their nation is there . . . the average American, cushioned by prosperity and a span

of 8,500 miles, has found it hard to realise that the struggle in South East Asia is indeed a war. But it is."

Thus *Time* is perfectly well aware that the United States is engaged in a full scale war against Communism in Vietnam, with enormous cost in American lives and money.

Time purports to support, always, the interests of the American nation; and *Time* is also aware of the strong and increasing Communist influence in the African States of Africa. For instance, *Time* states on page 33 of this issue that in 1965 President Nyerere of Tanzania confiscated 34,000 acres of white-owned farmlands merely to assuage African resentments "*and perhaps to undercut Communist pressures from within the government*", the clear implication being that those "Communist pressures within the government" must be not inconsiderable.

Time must also be only too well aware that, had political control over Tanzania not been handed over to African nationalism, the dangers of Tanzania ever becoming a Communist satellite would have been negligible; and, similarly, *Time* must know only too well that, so long as white Rhodesians retain control in Rhodesia, Communism cannot spread into Rhodesia, but that, the minute that Rhodesia is handed over to the African nationalists, there will be created a very real danger that Rhodesia will in a very short while fall within the Communist sphere of influence.

Nevertheless, whilst Americans are fighting and dying in the course of opposing Communism in Vietnam, *Time* is, for so-called "ethical" reasons, encouraging its Government to adopt a course of action in Rhodesia that could possibly in the very near future cause the whole of Rhodesia—approximately another 100 million acres of Africa—to fall within the Communist sphere of influence!

2. "*The blind application of so-called "good" principles.*"—"The British," writes *Time*, "would give Rhodesia its freedom only on condition that the nation's 4,000,000 blacks* be guaranteed control within the foreseeable future." Here, elsewhere, always, *Time*

* 50% of whom are 17 years of age or less!

implies that the way to a truly democratic regime is by means of a universal franchise. *Time* conveniently overlooks the point that, wherever this happens in Africa, the invariable sequence of events is that a small clique of black men gains political control and the state almost immediately becomes as fully totalitarian as Hitler's Germany. The sane person, however, fully appreciates that a universal franchise is by no means a Holy Cow, and that, if a man is to be entrusted with the vote, he should at least have the knowledge and competence to know how to use that vote wisely, which is the Rhodesian system.

3. "*The Double Standard.*" On page 66, *Time* quotes Section 26 of the Constitution of the State of California: "Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desirous to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses."

In other words, Californians believe that they can lease or sell, or refuse to lease or sell, their own property to whomsoever they like; and one wonders what Californians, or Americans in general, and *Time* in particular, would say if the American Congress, for instance, suddenly caused President Johnson's huge L.B.J. Ranch to be expropriated so that it could be divided, free of charge, amongst those Americans who have no land? There would no doubt be a public outcry of quite considerable proportions.

For a white man to deprive a white man of his land is wicked indeed. But for a black man to deprive a white man of his land?—there is, apparently, nothing wrong in that! There is one standard for black men, another for white men; and, imperturbably, and with apparent approval, *Time* reports: "The white man's fate in the new black African nations has not been all that bad. Kenya's . . . initial period of white panic and black exultation is past—a period that saw . . . thousands of European farmers who pulled up stakes and fled, out

of some misbegotten sense of guilt and impending bloodshed . . . Soon after *uhuru*, the Government of Jomo Kenyatta bought up thousands of acres in the White Highlands—at fair prices but with no refusal—and turned the land over to land-hungry Kikuyu families as part of Kenyatta's political debt to the tribe. Down came the trim hedges and the lofty stands of trees that the English farmers had so cherished; up went ramshackle huts and fields of maize. Many whites bugged out in despair . . . Tanzania, which as Tanganyika once had 22,700 whites, now has 17,000. Last year Julius Nyerere's oft-muddled government confiscated 34,000 acres of rich, white-owned farmlands . . ."

Just how nasty can one get? The white man's fate has "not been all that bad"—he has merely been stripped of everything he possessed, and only 5 1/2 thousand white men have felt it necessary to depart as virtual refugees from Tanzania, 19,000 from Kenya! And in what way can it be said that a white farmer is motivated by "some misbegotten sense of guilt" if, having been compelled to witness the foul Mau Mau atrocities, he declines to remain in Kenya with his wife and children when the reputed leader of the Mau Mau has become the head of the Government?

4. "*Distorted Sympathies.*" In the article from *Time* now under discussion, there are the following falsehoods concerning Rhodesia:—

1. "By law, white workers must be given preference over black." *There is no such law.*
2. "The overwhelming majority of blacks are only allowed to go as far as grammar school—'a waiter's education', as one African puts it." *False.*
3. Worst of all: "The Rhodesians are determined that the blacks will never rule . . . A constitutional conference . . . was held in 1961, and out of it emerged a new constitution that gave the blacks even greater strength in the legislature—15 seats out of 65—and set out conditions by which they might eventually compete for the 50 white seats as

well. The conditions: full voting rights for anyone with a high school diploma or a salary of \$739 a year. That was not what the settlers wanted at all."

Those that have read Chapter 6 of this book will appreciate that *this is nothing more than an outright falsehood* grossly prejudicial to the white Rhodesians; and one cannot help but conjecture as to *Time's* motives—the true facts being, of course, that the so-called "settlers" in fact accepted the new Constitution, in a national Referendum, by a majority of two to one!

If a supposedly responsible news magazine can mislead the public of the world in this fashion, what hope have the white Rhodesians for fair play at the hands of that public? Those who read this book, Britons and Americans particularly, might well pause, in the light of these comments, to re-examine their own presuppositions regarding Rhodesia and to ask whether they have not been seriously misled.

Indeed, press distortions concerning Rhodesia are so universal that one can hardly read an article in any newspaper in Great Britain without coming upon such distortions; and sometimes they are so subtle that, for a while, they may even mislead the Rhodesians themselves!

The following passage, for instance, is to be found in the editorial columns (page 1) of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of the 18th November, 1965:—

"And Britain must enforce her will: the Rhodesian Front Government had no case for assuming independence under the 1961 Constitution. This was never designed to take the Colony into independence.* It did not provide for adequate African representation in the National Assembly. The qualitative franchise ensured that the Government, by failing to expand secondary education, could keep the African voters on the upper roll (providing 50 seats out of 65) in a small minority for the foreseeable future."

Even a wary Rhodesian might be deluded into considering this an eminently reasonable and balanced argument, until he realised that, *in order to qualify for the*

* This is not what the Rhodesians were led to believe.

Upper Roll, an African DOES NOT HAVE TO HAVE A "SECONDARY EDUCATION"! This solemn assertion in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* then stands exposed for exactly what it is; and in view of Rhodesia's truly magnificent record for African education it is a particularly unpleasant inaccuracy.

One fact, too, which is passing strange, might well give the average Briton and American considerable pause for thought. The vast majority of the Rhodesians are of British stock—very many of them post-war immigrants. It is a well known fact that the majority of such immigrants are very "liberal" indeed when they first arrive in Rhodesia, but it is not long before they become very much more conservative. It is always, apparently, assumed in Britain that this change in attitude is attributable to a lack of intellectual integrity on the part of these immigrants—they are corrupted by the fleshpots. But these people are perfectly ordinary Britons—and to believe that they, almost one and all, lack integrity is not very fair. Is not another, equally feasible and equally reasonable explanation possible: that they were misinformed before they came to Rhodesia?—led astray by the British newspapers? *It is a near certainty that if all the supporters of the British Labour Party were to emigrate to Rhodesia today, nine-tenths of them would join the present governing party.*

Our examination of the manner in which particular periodicals handle the news concerning a particular matter, raises the whole enormous topic of "the Freedom of the Press"; but what is not generally recognised is that there are many different *kinds* of "Freedom of the Press". There is Freedom to print a fair and well-balanced rendering of the *truth*—and no-one cavils at this. There is Freedom *to make money* by publishing pornography and distorted sensationalism—which should surely be limited? And there is Freedom *to serve a political end* by publishing only part of the truth—readers may, again, be inclined to raise their eyebrows at this "Freedom".

The fact remains that the majority of newspapers are published only in order to make money—and, it is only too apparent, the more "exciting" the "news" that

a newspaper prints, the greater, by and large, will be the financial rewards accruing to that proprietor. And we the Rhodesians have to endure the singular misfortune that, since we live several thousands of miles away from either the United Kingdom or the United States, the unscrupulous newspaper proprietor can print almost what he likes and "get away with it". The average Briton, or the average American, has no means of checking in order to find out whether what is printed is true or not. He absorbs all the personal prejudices and distorted news of the newspaper proprietor in question, and he may not even be aware that he has done so.

And, in regard to Africa, the main false impression that members of the British and American public gain is that the African is in every way exactly like the European, except that he has a black skin . . .

It is not, however, only journalists and newspaper proprietors who are to blame for giving the overseas public a distorted vision of African affairs: the writers of books are often just as much to blame.

Sometimes a writer will make unpleasant, highly prejudicial statements that are just not true. For instance in his book *The Death of Africa* (Macmillan), Mr. Peter Ritner writes on page 97, in his Chapter on the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: "Lastly, 50 per cent of the land of Southern Rhodesia has been alienated to whites, and that which remains to the Africans is the inferior half—low, hot, infested with tsetse fly."

Now it so happens that one of my own favourite weekend haunts is the Chinamora Tribal Trust Area, which is approximately 25 miles from Salisbury. Many a time have I climbed Domboshawa and Ngomokurira in that beautifully picturesque stretch of country, which is a large area exclusively reserved for Africans—and which is *not* low, but of the same altitude as Salisbury; *not* hot; and *not* infested with tsetse fly. There are a further eight *large* Tribal Trust Areas (omitting small Tribal Trust Areas and Purchase Areas) within a fifty mile range of Salisbury—all with the same altitude, the same temperature and the same freedom from tsetse fly as Salisbury!

"After sixty years," Mr. Ritner advises his readers on page 107, "of docilely creeping around in the labyrinth of white society the African is still told that he must prove himself as a worker, but he is allowed to work only as a menial labourer."

If it were not so criminally prejudicial, I should find this sentence amusing—for, during the entire three years when I was practising as a barrister in Salisbury, one of my colleagues at the Bar, also practising as a barrister, was Mr. Herbert Chitepo, a full-blooded Rhodesian African!

It is fairly easy to nail the outright lie, but it is not quite so easy to deal with the half-truth—it is, indeed, with good reason that witnesses in Courts of Law are made to swear to tell "the truth, the *whole* truth, and nothing but the truth": sometimes the half-truth can be even more dangerous than the outright lie.

Mr. Clyde Sanger, in his book *Central African Emergency* (Heinemann) has this to say: "... In the meantime, the Native Land Husbandry Act has been passed which gives the African farmer an average of six acres* and will, when fully implemented, make legally landless a million Africans who consider that they hold communal rights in land although they have not necessarily been farming it. . . its—the Native Land Husbandry Act's—main result has been to force thousands of Africans off the land'. . . His (Burombo's) was the example which the younger Congress leaders, Nyandoro and Chikerema, followed ten years later when they fought the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act in the courts . . . The Southern Rhodesia Congress (spent) most of its energies fighting cases for farmers who were facing de-stocking under the Land Husbandry Act."

If ever there were a poisonous half-truth it is this one. Nowhere in the book does the author set out the real reason why the Rhodesian Government decided to introduce the Native Land Husbandry Act in the first place.** In the above excerpts, the Act is portrayed as

* Sanger omits to state this is the purely "arable" land—the farmer also had available to him residential sites and communal grazing areas.

** It is important to emphasize that this Act had, in terms of the 1923 Constitution, been specially reserved for the express approval of Her Majesty the Queen!

a most wicked measure, and the members of the African Congress as gallant Knights in shining armour opposing a wicked (white-spawned) Dragon.

Let us be charitable to Mr. Sanger. As a mere temporary visitor to Rhodesia, he possibly never did really find out why this Act was in fact introduced; but, before writing the above rubbish, so highly prejudicial to the Rhodesians, he should at least have made *some* effort to find out the *whole* story.

The true facts are as follows. By African custom there was no such thing as the private ownership of land—or, if it could be said to be owned at all, it was owned communally by the tribe. The traditional African mode of cultivation has been to till a patch of ground until its fertility was exhausted, and then to move on to another, virgin patch. This system worked very well in the early days when 21 1/2 million acres of land were set aside for the exclusive use of some three-quarters of a million Africans only: it did *not* work any longer by 1951 when the African population had increased to some 2 millions, even though the land reserved exclusively for the use of Africans had been increased by a further 8 1/2 million acres.

No virgin land was left in the African Reserves. Africans were ploughing the same land over and over again. No steps were being taken to protect the land so ploughed against soil erosion. The Reserves were being rapidly eroded; and, since they were already deserts of sand, it was becoming quite clear that if something were not done the Reserves would become, not merely dust bowls similar to those in the American West: the soil would be washed completely away under the thunder of the tropical rains, and *there would soon be left no soil at all*.

There was only one possible solution, and that was to hand over the responsibility for looking after particular pieces of land to particular individuals, and this is exactly what was done. Every Reserve was divided up into arable and pastoral areas. The arable land was then sub-divided into plots; and, in respect of each plot, the rights to the produce of that plot were given to a particular individual—in return for which, it was the

duty of the person concerned to contour-ridge the plot and take other conservation measures to ensure that it was not destroyed by soil erosion.

So far from being a wicked piece of legislation, the truth is that, *but for the Native Land Husbandry Act, the entire land surface of all the Reserves within Rhodesia would have been completely destroyed within a decade.*

To say that the Act "forced thousands off the land" is a particularly unpleasant half-truth. But for the Act, there would have been left no land at all; and the real cause of landlessness within the Reserves was the population explosion—there was just not enough land left to go round. And, far from the activities of the Congress being constructive, this organisation was simply seeking to make political capital out of an unhappy situation felt by everyone concerned to be unfortunate.

The reasons for the "de-stocking" referred to were similar. Any farmer in Africa will tell you that, if land is overgrazed, it becomes a prey to soil erosion. The simple fact was that there *were* too many cattle in the Reserves; the Reserves were becoming badly eroded; and de-stocking had become unavoidable.

Let us now consider a book published by the Oxford University Press in 1960 and "Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations." If any publication will give a totally accurate picture, this—one would think—would be it; and this book is *Year of Decision: Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960* by Philip Mason.

This work vividly illustrates how, not only is a "little learning" a dangerous thing, but that a "lot of learning" can also be a dangerous thing—if not adequately seasoned with first-hand knowledge. Mr. Mason's book is an excellent one—so far as it goes; but, not being a Rhodesian, he has not the background so necessary for the portrayal of the "whole" truth; and, by stating only the facts that lie within a narrow focus, he builds up a case against the Rhodesians where no case in fact exists. He compares, for example, the incomes of Europeans and Africans. Does he also compare their respective competence and educational qualifications? Does he draw comparisons with equiva-

lent figures for the monied classes in Egypt as contrasted with those of the *fellaheen*? Does he touch on the discrepancies in incomes in India, or in the other states in Africa? Does he bother to mention, for instance, that the gap between European and African annual earnings is some £500 *greater* in Ghana than in Rhodesia, or that average European earnings in Ghana are some 50% higher than in Rhodesia?—all of which goes to show that it is not necessarily any white "tyranny" that brings about the difference in Rhodesia, but the simple operation of the laws of supply and demand.

Such comparisons are, so it appears, in Mr. Mason's view irrelevant and are omitted, with the consequence that the picture he paints of Rhodesian economic affairs is highly prejudicial and grossly unfair to the Rhodesians.

On page 194, Mr. Mason writes: "The rebel (Rhodesian) Ministers continued to claim that they disliked Mr. Todd's domineering methods but were at one over policy. But his own view, that they thought him too liberal, was generally accepted by overseas observers and certainly by most Africans." —The subsequent events outlined in Chapter 9 may have corrected that impression.

Mr. Mason writes "The Public Order Amendment Act creates new offences of boycotting and intimidation... This offence may be punished with seven years' imprisonment." And so he lists penal provision after penal provision, rising in a magnificent crescendo to quote Churchill's words: "... the price of freedom is eternal vigilance ... " But Mr. Mason has not, as I have done, sat up half the night in the small cottage of an ordinary member of the African public, waiting for the expected petrol bombers to come ... He has not seen Crown witnesses grey with fear as they give evidence against their tormentors ... Above all—these poisonous literary half-truths!—where, O where, does he portray in adequate detail the campaign of terror with which this legislation was designed to cope?

Finally, on page 183, we find: "For certain approved Africans, however, it was enough to have a certificate which exempted them from carrying any other document; although this privilege was valued, Africans were often

bitter about it, saying it was merely one more pass under another name. The whole system was a cause of irritation and frustration."

True!—but why omit two other, very important facts, so leaving a one-sided picture prejudicial in the extreme to the white Rhodesians?

Why, firstly, omit the fact that the law obliges the European to have a Birth Certificate, which the African is not required to have?—and that the European is, on occasion, required to produce his Birth Certificate to establish his identity very much as the African is required to produce his Identity Certificate?

And, secondly, why omit the fact that, if there were not some such system for the registration of Africans, the country would soon be in administrative chaos? One reason for this is that the African, unlike the European, does not possess a surname, and he often has only the faintest notion of the true function of the European-type surname. Thus the son of John William, may call himself David John; and the son of David John may call himself, George David, i.e. each son in turn regards his father's *first* name as his own surname!

Added to which, Africans often have several names, and they use one or other of these names at whim. It sounds unbelievable, but an African client recently visited a Salisbury legal firm (not my own) on three separate occasions in connection with the same matter. On each occasion he gave a different name, with the result that *three different files were opened under three different names in respect of this one client's one matter!* It is this type of difficulty that makes the registration of Africans an administrative necessity.

Then there is *Prohibited Immigrant* (Bodley Head) by Mr. John Stonehouse, M.P. Again we find Mr. Stonehouse (who, as a British Member of Parliament, should have had a greater sense of responsibility than this) giving a completely false picture of the Native Land Husbandry Act. He writes: "Within a few months the (Southern Rhodesian African National) Congress found it was getting mass support, particularly because of its campaign against the Native Land Husbandry Act, which was forcing the peasants off their land. Mr.

Joshua Nkomo, the President of the Congress, voiced the feelings of most Africans when he said that the Act'. . . undermines the security of our small land rights, dispossesses us of our little wealth in the form of cattle, disperses us from our ancestral homes in the Reserves and reduces us to the status of vagabonds and a source of cheap labour for the farmers, miners and industrialists.' "

Stonehouse was obviously completely taken in! He apparently regards it as persecution that any African should be fined for telling women to disobey Native Commissioners when asked to establish fireguards, and for falsely telling a funeral audience that the dead man had been killed by Europeans.

He gravely quotes a Mr. K. E. Brown to the effect that "most of the African area is poor soil, usually the poorer types of granite sand known technically as Class III land, while the European area contains all the areas of fertile soil in the Colony . . ."—What Stonehouse did not know, and did not bother to find out, was that normally Africans *prefer* to live on the sand soil, because (1) it is easier to work, (2) parts of it remain wet in winter and can be used for winter gardens and winter grazing, (3) water supplies are better, and (4) it is far more attractive to live in—and, had Stonehouse but known it, far from being necessarily the most "poor" soil, it is the best soil in Rhodesia for tobacco, which is Rhodesia's most profitable cash crop!

"The houses (in Highfield suburb) are," writes Stonehouse, "controlled by the white authorities and if a worker loses his job his house goes as well."—These houses, in fact, are *all* under the supervision of a Government-appointed Town Manager; but, so long as the residents continue to pay their hire-purchase instalments, whether they remain in employment or not is quite irrelevant.

Finally, Stonehouse finds it extraordinary that Rhodesians should regard it as impertinent that a young man who has only been in Rhodesia a day or two should take it upon himself to advise the Africans of Rhodesia how to behave; nor, apparently, did it cross Stonehouse's mind that in certain circumstances exhortations to non-

violence may be interpreted as exhortations to violence. He found it remarkable that the Federal Government considered it necessary to deport him. This gave him a brief spell of international notoriety, after which he relapsed into the obscurity from whence he had come, although remaining for ever afterwards, however, an "authority" on Central African affairs.

Or, again, there is *Crisis in Southern Rhodesia*, a 40-page pamphlet by Dr. Terence Ranger, published for four shillings by the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau. Dr. Ranger is, academically, a remarkably intelligent young man who formerly held a post as a Lecturer in History at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. His pamphlet is very well written and full of illuminating facts and figures; and perhaps the most serious charge that he levels against the white Rhodesians may be summarised in the words he quotes on page 23: "In Southern Rhodesia, where land is abundant, half a million at least of the African people entitled to land now find themselves landless. The whole network of rights and duties in African family life is suddenly torn to pieces."

But is this *really* the WHOLE truth? The African population, he tells us on page 17, is increasing so rapidly that it will double every 23 years. But he tells us on pages 14 and 15 that in 1930, when approximately one-third of the total land surface of Rhodesia had been set aside for the African, and when the African numbered less than one million, the African people had even then only "been allocated an area just sufficient to allow them to continue the traditional methods of husbandry;* and, on page 18 he virtually condemns anything other than this "migrant" form of husbandry: "Conservation officers working in the European farming areas would never dream of advising continuous cultivation of sandveld soils."

If one-third of the land surface of Rhodesia will only accommodate one million Africans, where on earth is land to be found for the present four million Africans in Rhodesia?—and, more serious still, how is land to be

* He omits the point that the amount allocated was 30 acres for each man, woman and child!

found for those Africans when they have increased to *eight* million in another 23 years' time ? Added to which, Dr. Ranger has not thought fit to point out that the European's farming methods contribute to the national income, but the African farms, by and large, merely on a subsistence level. Transfer of land on a large scale from cash farming to subsistence farming would almost certainly have had a disastrous impact upon the economy of Rhodesia.

So much, then, for the pictures that various writers have drawn of Rhodesian affairs; but what I should like to emphasize most vigorously is that these five books that I have just reviewed have been selected entirely *at random*—they simply happen to be the few books that I have found conveniently to hand on my own bookshelves. *I AM CERTAIN IN MY OWN MIND THAT I COULD FIND AS MANY MISLEADING STATEMENTS OR HALF-TRUTHS IN ALMOST ANY BOOK HANDED TO ME PURPORTING TO ANALYSE LIFE IN RHODESIA, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE.* The white Rhodesians are tyrants in the eyes of the world, and writers tend to look for facts to fit that theory, rather than to deduce their theories from the facts.

To take another example merely because it happens to affect myself... in July, 1961, *The Times* of London carried a news item concerning an arrest that I had myself made personally in my capacity as a police reservist. *No press reporter at any time approached me to ascertain the facts.* Nevertheless, the man arrested was, in *The Times*, described as a "demonstrator"—in actual fact I had arrested him for suspected intimidation of other Africans.—There is, it is obvious, a world of difference between a mere "demonstrator" and an "intimidator." One can be a most likeable fellow: the other is merely a thug.*

Returning now to our broad theme . . . if, then, journalists, newspaper proprietors and writers alike should all, whether consciously or unconsciously, collude in painting a distorted picture of Rhodesian affairs, what possible hope is there of any ordinary member of

* "The Times" had the good grace to publish a correction.

the British or American public being able to make a balanced assessment of conditions in Rhodesia?—and how can their governments fail to share their misconceptions?

And, inevitably, the question also arises of *why* world fashions of thought should have changed from the Imperialism of the Victorian Age to the Ethical Insanity of the New Elizabethan Age. Perhaps the answer quite simply is that Darwin, Freud and modern Science have all in their various ways undermined the European's confidence in his own infallibility. Added to which, in this Age of Anxiety the modern European is not altogether convinced that his own civilisation is quite the success he once thought it to be. The Victorian believed that he knew what was Right and what was Wrong, what was Good and what was Bad—the New Elizabethan is not so sure of himself: he is inclined to think that the African may have better ideas than he himself has. And so perhaps his attitude in Africa unconsciously becomes "Hands off!—let's leave the African to see if he can do better by himself." (I do not say that this is necessarily the attitude of the *politicians*.)

Possibly, too, due to the slave trade and to certain undesirable aspects of colonialism, the West suffers from a "guilt complex" in regard to all things African—and there is, of course, that inevitable sympathy for whoever is believed to be the underdog.

Nevertheless, a child cannot be compensated for real or fancied parental injustice by the murder of those parents, and if he desists from exercising the utmost realism in the making of value judgments in such matters, the Briton is avoiding his responsibility.

The first value judgment that he *must* make is: "Is it desirable that I should do all in my power to prevent the countries of Africa from becoming Communist countries?"

The second value judgment that he must make is: "Is it desirable that I should do all in my power to give to the nations of Africa a *Westminster-type* democracy

or is it better for them that they should have the so-called African-type 'democracy'?"

If the average Briton or American is *not* prepared to make these two value judgments, then he is not entitled to enter into further discussions of the "ethics" and "morality" of the Rhodesian situation.

In other words, he cannot avoid making a decision as to whether it is better to have an oligarchy in Rhodesia that will steadily and inevitably evolve with the passage of time into a full democracy within the Western sphere of influence, or whether it is better to have some other form of government that will inevitably become, within a very short time, a full dictatorship on the Ghana pattern, and which will be very likely to fall into the Communist sphere of influence.

No Briton can, today, evade the responsibility of making these decisions for himself.

Now the vital change that has taken place in the United Kingdom's economic empire in Africa since the Second World War is that, whilst it previously rested upon relationships of *Power* (political power, backed up by military might), it now rests solely upon relationships of *Good Will*; and it is arguable that, at the present juncture, we the Rhodesians are merely the fatted calf with which Mr. Wilson seeks to delectate the nostrils of the powers that be in the African States.

Leaving aside, for the moment, all questions of morality—is this wise?

Suppose that Mr. Smith is destroyed . . . will this *really* ensure the Good Will of the African States towards Britain?—Mr. Wilson might do well to remember that once upon a time the White Man's Burden was merely to extend Law and Order—and to earn respect by so doing; today, the White Man's Burden is far more onerous, and consists in distributing unlimited sums in "aid"—and in being kicked in the teeth while doing it. Once upon a time it was thought despicable to be a beggar; in this modern world the undeveloped (we dare not say "backward") countries not only expect

aid, but feel that they have a *moral right* to it, whilst at the same time reserving to themselves the right to insult and injure their benefactors at will,* and to indulge in the constant moral aggression of all the time threatening to obtain that "aid" elsewhere.

For Mr. Wilson should face realities: the African States will only go on rendering such economic assistance to Britain as lies within their power just so long as it suits their book. Numbers of those states are already heavily saturated with Communism, and these will only continue to "play along" with Britain so long as it fits in with the designs of their Communist masters.

And Communist designs in Africa are quite simple: to eject Western Man from Africa so that Communist Man can replace him. The United Kingdom has most obligingly assisted the Communists in this regard by removing herself from such states as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. Communist Russia and Communist China are happily expectant that, with its most obliging ethically insane principle of loving neighbour *more* than self, the United Kingdom and American Governments will now assist by ejecting Western Man from Rhodesia; and—if Communist Russia and Communist China are fortunate enough—the United Kingdom and American Governments may even assist still further by ejecting Western Man from the Portuguese territories in Africa and from the Republic of South Africa.

No doubt a visitor from Mars might find it passing strange that the United States should spend American blood and money like water in Vietnam in order to deter Communism from spreading a few hundred miles further; but that, due to some strange ethical kink, that same United States should be seeking to clear out of Africa those very peoples and governments that could effectively and for ever bar the advance of Communism in that continent!

If Great Britain and the United States will only

* Tanzania is, incredibly, permitted to "break off relations" with Britain in an insulting fashion yet to go on receiving British aid!

pause to reconsider, they will appreciate that—in the context of global strategy—the only territories in Africa that can now with any certainty be retained within western spheres of influence are the territories south of the Zambezi—Rhodesia, the Portuguese possessions, and the Republic of South Africa. Whether or not it may be true that the Roman Empire committed ethical suicide, if Britain wantonly seeks to deprive these territories of their defences against Communism, there will be no doubt as to what Britain will have done.

If Mr. Wilson is indeed thinking in terms of global strategy, he will surely call a halt to any further abandonment in Africa of defences against Communism. This *can* be done; and I have, in my next Chapter, outlined the policy that it is open to Mr. Wilson to adopt.

CHAPTER 11

THOUGHTS CONCERNING A SOLUTION

I have, in this book, been compelled to say many harsh and unpleasant things, but those who—directly or indirectly—choose to harm my country can only expect to be so treated; and, although some of these individuals may have spoken or acted from the best of motives, it is as well to bear in mind the adage that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

In this Chapter, I propose to offer some thoughts concerning the solution of the present "Rhodesian Problem"; and, although events are moving so rapidly that what I write may well be out of date in some respects before this book is published, the very turn of events may conspire to cause my words to become all the more worthy of attention. Gentlemen like Mr. Clyde Sanger, Dr. Terence Ranger, Mr. John Stonehouse and Mr. Harold Wilson can, as mere visitors, afford to indulge in what one might term a "Pre-Raphaelite Ethical Outlook" in regard to the African and African affairs—mystical, mazy, romantic and totally unrealistic. Since Rhodesia is my permanent home, I am myself, however, if only for purely business and professional reasons, compelled to be a realist.

1. Britain's Share of the Blame.

If one is to approach the Rhodesian situation realistically, it is essential to appreciate that Britain is as much to blame for the present situation as anyone else:—

- (a) Successive British governments have had the power, theoretically at any rate, to disallow every single piece of racially "discriminatory" legislation that has ever been enacted in Rhodesia; and they have failed to do so.
- (b) Successive British governments have allowed it to be believed that nationalist organisations can best

"deal" with British governments by resorting to terrorism.

- (c) British governments have affronted the white Rhodesians by abandoning to their fates the white "settlers" in countries such as Kenya—even though successive British governments encouraged these unfortunates to "settle" in the first place.
- (d) The behaviour of the British Government in respect of the Rhodesian 1961 Constitution and the Monckton Commission was hardly calculated to win respect and trust.* It was indeed almost tantamount to a deliberate waiver of any claim to moral superiority.
- (e) The British Government has made it appear to Rhodesians that it is at least as much, if not far more, concerned with "World Opinion" and with "African Opinion" than with the ultimate fate of Rhodesia.

2. *African Nationalism's Share of the Blame.*

The activities of African nationalists are also as much to blame as anything else for the present situation:—

- (a) Had the African nationalists really had the support that they claim to have, they could have obtained 15 "B" Roll seats in Parliament immediately and possibly at least one "A" Roll seat (Fort Victoria). To obtain 25 % of all the seats in Parliament for a start is, one would think, not altogether unfair—the Liberal Party in England is surviving on far less.
- (b) What was also often overlooked was the "cross-voting" procedure contained in the 1961 Constitution, whereby the "B" Roll voters had a 20% say in the election of "A" Roll Candidates. It is clear that in any constituency where the "A" Roll voters were fairly evenly divided between the two major political parties, and in which there were only a relatively small number of "B" Roll voters, the "B" Roll

* It must never be forgotten that it was a government of the United Kingdom that destroyed the Federation, despite repeated undertakings to the contrary; and the Rhodesians have therefore no reason to suppose themselves exempt from much the same treatment.

voters could have had an influence out of all proportion to their numbers.

It must be remembered that it was quite obviously Sir Edgar Whitehead's considered opinion that the "B" Roll vote would be sufficiently effective to debar the Right Wing Parties from being returned to power in Rhodesia ever again.

Hence the leaders of African nationalism (if they do indeed have the popular support they claim to have) could, had they so chosen, today be Members of Parliament, having much influence in regard to the passing of legislation, and commanding the respect and admiration of the European and the African alike; and the steady, orderly and happy evolution of Rhodesia towards (to use Mr. Wilson's adopted phrase) "majority rule" would have been a certainty.

- (c) Finally, what has appeared to be the resort of African nationalism to terrorist tactics has been particularly inexcusable; and it has been this, above all, that has had the effect of "hardening" European opinion—if you treat a man like a gentleman, and he behaves like this, what are you to do?

By thus apparently resorting to terrorist tactics in order to seize political power for itself immediately, supporters of African nationalism have antagonised the European and done enormous damage to relationships between the races; whilst the intolerance of the two nationalist groups towards each other has seemed to indicate that so far from the prime concern of each group being merely to obtain "freedom" for all Rhodesians, their prime aim has been, in reality, to seize political power, with all its attendant material rewards, for themselves.

3. *The Mistakes of Mr. Harold Wilson.*

Prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Mr. Smith, Mr. Harold Wilson repeatedly stated that any agreement would have to be in accordance with "Five Principles", which were as follows:—

(1) *"The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule enshrined in the 1961 Constitution would have to be maintained and guaranteed."*

This was fully accepted by the Rhodesian Government.

In fact, the British Government itself and the African nationalists were the two bodies most responsible for any failure of the 1961 Constitution to work as well as it should have done. By its duplicity in 1961 the British Government antagonised almost the entire white Electorate, whilst the African nationalists engineered an African boycott.

(2) *"There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution."*

Mr. Smith offered a Treaty of Guarantee, which could have contained appropriate conditions. What more could Mr. Harold Wilson want?

(J) *"There would have to be immediate improvements in the political standards of the African population."*

By this, presumably, was meant that the qualifications for the franchise should be lowered.

It is difficult to conceive of a more consummately silly requirement.

A man is, allegedly, starving. You give him a plate of food. He rejects the food you give him with contempt, and yet demands to be given more (of the same) food. Why, in heaven's name, should he be given more food before he has eaten that which he already has?

As has been pointed out, if African nationalists in Rhodesia do indeed have the popular support they claim to have *they could already be occupying one-quarter of all the seats in Parliament*. If they reject these with contempt, why should they be given more—before they even make use of those available to them?

(4) *"Progress towards ending racial discrimination would have to be made."*

This sounds, *prima facie*, a most laudable principle; but Mr. Wilson neglected to inform the British public of one very pertinent fact: that, during his term of office, Sir Edgar Whitehead had combed the statute

books and—so far as I am aware—deleted all "prejudicial" racial discrimination save the Land Apportionment Act. —This was done by the Rhodesians themselves without any need for pressure from the United Kingdom Government.

Indeed, the only two "prejudicial" forms of racial discrimination that Sir Edgar Whitehead found to remain when he prepared his party platform for the 1962 General Election were the Land Apportionment Act and racial discrimination in public places; and I shall consider these in Section 7 of this Chapter.

(5) *"The British Government would have to be satisfied that any basis proposed for Independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."*

This is surely a clever piece of sophistry if there ever was one!

The British Government has repeatedly declared—see the passage from the Introduction to Command 1399 quoted on page 38—that it will *not* interfere in the affairs of Rhodesia.

Why, then, did it matter whether Rhodesia was independent or not?—Britain, allegedly, *could not have intervened!*

Secondly, such a principle is totally unnecessary. All that is required is the prohibition of prejudicial discrimination on grounds of race—then it is perfectly certain that the wishes of the majority *will*, in the long run, prevail.

Thirdly, in what way *does* one ascertain whether Independence is indeed "acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole"?

Having agreed, by acceptance of the principle of the qualitative franchise that "the people as a whole" are unfit to govern themselves in the day-to-day conduct of their affairs, does Mr. Wilson nevertheless still, with a happy-go-lucky illogicality, deem them fit to decide this, one of the most important questions of all?

—Or does the opinion of poor unfortunate illiterates herded like so many cattle to the polls by nationalist intimidators count for more in Mr. Wilson's opinion than, say, the opinions of the Chiefs, which reflect in

traditional tribal fashion the opinions of their people, gathered in day-to-day discussions following time-honoured custom?

These Chiefs must, for example, most certainly know—better than Mr. Harold Wilson will ever know—the feelings of their people at having to take to the hills each night, for weeks or months at a time, lest the terrorists should come knocking on their doors.

Mr. Harold Wilson's "Five Principles" were thus the cloud-cuckoo-land, up-in-the-air theories of the intellectual adolescent rather than of the serious politician, or—more seriously—of the man who is, from the start, determined not to reach agreement. In any event, can it be said that a man seriously intends to *negotiate* if he lays down his terms for agreement before the "negotiations" even commence?

In short, for reasons best known to himself, Mr. Harold Wilson, so it appears, *STARTED his negotiations with the Rhodesians by making agreement impossible.*

Finally, Mr. Harold Wilson suggested the "solution" of a Royal Commission—but on his return to London he immediately made it impossible for the Rhodesian Government to accept that Commission by laying down the following impossible conditions.

Mr. Wilson declared that (1) before canvassing the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole, the Commission would have to submit for approval, and acceptance by both Governments, an interim report on how it intended to ascertain the views of the people of Rhodesia; (2) the report of the Commission would have to be unanimous; and that (3) in any event, the British Government could not commit itself in advance to accept the report of the Commission.

Thus Mr. Wilson's "solution" was an unworkable Commission, one that would only be permitted to operate if its views supported those of Mr. Wilson himself, a "Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose Commission"—and, so the Rhodesians suspected, a Commission similar to the Monckton Commission in that its terms of reference and its report would be used only for the implementation of pre-determined governmental policy.

When Mr. Wilson returned to London, he was indeed extraordinarily naive. Apparently he overlooked the simple point that the Twentieth Century is an age of radio communication, and that the Rhodesians were hence well able to note the differences in tone and content between what he had said in Rhodesia and what he said in London; and they could hardly fail to miss news items similar to that contained in *Newsweek* of the 15th November:—

"In the drafty, stone corridors of the House of Commons, British M.P.'s were still chuckling early last week over 'Harold's masterly piece of brinkmanship'. Back from Central Africa looking fatigued but extremely pleased with himself, Prime Minister Wilson appeared not only to have dissuaded Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith from making a rebellious unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), but also to have persuaded him to swallow a highly spiced carrot called a Royal Commission—a three-man body to determine whether independence with a greater African role in the government would be acceptable to both blacks and whites.

Smith, however, was finding the carrot extremely hard to digest. For, even if he hadn't realised it, the 'Cowboys' in his Cabinet who want an immediate UDI had instinctively recognised that Wilson was setting a trap. And to prove them right, the British Prime Minister sprung it right on the floor of the House of Commons . . . "

This was a reputable American, not a Rhodesian, publication telling the Rhodesians that, once again, they had been tricked . . .

Finally, on the morning of the 11th November, 1965—on the day that Mr. Smith made the unilateral declaration of independence—Mr. Wilson telephoned Mr. Smith, tape-recorded the conversation, and then later released it to the Press. Mr. Wilson had quite clearly prepared in advance, most carefully, what he had to say; and this "showpiece" telephone conversation has all the unpleasant flavour of a police trap designed

to gather incriminating evidence for a subsequent prosecution—or for self-justification.

Now, Independence having been declared, Mr. Wilson takes the attitude that he refuses to negotiate with Mr. Smith.

Is not this an absurdity?

After all, even if you are dealing with gangsters, you do deal with the leader of the gang.

And Mr. Wilson has set a precedent of unpleasant abuse, unbecoming of a Prime Minister, which Rhodesians will find it hard to forgive and which will make the whole problem all the more difficult to solve. This I shall mention further in the next Chapter.

5. *The Appeal to "World Opinion".*

Some of my readers may be tempted to enquire of me whether I am not unfairly seeking scapegoats for the misdeeds of the Rhodesians; and they may be inclined also to believe that the Rhodesians must be incredibly naive to have allowed themselves to be deceived in the manner that has been suggested.

My answer to that is quite simple. Britons commonly regard themselves, I believe, as more sophisticated than the white Rhodesians (although in fact the majority of the white Rhodesians are of British stock). Britons also out-number the white Rhodesians some 500:1. Nevertheless, in 1939 the United Kingdom very nearly allowed itself to be led to complete disaster by Mr. Neville Chamberlain.

When Mr. Wilson appeals to the authority of "World Opinion" I am unimpressed. World Opinion permitted Hitler to rise to power. World Opinion, in those pre-war years, regarded Winston Churchill as an eccentric.

And when *The Times* of London writes of the "laager mentality" of the Rhodesians, I am equally unimpressed. What had *The Times* to say of Adolf Hitler when Adolf Hitler was rising to power? The photographs in Chapter 8 of this book should, by themselves, induce the Editor of *The Times* to consider whether, if he cannot be sympathetic towards the white Rhodesians, he cannot at least be polite—why descend to pejorative

epithets? Can he not at least concede the point that he *might* be wrong?

World fashions of thought come and go, and might not Mr. Ian Douglas Smith, a man with a somewhat distinguished war record, also just conceivably be right in his suggestion that Mr. Wilson is perhaps, unintentionally if not intentionally, a "fellow traveller" in that all the *practical* results of Mr. Wilson's policies will be of great assistance to the Communists in their aspirations towards world conquest?

6. *The Consequences of Mr. Wilson.*

To Rhodesians, Mr. Wilson appears to be coming near to being the puppet of the African States—perhaps it is not insignificant, and an adumbration of things to come, that the Lagos Conference should have been the first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held outside London.

There would appear to be four main reasons why the African States so dominate Mr. Wilson's mind:—

(1) *Mr. Wilson wishes to preserve the Commonwealth.*—But is the Commonwealth today anything more than a farce? Two members—India and Pakistan—have been at open war with one another (and Mr. Wilson has been so inept as to allow Russia to become the mediator between them); and two others—Ghana and Tanzania—have insultingly broken off overt relations with Britain, while continuing to accept *baksheesh* under the counter. Besides, is not the Commonwealth today an embarrassment to Britain in that it keeps her from her real economic home—the European Common Market?

(2) *Mr. Wilson wishes to retain British markets in Africa.* This factor probably dominates Mr. Wilson's thinking most. But is he not sadly miscalculating? Even if he sacrifices Rhodesia as a fatted calf to delectate the nostrils of the black Dictators of Africa, will this *really* make Britain's markets secure. No!—the African States will play off the East against the West just as it pleases them, and they will remain allies of the West only just so long as it suits their self-interest.

(3) *No doubt Mr. Wilson likes to live in harmony with*

prevailing world fashions of thought. The Churchills of history have dared to be unfashionable. Besides, the extent to which "World Opinion" has been deliberately manipulated is questionable—the ownership of the leading newspapers and periodicals of the world might make a most interesting study.

(4) *No doubt Mr. Wilson claims to be acting in the interests of morality.*

—*Really, Mr. Wilson?*

—Does Mr. Wilson wish to settle the Rhodesian question peacefully, *now*?—why, then, most significantly of all, does he offer the Rhodesians nothing save unconditional surrender. —Are Rhodesians truly only worthy of being offered the fate accorded to Hitler, Goering and von Ribbentrop? The Right Honourable Mr. Harold Wilson may find that men and women of predominantly British stock will not lightly submit to this.

And where is Mr. Wilson's policy (or lack of one) taking him? If Rhodesia becomes a Congo, how will that help?—I am not aware that rape, murder and arson have ever been constructive. Or, if Mr. Wilson crowns with laurel some local Nkrumah, will that *really* promote the cause of justice and freedom?—if he were to "win" (Mr. Wilson having made himself so much a lackey of the opinion of the African Dictators) would he have any other alternative?

Is there no danger, either, in descending the slippery slope of an African Munich towards a wider conflagration?—the appetite of the Afro-Asian *bloc* for appeasement is surely as insatiable as any in 1939?

Mr. Wilson has repeatedly declared Rhodesia to be no concern of the United Nations: on the 7th April he scurried to that body for assistance. He repeatedly extolled the principle of "one-man-one-vote"—is there one-man-one-vote at the United Nations? He stated in the House of Commons on the 31st December, 1965: "We have no intention of imposing a naval blockade on Beira": on the 10th April, 1966 (after the British General Election was safely over) he did so. He continually denounces the "illegal" Rhodesian government,

and yet on the 10th April, 1966, himself indulges in the illegal* seizure off Beira of the oil tanker *Manuela*. (In the First World War, the Kaiser—by illegally forbidding the world to trade with Britain—brought America into that war . . . was the position of the *Lusitania*, at that time, really very different from the position of the *Manuela* now?) Mr. Wilson refuses to support the United States in Vietnam, even assists trade with North Vietnam, yet expects the United States to assist her against Rhodesia. And he still dares not state the solution he seeks in Rhodesia?—is it that those intentions do not bear scrutiny? If he does wish to offer fair and reasonable terms, why does he not make these clear?—Can Rhodesians really be blamed for trusting Mr. Wilson as they would adders fanged?

What Mr. Wilson *has* done is to succeed in uniting the Rhodesians in spirit against his Government as they have never been united before; and, strangely enough, it is not so much self-interest that unites the Rhodesians as—contempt. They feel towards Mr. Wilson much of what they felt for the common enemy of Britain and Rhodesia in 1939.

And now we have Mr. Bottomley's hints of the 9th February, 1966, that, if sanctions do not succeed, resort will be had to force:—

"We are confident that sanctions will have the required result. But if they do not, it is not Britain alone, but the United Nations itself which will begin to look at this; and there are many ways in which the United Nations might determine that other measures could be employed to bring an end to this regime."

Afraid to be the Hangman himself of Englishmen, Scotsmen, Welshmen and Irishmen in Rhodesia, does Mr. Wilson intend to call in the Common Hangman

* Illegal because the United Nations resolution purporting to authorise that seizure was invalid for two distinct and separate reasons: firstly, the seizure was not, as is required by Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, as read with Article 41, necessary in order to maintain or to restore peace; and, secondly, the resolution was not, in compliance with Article 273 of the Charter, passed with the affirmative concurring vote of all the permanent members. — To base one's own case upon legalities and then to resort to illegalities oneself — when it suits one's book — is hardly likely to conduce towards the Rule of Law (and to peace) internationally.

—directly or by devious means? Then, indeed, will his historical role, as a minor Pontius Pilate, be assured!

—Can one have imagined a Winston Churchill, a Chatham, a Gladstone or even a Disraeli acting thus?

Need I echo the bitter words, spoken to Mr. Arthur Bottomley, of the Rhodesian Chiefs? —"All I can say is that, if you do, the time will come when the person who is about to die will point his finger at you."

7. The Essentials of a Solution.

Certainly Mr. Wilson's policy toward". Rhodesia has all the costliness and intrinsic value of the Emperor's New Clothes; and perhaps Mr. Wilson and his grave Councillors may not be able to see the solution to the "Rhodesian Problem" because of its very simplicity.

For a permanent solution there are only two essentials:—

- (1) The prohibition of prejudicial discrimination on grounds of race.
- (2) The provision of machinery to ensure this.

Providing these two requirements are met, there can never be anything other than a steady and fairly rapid advance towards "majority rule"; and I am confident that Rhodesians will accept such a solution. They can then be left to "get on with it"—to solve their own problems.

In order to achieve Point One, agreement can be reached that the Land Apportionment Act be repealed in regard to industrial, commercial and rural areas. This I believe the majority of Rhodesians would find perfectly acceptable, and it would obviate the need for legislation to prohibit racial discrimination in public places. African businessmen could, if necessary, themselves provide amenities for the African public; and—due to economic factors resulting from sheer weight of numbers—these amenities might well prove to be, in the course of time, finer than the amenities available to Europeans.

I believe that the majority of white Rhodesians would also accept a staged repeal of the Land Apportionment Act in regard to European residential areas; and

it might be accomplished, I would suggest, by some provision such as that if a man registers as an Upper Roll voter he is then entitled to live where he likes.*

A gradual absorption of the Tribal Trust Areas into the general economy is also desirable, so causing them to become non-racial and retrieving them from their present medieval stagnation. This could be accomplished by offers to finance development in particular regions in exchange for their entry into the general economy.

Each race should be able to attend its own schools, hospitals and recreational amenities—but the choice should rest with the particular individual concerned.

In regard to Point Two, Rhodesia cannot—politically—trust the governments of the United Kingdom any longer; and she must be given her full Independence.

I am quite sure, however, that the Rhodesians would agree to a mechanism whereby appeals could be brought to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against prejudicial discrimination on grounds of race; and this could be established by a Treaty of Guarantee—it is *political* interference that the Rhodesians fear.

8. *Mr. Smith's Position.*

Mr. Wilson would do well to appreciate that, at the present time at any rate, the only person whom the overwhelming majority of white Rhodesians regard as their representative is Mr. Ian Smith. The reason for this is, quite simply, that—I repeat—the Rhodesians do not trust the governments of Britain, and Mr. Smith is the first leader they have found who has "stood up" to the British Government.

It is a fallacy to assume that Mr. Smith is a new-comer to politics. He has in fact been a Member of Parliament continuously for some 18 years; and it should be realised that, in order to remain in politics so long, he must (a) have been a realist, and (b) he must be aware of the necessity for reasonable loyalty to Party.

* With steadily increasing African representation, even a further temporary retention of this Act would hardly be fatal.

9. *The Road to Reason.*

What, in a nutshell, the white Rhodesian desires most of all is the maintenance of standards.

In public life, he wishes to see a competent and honest Legislature, Judiciary and Administration; and he wishes, also, to keep Industry, Commerce, Mining and Agriculture equally free from incompetence and corruption.

In private life, too, he wishes to maintain standards: he wishes, for example, his children to have as good an education as his own.

These are very reasonable wishes, and it is clear that it is in the interests of white and black Rhodesians alike that high standards should be maintained—providing there is no unfair discrimination on grounds of race.

In short, all I believe that the British Government is entitled to expect of the Rhodesians is that they follow their traditional policy of equal rights for all civilised men, together with the opportunity to become civilised. The franchise qualifications in Rhodesia are already so high that they cannot be raised any higher without disenfranchising numbers of Europeans. Hence, providing there is adequate precaution against prejudicial discrimination on grounds of race, any provision against raising the franchise qualifications would be pointless.

At the present time, for obvious reasons, Rhodesians are inclined to regard commissions and conferences as the paraphernalia of the confidence trickster; and, in my view, the way to a solution is to be found by direct negotiations between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith, leading to a Referendum restricted to the present Electorate. (It is unlikely that, this time, any resultant constitutional amendments would be permitted to differ from the proposals in the White Paper whereby these proposals are placed before the Electorate.)

Britain can allay the fears of the rest of the Commonwealth by undertaking to inject capital into Rhodesia, so that with (1) prejudicial racial discrimination outlawed for all time, and (2) a booming economy, Rhodesia will (1) be on the road towards *true* "majority rule" and *true* freedom, (2) Rhodesia will remain a

permanent bastion against further Communist advance in Africa, and (3) instead of squandering literally millions* of the British taxpayer's money in causing misery and destruction, she will be creating a prosperous and happy country—and, in all probability, she will also be gaining a substantial return on her investments.

10. Conclusion.

I should like to conclude this Chapter by addressing certain remarks directly to you the people of the United Kingdom and you the people of the United States of America.

I have, throughout this book, confined myself to criticisms of the policies of your respective governments. But the people of a nation cannot totally disclaim responsibility for the actions of their own governments. I have myself personally opposed Mr. Smith's Government, at no little financial prejudice to myself and at some cost to my health, in two General Elections. Nevertheless, the sanctions directed at my country may well have the effect of injuring me personally as well as anyone else; and, were this country's economy simply to collapse, the civil disorder that might ensue might well place the very lives of myself and my family in jeopardy.

We are constantly under attack in your newspapers and periodicals, in books, on the radio and on television; and hence you are by no means entirely to blame if you have gained a rather distorted picture of our affairs. We are, after all, by comparison with the rest of the world, only an obscure little country tucked away in the middle of Africa, and you cannot be expected to know a great deal about us.

But it is with you that the responsibility for our affairs lies ultimately at the present time, and I beseech you earnestly, as Christians and as reasonable beings, to consider carefully what has been said in this book, and to take whatever steps you can to ensure that, for the future, your own government acts in regard to Rhodesia with Wisdom, Integrity and Justice.

* £4,000,000 for improvements to Dar es Salaam Airport, £80,000 per month on keeping the R.A.F. in Zambia, £750,000 per month for the air lift — and £2,000,000 per month if Zambia cuts her trade links with Rhodesia.

CHAPTER 12

P O S T S C R I P T

A book of this nature is never complete. No sooner does one believe it finished than other matters arise requiring comment or refutation . . .

1. *The Zambian Broadcasts to Rhodesia.*

Over the past few months *Zambia* Radio has been broadcasting incitements to violence, spoken in Shona and Sindebele, directly to the African people of Rhodesia; and Rhodesian monitors claim that these include statements by the members of African nationalist parties banned in Rhodesia.

Speakers have urged the Africans in Rhodesia to create chaos in the farming industry by killing cattle and "if you can't do that, maim them", and by cutting down tobacco plants; they have urged factory workers to strike, adding "You must make a note of all those who go to work. Find out where they live. They are lice—destroy them." Chiefs have also been described as "lice", and listeners have been urged to kill them, even if this involved serious bloodshed. The listeners to these broadcasts have even been urged to stone cars on the main roads, aiming at the drivers in order to kill or maim them.

Protests by the Rhodesian Government to the British Broadcasting Corporation and to the British Government have to date brought only a letter of acknowledgement from the B.B.C.; yet, despite its knowledge of these activities of *Zambia* Radio, the British Government has assisted the Z.B.C. to erect two further medium wave transmitters to supplement its broadcasts to Rhodesia.

2. *The Ambassador Hotel Affair.*

On the 12th January, 1966, three British Labour Members of Parliament were so singularly ill-advised as to hold a public meeting in the Ambassador Hotel, Salisbury.

One cannot but marvel at the folly of these three gentlemen. Mr. Wilson's Government was, and is, seeking to destroy Rhodesia economically; and the use of force has "not been ruled out". Yet they had the folly to hold a public meeting to which every Tom, Dick and Harry was invited; and they then proceeded to lecture their audience like Victorian school marms! In a less orderly community—perhaps even in Britain itself—they would have been tarred and feathered!

I was myself an eye witness, and recognised several of those present as individuals who habitually attend public meetings only to indulge in rowdy heckling. At the end of the meeting there was a brief scuffle, in which Mr. Ennals and about half-a-dozen people were involved, and which could only have lasted some ten seconds. Quite clearly the majority of people present did not even know what had happened.

Mr. Ennals was none the worse for the incident, and Mr. Ted Scrace and I had a most amiable conversation with him later that evening, during which I admired his sincerity, but doubted his realism—a sentiment which was no doubt mutual.

Mr. Ennals himself described the incident to the *Herald Africa News Service* in the following words:—

"Very quickly members of the Rhodesian Special Branch moved up and other Rhodesians round about shouted, 'Leave him alone' and moved in to protect me. I was then escorted to an exit. I think it was an accidental incident. If someone had not made a grab at my papers it would not have happened."

Nevertheless, Mr. Harold Wilson is reported to have said in a *prepared statement* in Nairobi:—

"I can only express my disgust at the fact that anyone who visits Rhodesia at present can expect boorish treatment. Rhodesia's Special Branch Police were obviously given orders not to interfere in a clear cut breach of normal standards of law and order. The incident can only have the effect of showing the nature of the problem which the British Government and the whole civilised world are facing in a country whose leaders have deliberately put it outside the law."

I find this comment unpardonable. Mr. Wilson must either have made it without taking the trouble to ascertain the true facts, or else he is guilty of a deliberate falsehood. To characterise, in effect, all Rhodesians—including myself—as "boors" is to introduce a singularly unstatesmanlike, childish and unnecessary note of personal rancour into Anglo-Rhodesian relationships, which can only do harm in the long run; and to say that this silly incident, in which Mr. Ennals was perhaps punched on the body once or twice and had a little beer spilt over him (the facts are not clear), shows "the nature of the problem which the British Government and the whole civilised world are facing" is such an absurdly malicious generalisation that it quite takes one's breath away. One may be pardoned, perhaps, for ceasing to hold Mr. Wilson in much regard after this.

For what an astonishing Ethical Insanity is this! What a thorough-going application of the Double Standard!

What of poor David Dodo? What of Moses and Batoni? Even poor Evangelista would have welcomed the slight hustling that Mr. Ennals received—in place of the Club, the Knife and the Petrol Bomb.

3. The Parable of Nigeria.

Far be it from me to gloat over the misfortunes of Nigeria since, of all the African States, Nigeria has behaved most responsibly towards Rhodesia; but surely the Nigerian Revolution is a parable that only the most unjust will fail to take to heart?

The communique issued at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference held in Lagos on the 11th and 12th of January, 1966, declared that the use of military force in Rhodesia could not be precluded "if this proved necessary to restore law and order".

Can there, in all the history of the human race, have been a more weird application of the ethical Double Standard, of the pot calling the kettle black, than this extraordinary Mad Hatter's Tea Party of a Conference?

Twelve victims of mob violence lay murdered in Lagos itself even as the Conference assembled—scores more had been wounded; and, within one week, the very convenor of the Tea Party, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was dead*—slain, so his opponents alleged, because of the very corruption and despotism of his regime.

With stern Gilbertian resolution, Mr. Harold Wilson closed his eyes to the corruption rampant in Nigeria, to the rigged 1964 elections, to the despotism blatant. Nigeria was government by black men: it was therefore, apparently by definition, a showcase of African democracy.

Dahomey's government might, on the *22nd December, 1965*, be toppled by a military coup; the Central African Republic's government might, on the *1st January, 1966*, be toppled by a military coup; Upper Volta's government might, on the *3rd January, 1966*, be toppled by a military coup; Nigeria's government might, on the *15th January, 1966*, be toppled by a military coup—but No!—to Mr. Harold Wilson these were no "breaches of law and order", no "departures from constitutional government", no establishing of "illegal regimes" . . . the four new Dictators were *black*: and so the Prime Minister of Great Britain, a Don Quixote with a stocky little Sancho Panza trotting at his side, left Lagos to tilt at the windmill of Mr. Ian Smith in peaceful, prosperous and orderly Rhodesia.

4. *The Object Lesson of Ghana.*

Seldom in all this endless flux of time and of event can History herself have scoffed more openly than at the Right Honourable Mr. Harold Wilson's travesty of a policy for Rhodesia.

On the 24th February, 1966, General Ankrah led the seventh military coup in Africa within twelve months (omitting the civil coup in Uganda, let alone mass murder and corruption elsewhere), deposing Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana, the *Osagyefo*,

* No Memorial Service was held by Mr. Wilson for Sir Abubakar. — Too embarrassing?

Victorious Leader, the Great Messiah, His High Dedication *et al.*

Yet, within one short week, by the 4th March—a little week, or ere those shoes were old in which he sought to win approval from the *Osagyefo* at Lagos—Mr. Harold Wilson recognised this newest African Usurper.

The Double Standard was applied . . .

Ankrah, who conquered Ghana with the sword without the slightest semblance of legality, was accepted: but Ian Douglas Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia, lawfully elected by a lawfully enrolled Electorate, is still execrated by Mr. Wilson "because" he heads an "illegal regime".

Smith is white: Ankrah is black.

5. *Words we Appreciate.*

With so many people in the world today with nothing better to do than to slander us, it is with profound gratitude and appreciation that we accept the words of those who, in recent months, have had both the honesty and the courage to be fair . . .

(a) We thank the British Conservative Member of Parliament, Mr. King, for declaring: "I have walked freely and unescorted in African townships where order prevails and the sight of a policeman is less common than it is in London."

The Zambian Government immediately declared Mr. King and his companions prohibited immigrants!—is there not a moral to be drawn from this?

(b) We thank Mr. Enharo, the Nigerian Editor-in-Chief of the *Lagos Daily Times* for declaring: "The overseas picture of Rhodesia as a grim, tense police state is a massive fraud. I was disconcerted to find the country so calm and free of colour bars."

Let me disillusion you further and confess that I was treated with courtesy wherever I went, although I knew that the reason for this is that the Rhodesian whites respect and place such a premium on education.

The moment they find that you can speak English, can read and write, you become what the Portuguese call an 'assimilado'.

I was suspicious all the way, and once even went out of my way to be unpleasant to an immigration officer who was taking his time over my passport. He apologised for the delay and handed the document back to me. I was flushed.

Another embarrassment I faced was the apparent absence of social discrimination in public places. I had a preconceived notion that there would be places barred to me.

Well, there are hotels in Rhodesia where Africans are barred, but these are the small hotels owned by small-minded, small-time hoteliers, mainly in the country."

(c) We thank Lord Salisbury for his courage in declaring bluntly in a letter to the *Daily Telegraph*: "Both (Rhodesia and Vietnam) are areas where the Communist Powers are trying, in their unrelenting campaign for world domination, to press back the boundaries of the free world . . . support for African nationalism is no doubt a convenient stalking horse behind which they can advance, but it is, for them, only a stalking horse."

(d) And we thank Dr. Banda (whom I have castigated elsewhere!) for saying at Lagos: "You talk of using force in Rhodesia. But who are the Rhodesians ?

They are Englishmen, Scotsmen and for that matter Irish too. Can you expect Britain to send an army made up of Englishmen, Scotsmen and Welshmen to go and kill Englishmen, Scotsmen and Welshmen in Rhodesia?

Is that reasonable, human or natural ?"

APPENDIX

THE MIDDLE ROAD

This Appendix is reprinted from the Election Manifesto issued by the Author when he contested the Avondale seat as an Independent in the Rhodesian General Election of May, 1965. It may be of some interest to overseas readers as the words of a Rhodesian speaking—at the time—only to Rhodesians.

It is the inescapable task of Statesmanship in Rhodesia to create of the diverse elements of this country a nation with a burning sense of national pride and loyalty, with an informed and responsible populace possessed of an intense conviction that Rhodesia is a country different from, and better than, any other country in Africa, and that not to be a Rhodesian is a misfortune beyond all measure.

This can only be accomplished by firmly establishing our political institutions and our economy upon an unassailable moral basis; by launching and maintaining—employing for the purpose every form of media—a mass education and propaganda (there is no other word) campaign of unprecedented magnitude; by vigorously upholding law and order; by raising standards of living and of achievement in every field of endeavour; and by taking to heart the maxim that justice without strength is self-defeating, but that strength without justice is contemptible.

1. *Standards.*

The retention of government in civilised hands is the only guarantee that standards will be maintained—including standards of legislation, justice and administration, and freedom from favouritism, corruption and incompetence.

I share the conviction that it may be necessary to raise the franchise in regard to educational, monetary or age qualifications; and I have no strong feelings about eliminating the "B" Roll and the "A" Roll cross-voting procedures.

These are, however, steps not to be taken lightly. The correct method is to have the position kept under observation by competent statisticians and to frame policy in the light of their reports.

But this is not enough: franchise qualifications cannot go on being raised continually—this, by itself, could only lead ultimately to the disenfranchisement of the entire nation.

No responsible government can therefore afford, secondly, not to utilise to the full the civilising possibilities of mass media, which will be considered in the next Section.

Thirdly, nothing is as likely to conduce towards contentment and a sense of responsibility in public affairs as personal prosperity—the man who is dangerous is the man with "nothing to lose".

Fourthly, it is essential that there be a square deal for every Rhodesian, rich as well as poor, because, with a substantial portion of the populace labouring under a not unreasonable sense of grievance, it is improbable that there can be that co-operation and resultant prosperity essential if Rhodesia is to progress.

Lastly—a small point—there is the time-honoured Latin tag: *mens sana in corpore sano*—a healthy mind in a healthy body; and if the Country Club proposals advanced elsewhere are implemented, they will do a great deal to eliminate that frustration that comes when sheer pent-up physical energy can find no outlet—it is incontrovertible that it is better that the populace yell at football matches rather than at political meetings, throw cricket balls rather than stones, and kick a football about rather than each other.

To sum up, a qualitative franchise is essential; but equally important, if not far more important, is the need to raise the standards of knowledge, of judgement, of living, and the sense of being fairly treated, of the masses—and, no matter how hard, how difficult, how well-nigh impossible, it may seem to be, this is the task to which any politician, who aspires to become a statesman, must set himself in Rhodesia today.

2. *Propaganda.*

The ruling party appreciates the importance of propaganda, but has chosen for its target the Electorate; and the previous Government's use of propaganda was unsatisfactory—the Build-a-Nation Campaign failed for several reasons, including a failure to define its objectives clearly, to make adequate use of modern mass media, and to keep to topics of general public interest by avoiding the problems of particular private individuals.

The first essential for a properly conducted campaign is to define one's "targets" which are—in order of importance: (a) the mass of the local populace, (b) the Western nations, and (c) the other countries in Africa.

The second requisite is to draw up a "syllabus" to be utilised in respect of each "target".

Thus the "National Syllabus" for Rhodesia should at least cover details of what every Rhodesian should know if he or she is to be able to cast his or her vote intelligently—such as the basic facts of economic life, how democracy works, how to recognise false propaganda, how easily freedom can be lost, and so forth. It must also inculcate national pride by recounting our achievements and by contrasting them with those of other states in Africa. In short, it must provide a basic mass training in good citizenship.

Once the Syllabuses are complete, then the talents of our finest creative minds, and the enormous resources of modern mass media—the press, films, radio and television—should be utilised to educate the masses accordingly.

Care must, of course, be taken that fair comment is not stifled; but our Government has no choice—unless it resolutely sets itself to counteract and to overcome the subversive radio propaganda even now beaming in from Zambia, from Tanzania, from Cairo and even from Peking, we shall be conquered before we have even started to begin.

3. *Productivity.*

The man who is prospering and happily preoccupied with his own business affairs is no revolutionary; and

the key to that door of contentment lies in the modern word "productivity".

We have unlimited supplies of electrical power, enormous natural resources, abundant supplies of labour—all we lack is an attitude of mind.

What Rhodesia requires is a High Command—a Productivity Council, such as was appointed in Britain after the war—that will wage war on Want by concentrating upon the increasing of Productivity, and of Productivity only.

It will, for example:—

- (a) Endeavour to create throughout the Nation the same "productivity-consciousness" as exists in the United States.
- (b) It will send teams overseas, as Britain did after the War, to bring back information as to how productivity can be increased in Rhodesian Commerce and Industry.
- (c) It will stimulate Mining and Agriculture by seeking to establish local manufacturing outlets for these industries.
- (d) It will advise on the encouragement of industry by the provision of inexpensive sites and amenities, by means of tax incentives, and by the provision of an appropriate tariff structure.
- (e) It will endeavour to rescue the Tribal Trust Areas, which comprise so large a portion of the land area of Rhodesia, from the economic conditions of the Nineteenth Century.

These are only some of the ways in which the National Council on Productivity will operate; and it may well be found that what has been lacking to some extent in Rhodesia heretofore has been, not so much capital, but that "productivity consciousness" possessed by the humblest working man in the United States.

4. *Justice.*

But all our strivings are foredoomed to failure unless our nation is in fact established upon unassailable moral foundations; and justice, in a political context is not so much an objective principle, but an attitude

of mind—a determination to share with Mr. Rhodes the capacity to see both points of view and to arrive at a reasonable and fair compromise between opposing viewpoints.

Those that have, through a life-time of hard and patient endeavour, earned pensions, savings, attractive homes and a gracious way of living must and shall have these protected—progress is levelling up, not levelling down; and in times of immaturity—in the schools; of weakness—in the hospitals; and in their private lives and recreational pursuits, Rhodesians are entitled, if they so wish, to live and move amongst their own kind.

Equally, it is only fair that every Rhodesian should be enabled—so far as finances permit—to make the most of himself or of herself; and that ability and achievement should be recognised and utilised—and even sought out—wherever they are to be found.

It injures the entire nation economically that any Rhodesian cannot establish industries and businesses wherever he wishes in the industrial and commercial areas of his homeland, subject—of course—to considerations of hygiene and of sanitation; and this applies to the Tribal Trust Areas as well. Every effort should therefore be made to remedy this position.

No businessman should be made to face financial ruin by being compelled unwillingly to open his doors to all; but others must be enabled to provide equally good alternative amenities.

In regard to places of residence, there are two opposite points of view, both honest and reasonable—the belief of one section of the community that it is entitled to the maintenance of those standards that have been so laboriously achieved through years of patient endeavour, and the belief of another section of the community that it is unjust that a man should not be permitted to live wherever he likes in the land of his fore-fathers merely by reason of that ancestry.

A fair and reasonable compromise between the two points of view is perfectly possible—such as that highly qualified men may live where they like; and I believe

that, although many of the Electorate may find this distasteful, they also have the wisdom to see that it is absolutely essential to be able to build a great future.

I have repeated on a public platform before, and I shall repeat again, the words of the great French Minister, Talleyrand: "Madam, it was worse than a crime: it was a blunder." Be unjust, and you hand to nationalism a creed and a cause worth dying for: be just, and you deprive it of ammunition, and you destroy it. Justice is the foundation upon which the greatness of our nation must be established; for, without it, you can satisfy the greed, but you can never win the hearts, of men—and the greatness of a nation lies, in the last analysis, in the hearts of its people.

A Conspiracy of Silence ?

Why not help to shatter that silence by sending "Rhodesia Accuses" to friends, acquaintances, organisations, influential people, booksellers, newspapers and periodicals in other countries!

* Residents of the Republic of South Africa may obtain copies of "Rhodesia Accuses" from their local bookseller or from any branch of the Central News Agency.

* Residents of other countries may, circumstances permitting, obtain copies direct from the Publishers at a cost of 9/6 per copy plus postage.

* The Publishers will, further, despatch bulk orders to destinations outside the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia at the following reduced rates—

- (a) For Orders of 100 copies or more: 8/6 per copy plus postal or freight charges.
- (b) For Orders of 1,000 copies or more: 7/6 per copy plus postal or freight charges.

* Trade enquiries should, in the Republic of South Africa, be directed to the Central News Agency; and, elsewhere, to the Publishers.

Please Use the Order Form Overleaf.



A. J. A. Peck, the son of a Rhodesian farmer and now a solicitor, was born in 1922 at Fort Victoria. He went to school in Fort Victoria and in Gwelo, studied Law and English Literature at Rhodes University, and Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oriel College, Oxford.

Politically, the author has consistently advocated a policy of moderation. In the Rhodesian General Election of 1962 he stood as a candidate for the United Federal Party. He again opposed the present governing party in the General Election of May, 1965, this time as an Independent.

The Author is both a Rhodesian and, most essentially, fair-minded and a realist in his political outlook; and the perusal of this book is a "must" for any overseas reader who wishes to understand the attitude of the average white Rhodesian at the present time.



THREE SISTERS BOOKS